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World War Commemoration and the Politics of the Union in the British Isles, 
1994 – 2016 
Charlotte Jade Kenealy 
 
The commemoration of the World Wars has frequently attracted controversy and 
widespread debate, revealing tensions and divergence between politicians, academics and 
other commentators with regards to the thematic justification, tone and narratives of 
commemorative events. Within the United Kingdom these debates have been complicated 
by the multi-national nature of the state. Here, commemoration can simultaneously draw 
on shared experiences of past conflicts involving all nations within the state as well as 
highlight divergent sub-state national forms of remembrance. 
In the UK, war commemoration has predominantly been based on widespread political and 
popular subscription to mutually inclusive narratives, rituals and symbols of remembrance 
involving all the nations of the UK. This, however, obscures the presence of multi-national 
asymmetries in ‘national’ forms of history, memory and identity. It also overlooks the 
existence of distinctive experiences and legacies of war that inform commemoration in 
England, Scotland, Wales and the island of Ireland. 
Additionally, since 1994 the UK has undergone a series of socio-economic, cultural and 
political changes, which have created different dynamics for the politics of national 
remembering. The advent of devolution in Scotland and Wales in 1998, the Northern 
Ireland Peace Process and resultant Good Friday Agreement, the election of the SNP in 
Scotland and subsequent referendum on Scottish independence, for example, all 
contributed to the creation of a new political climate in which the representation and 
commemoration of the World Wars took place.  
Through the adoption of a ‘Four Nations’ framework, then, this thesis seeks to 




climate impacted upon the tone and focus of World War commemoration from 1994 to 
June 2016, prior to the ‘Brexit’ vote. In this, it not only highlights the complexities arising 
from the multi-national nature of the state, but also adds a new dimension to our 
knowledge of official commemorative practices across the UK and its links to and 
interactions with the politics of the Union. This thesis is formed of two parts, consisting of 
five chapters in total. Part One focuses on ‘state’ approaches to and involvement in 
commemoration with Chapters One and Two analysing the Westminster Government and 
institution of the monarchy respectively. Following that, Part Two explores the approaches 
to commemoration adopted by the Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh devolved 
governments in turn. It will also analyse World War commemoration in the Republic of 
Ireland where it relates to the UK. This is due, in no small part, to the intertwined nature of 
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Introduction: The United Kingdom in an ‘Age of Commemoration’1 
Between 2014 and 2018, the United Kingdom experienced an intense flurry of 
commemorative activity intended to mark the centenary of the First World War. This 
included: national commemorative events to mark key dates such as the start of the War, 
the Battles of the Somme, Jutland, Gallipoli and Passchendaele, and Armistice Day; the 
multi-million pound refurbishment of the First World War Galleries at the Imperial War 
Museum London; a £5.3 million educational programme enabling one teacher and two 
pupils from every state secondary school in England to visit the First World War 
battlefields; and funding for the National Heritage Lottery Fund to support community 
projects marking the centenary.2 Additionally, the Government also provided funding for 
an official arts programme, 14-18 NOW. Throughout the centenary, 14-18 NOW  
commissioned 107 projects including Danny Boyle’s Pages of the Sea and Peter Jackson’s 
They Shall Not Grow Old.3 It also toured the United Kingdom with Wave and Weeping 
Window, which had originally formed part of Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red [See 
Figure 0.1].4 This evolving art installation, created by Paul Cummins and Tom Piper, was 
based at the Tower of London between July and November 2014 and saw 888,246 ceramic 
poppies progressively fill the famous moat, each of which represented a British and 
Colonial military fatality during the War.5 
                                                             
1 P. Nora, ‘L’ère de la Commémoration’, Les Lieux de Memoire, Vol. 3, (Paris: Gallimard, 1984-1992); 
P. Nora, ‘Reasons for the Current Upsurge in Memory’, Eurozine, 19 April 2002. Accessed at: 
https://www.eurozine.com/reasons-for-the-current-upsurge-in-memory/ [Date Accessed: 
29/09/2019]. 
2 Department for Digital, Cultural, Media and Sport Committee (DCMS), Lessons from the First World 
War Centenary: Thirteenth Report of Session 2017-2019, (House of Commons, 16 July 2019); D. 
Cameron, ‘First World War Centenary Plans’, Speech at the Imperial War Museum, London, 11 
October 2012. Accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-at-imperial-war-
museum-on-first-world-war-centenary-plans [Date Accessed: 18/01/2016]. 
3 ‘About Us’, 14-18 NOW. Accessed at: https://www.1418now.org.uk/about/ [Date Accessed: 
28/08/2019]. 
4 Ibid. 
5 ‘Tower of London Remembers: WW1 Centenary Commemorations at the Tower of London’, 
Historic Royal Palaces. Accessed at: https://www.hrp.org.uk/tower-of-london/history-and-
stories/tower-of-london-remembers/ [Date Accessed: 26/10/2015]. See also: 





Concurrent with the centenary commemorations, however, was significant controversy 
about the ways in which the First World War should be remembered and represented. This 
can be illustrated by the heated and highly polarised debate which took place in the press 
between then Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, and Sir Richard Evans, then 
Regius Professor of History at the University of Cambridge.6 In January 2014, Gove sharply 
criticised an understanding of the First World War that appeared to him to be based on 
                                                             
Remembrance? Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red and the Significance of Centenaries’, Cultural 
Trends, 27:2 (2018), pp.68-82 [Date Accessed: 26/10/2015]. 
6 It is notable that Gove and Evans had previously engaged in a public debate about Gove’s proposed 
reform of the English school history curriculum, which had generated major controversy in 2013 and 
resulted in the modification of the proposals. See, for example: R.J. Evans, ‘Michael Gove’s History 
Wars’, The Guardian, 13 July 2013. Accessed at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/jul/13/michael-gove-teaching-history-wars [Date 
Accessed: 29/09/2019]; W. Mansell, ‘Michael Gove Redrafts New History Curriculum after Outcry’, 




Figure 0.1: A photograph showing the Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red installation at the 
Tower of London. 
Attribution: Dom Crossley [NoDerivs 2.0 Generic (CC BY-ND 2.0) 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/] No Changes Made. Accessed at: 




popular television programmes such as Blackadder, which characterised the War ‘as a 
misbegotten shambles – a series of catastrophic mistakes perpetrated by an out of touch 
elite’.7 He continued by suggesting that there were ‘left-wing academics all too happy to 
feed the myths’ deliberately designed ‘to belittle Britain and its leaders’.8 Gove specifically 
attacked Evans, arguing that he ‘criticised those who fought... and attacked the very idea of 
honouring their sacrifice as an exercise in “narrow tub-thumping jingoism”’.9  
This provoked a robust response. Evans argued that Gove’s criticism not only represented 
an ‘ignorant attack’ on his work, but was also a demonstration of Gove’s own ‘ignorance of 
history’.10 Writing in The Guardian, he drew attention to the scholarship of a number of 
‘right-wing historians’, such as Sir Max Hastings and Professor Niall Ferguson, who were 
also critical of British military leadership, thus indicating that the discussions that would 
inevitably be had about the War during the centenary had ‘nothing to do with left or 
right’.11 Furthermore, Evans concluded by arguing that ‘defaming historians and others who 
think and write critically about Britain’s role in the First World War... is no way to conduct 
the debate Gove says he wants to encourage. He should be ashamed of himself’.12 
Similarly, Tristram Hunt, then Shadow Education Secretary and a trained historian, 
described Gove’s comments as ‘crass’ and argued that the ‘Government is using what 
should be a moment for national reflection and respectful debate to rewrite the historical 
record and sow political division’.13 Rather, he argued that ‘this year’s anniversary events 
                                                             
7 M. Gove, ‘Why Does the Left Insist on Belittling True British Heroes’, Daily Mail, 2 January 2014; T. 
Shipman, ‘Michael Gove Blasts “Blackadder Myths” About the First World War Spread by Television 
Sit-Coms and Left-Wing Academics’, Daily Mail, 2 January 2014. Accessed at: 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2532923/Michael-Gove-blasts-Blackadder-myths-First-
World-War-spread-television-sit-coms-left-wing-academics.html [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019]. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. Others from the political right, such as UKIP leader Nigel Farage and Conservative London 
Mayor Boris Johnson, concurred with Gove’s analysis, proclaiming the war as patriotic and just. 
Johnson, in fact, denounced the ‘intellectual dishonesty of the left’. See B. Johnson, ‘Germany 
Started the Great War but the Left Can’t Bear to Say So’, The Daily Telegraph, 6 January 2014. 
10 Richard Evans quoted in J. Brown, ‘Cambridge History Professor Hits Back at Michael Gove’s 
“Ignorant Attack”’, The Independent, 3 January 2014. 
11 R. Evans, ‘Richard J Evans: Michael Gove Shows His Ignorance of History – Again’, The Guardian, 6 
January 2014. 
12 Ibid. 




need to reflect and embrace the multiple histories that the War evinces – from the Royal 
British Legion to the National Union of Railwaymen to the Indian, Ethiopian and Australian 
servicemen fighting for the empire’.14 
The commemoration of this anniversary and the extensive discussion that surrounded it 
raises a number of points that are central to this thesis. In the first instance, it highlights 
the extent to which the commemoration of the World Wars has attracted significant 
controversy and caused widespread debate, revealing tensions and divergence between 
politicians, academics and other commentators with regards to the thematic justification, 
tone and narrative of commemorative events. As such, it also draws attention to the way in 
which political ideology can interact with the commemoration of the World Wars and how 
the legacy and memory of these events often serves in contemporary Britain ‘as a proxy for 
current identity politics’.15 It also illustrates the fact that although the events are receding 
into the more distant past, with few people left to remember them directly, memories of 
the First – and Second – World Wars remain ubiquitous in the British national 
consciousness. The images, myths and narratives of war are frequently invoked in both 
political and public discourse as well as featuring prominently in British popular culture. 
This commemorative activity, in fact, should be understood as part of a wider phenomenon 
known as a ‘memory boom’, or what Pierre Nora has referred to as an ‘age of 
commemoration’, which has seen an intensification of commemorative activity over the 
                                                             
14 Hunt, ‘Michael Gove, Using History for Politicking is Tawdry’; Johnson responded to Hunt’s 
comments by demanding his resignation and accusing him of denying that German militarism ‘was 
at the root of the First World War’. See Johnson, ‘Germany Started the Great War but the Left Can’t 
Bear to Say So’; G. Graham, ‘Boris Johnson: Tristram Hunt Should Resign Over First World War 
Comments’, The Telegraph, 6 January 2014. Accessed at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/10552981/Boris-Johnson-Tristram-Hunt-
should-resign-over-First-World-War-comments.html [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019]; M. Chorley, ‘Why 
Won’t the Left Blame Germany for the First World War? Boris Johnson Calls for Labour’s Education 
Spokesman to Resign in Row Over How to Mark Great War’s Centenary’, Daily Mail, 6 January 2014. 
Accessed at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2534582/Boris-Johnson-Why-left-say-
German-blame-First-World-War.html [Date Accessed: 29/09/2019]. 
15 H. Jones, ‘Goodbye to All That? Memory and Meaning in the Commemoration of the First World 




last three decades.16 Since the 1990s, there has not only been a proliferation of public 
interest in the World Wars and the various cultural and political dimensions of war 
memory, but also a distinctive shift in the focus, forms and practices of war 
commemoration. 
This, in part, appears to be a response to Britain’s changing demographics and the gradual 
dying out of the First and, increasingly, Second World War generations.17 For example, 
when the last serving British combatants of the First World War, Henry Allingham and 
Harry Patch, died in 2009, The Economist ran a headline which declared that the conflict 
had shifted ‘from memory to history’.18 Although the extent to which this is true has been 
debated, the headline revealed not only the perceived inter-relationship between history 
and memory, but also consternation that not enough people had an understanding of, or 
cared about, the events. This, in turn, appeared to tap into concerns about the value of 
remembrance and, consequently, the necessity of commemoration. Furthermore, there 
has been an increasing number of major anniversaries, marking key military events of the 
Wars, whose profile has been amplified by the news media.19 This has both enhanced the 
public visibility of such commemorative events and created further opportunities for the 
contestation and analysis of dominant narratives and their contemporary meanings. 
Additionally, the UK’s involvement in a series of conflicts in the last two to three decades 
has further raised the profile of the military. This, in turn, has led politicians, veteran’s 
associations and the media to encourage greater public recognition of and engagement 
                                                             
16 Nora, ‘L’ère de la Commémoration’;  Nora, ‘Reasons for the Current Upsurge in Memory’; See also 
J. Beaumont, ‘The Politics of Memory: Commemorating the Centenary of the First World War’, 
Australian Journal of Political Science, 50:3 (2015), pp.529-530; J. Winter, ‘The Generation of 
Memory: Reflections on “The Memory Boom” in Contemporary Historical Studies’, Raritan, 21:1 
(2001), pp.52-66; J. Winter, Remembering War: The Great War and Historical Memory in the 
Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
17 A. Mycock, ‘The Politics of the Great War Centenary in the United Kingdom’ in S. Sumartojo & B. 
Wellings (eds), Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration: Mobilising the Past in Europe, 
Australia and New Zealand (Oxford: Peter Lange, 2014), p.101; T.G. Ashplant, G. Dawson & M. 
Roper, The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration (London: Routledge, 2000), p.4. 
18 ‘From Memory to History’, The Economist, 393: 8662 (19 December 2009), pp.51-53. 
19 Mycock, ‘The Politics of the Great War Centenary’, pp.101-102; Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, The 




with war commemoration.20 It is striking, however, that this has coincided with a reduction 
in funding for the Armed Forces and veterans as well as the disbanding of historic 
regiments. 
This speaks to a new stage in the commemoration of the World Wars.21 A greater temporal, 
emotional and political distance has now meant that, as we are increasingly removed from 
the events themselves, commemoration has become less about direct mourning and grief. 
Rather, it is increasingly driven by a politics of the present and contemporary political 
concerns, which have evolved in response to the changing socio-economic, cultural and 
political circumstances outlined above.   
 
The Politics of War Commemoration and the ‘Four Nations’ 
In the modern era, the ‘nation-state’ has been the primary agent for the interpretation, 
articulation and mobilisation of war commemoration and remembrance.22 This is due, in 
part, to the fact that war has been central to its identity and is seen to establish a symbolic 
continuity between the past, present and future of the nation-state.23 As T.G. Ashplant, 
Graham Dawson and Michael Roper have argued the commemoration of war, is a ‘key 
element in the symbolic repertoire available to the nation-state for binding its citizens into 
a collective national identity’.24 
                                                             
20 Mycock, ‘The Politics of the Great War Centenary’, p.102. 
21 It is worth noting that this claim is relevant to the commemoration of the World Wars specifically 
and notes that a wider chronology and thematic range may lead to more complex conclusions. This 
thesis also writes in full awareness of the historic inter-relationship between the commemoration of 
war and contemporary concerns. 
22 A. Mycock, S. Sumartojo & B. Wellings, “The Centenary to End all Centenaries”: The Great War, 
Nation and Commemoration’ in Sumartojo & Wellings, Nation, Memory and Great War 
Commemoration, p.10; Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, The Politics of War Memory and 
Commemoration, p.21. 
23 Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration, p.21. They suggest 
that the ongoing political vitality of war memory and commemoration is intimately related to the 
formation of some nation-states and to the basis of enduring conflicts, identities and traditions of 
political life in others. See also B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006). 




This has meant, however, that the commemoration of war has frequently been founded on 
‘dominant or hegemonic state-approved historical narratives’, which recognise and 
incorporate particular memories of war while simultaneously marginalising or forgetting 
others.25 The significance of previous wars can also be reworked retrospectively, in 
accordance with the political requirements of the present.26 State formations and political 
parties or movements are, therefore, all involved in constructing versions of the national 
past.27 They rework ‘the repertoire of national stories and symbols to fashion effectively 
useable public memories for their particular ends and purposes’.28 
This is indicative of the way in which commemoration has been and largely remains 
primarily a ‘political’ project. As Andrew Mycock has identified, the state, and its 
institutions, ‘mediate and order formal and informal collective memories and histories’ in 
the promotion of a unitary national identity.29 This process, however, is inherently multi-
faceted and highly contentious. The intimate relationship between ‘collective’ national 
forms of memories or histories and the present, in fact, has meant that they are not only 
subject to processes of selection but also susceptible to appropriation, manipulation and 
politicisation.30 It is perhaps for this reason that disputes over the interpretation, framing 
and commemoration of past conflicts have become a significant component of the 
emotionally charged debates known as ‘history’ or ‘memory’ wars. These contests, which 
have emerged as an increasingly persistent facet of public discourse, have also often been 
linked to wider politicised discussions about political, cultural and socio-economic issues.31 
                                                             
25 Mycock, Sumartojo & Wellings, “The Centenary to End all Centenaries” in Sumartojo & Wellings, 
Nation, Memory and Great War Commemoration, p.10. 
26 Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration, p.53. 
27 Ibid, p.16. 
28 Ibid, p.7. 
29 A. Mycock, ‘The First World War Centenary in the UK: “A Truly National Commemoration?”, The 
Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 103:2 (2014), p.154.  
30 P. Nora, ‘Recent History and the New Dangers of Politicisation’, Eurozine, 24 November 2011. 
Accessed at: http://www.eurozine.com/recent-history-and-the-new-dangers-of-politicization/  [Date 
Accessed: 29/08/2019] and P. Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire’, 
Representations, 26 (1989), p.8; See also: ‘Mycock, ‘The First World War Centenary’, p.154; 
Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration, p.16, 20, 53; 
Beaumont, ‘The Politics of Memory: Commemorating the Centenary of the First World War’, p.531. 




This is illustrative of the significant complexities that exist relating to history, memory and 
the commemoration of war. Within the United Kingdom, this is further complicated by the 
multi-national nature of the state. World War commemoration can simultaneously draw on 
‘shared experiences of past conflicts’ connecting all the nations of the United Kingdom 
whilst also highlighting ‘distinctive or divergent sub-state national forms of remembrance’ 
based on conflicting or alternative ‘constructions of official and unofficial history and 
memory’.32  
The commemoration of the World Wars in the United Kingdom, however, has 
overwhelmingly been framed on what are perceived to be shared experiences and 
memories of past conflicts.33 This has largely been based on widespread political and 
popular subscription to ‘mutually inclusive narratives, rituals and symbols of remembrance’ 
involving each of the nations of the state.34 Generalisations about the universal nature of 
‘British’ experiences of war and the conflation of ‘British’ and ‘English’ narratives, however, 
often obscure the existence of ‘multi-national asymmetries’ in ‘national’ forms of history, 
memory and identity.35 As a result, it frequently overlooks the distinctive experiences and 
legacies of war in the home nations that inform the nature of war commemorations, which 
while interconnected are not necessarily homogeneous.36  
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In recent years, however, the United Kingdom has undergone (and continues to 
experience) a series of socio-economic, cultural and political changes, which have created 
different dynamics for the politics of national remembering. A key component of this 
broader shift is the perceived ‘decline’ of the United Kingdom – an increasing separation 
between the United Kingdom’s constituent parts, in political, popular and academic 
discourse – and the rediscovery of what Richard Weight has termed ‘core’ national 
identities.37 Within this, developments such as the advent of devolution in both Scotland 
and Wales in 1998, the Northern Ireland Peace Process and resultant Good Friday 
Agreement, the election victory of the Scottish National Party in Scotland in 2007 and 2011 
and, later, the Scottish independence referendum have contributed to the creation of a 
new political climate in which the representation and commemoration of war now takes 
place. 
This raises the possibility that throughout the United Kingdom commemorative narratives, 
forms and practices are diverging during the period under consideration in this thesis. This 
thesis, then, is concerned with the extent to which both the multi-national nature of the 
United Kingdom and the changing political climate have impacted the tone and focus of 
World War commemoration. It aims to draw attention to the complexities arising from the 
politics of the union and add a new dimension to our knowledge of official, state-led 
commemorative practices by exploring the approaches adopted by the Scottish, Welsh and 
Northern Irish devolved governments in addition to that of Westminster. It is also worth 
noting that, due to complexities relating to the history and politics of the island of Ireland, 
references to the Republic of Ireland have been included where they pertain to 
developments in Northern Ireland. It is for this reason that the title of the present thesis 
refers to the ‘British Isles’. It will argue that, on the most fundamental level, there existed a 
close relationship between the commemoration of the World Wars and the politics of the 
union. This, however, was frequently determined by the political climate as well as the 
political agendas present in each individual nation at any given time. 
                                                             




Specifically, this thesis seeks to examine this premise by exploring World War 
commemoration between the years 1994 and 2016. In the United Kingdom, 1994, which 
constitutes the starting point under consideration, witnessed the coincidence of the 
eightieth anniversary of the start of the First World War and the fiftieth anniversary of the 
D-Day landings with the start of the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. It has deliberately 
chosen the end point as June 2016 in recognition of the complexities and uncertainty that 
continue to surround what has become known as ‘Brexit’, following the United Kingdom’s 
vote to ‘Leave’ the European Union. 
 
Historiography 
In order to gain a more nuanced understanding of the issues presented above, this thesis 
intends to both build upon and bridge two strands of historiography. On one side sits the 
ever-growing body of scholarship on memory, history and, more specifically, the 
commemoration of the World Wars. On the other side, is a body of literature, often 
referred to as ‘New British History’ or ‘Four Nations History’. 
i. Memory, History and the Commemoration of the World Wars 
Any study of commemoration should first be situated within the context of memory 
studies. The study of memory, which starts with the conviction that both memory and 
commemoration have histories of their own, has experienced sustained growth matched 
by few other fields of historical enquiry, seeing a proliferation of academic research and 
critical enquiry.38 
In this so-called ‘memory boom’ the ‘rediscovery’ of Maurice Halbwachs’ work and his 
concept of collective memory in the 1980s was particularly influential, providing a template 
for early scholars working on memory.39 Halbwachsian collective memory is predicated on 
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the notion that ‘it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in 
society that they recall, recognise and localise their memories’.40 In this way, Halbwachs 
argued, individual memory is understood only through a group context; the group 
constructs the memory and the individuals do the work of remembering.41 In turn, these 
social dynamics render collective memory as changeable and so distinct from history. 
Significantly, Halbwachs claimed that collective memory was informed by the political and 
social realities of the day.42 He also explored the ways in which present concerns determine 
what and how we remember the past.43 
The study of commemoration is equally indebted to Pierre Nora, who expanded on 
Halbwachs’ concept.44 He contended that collective memory is used by groups to interpret 
the past, but that these memories become detached from that past.45 Furthermore, Nora 
argued that groups reconstruct a certain past in order to explain the present .46 These 
groups choose which events are remembered and, therefore, those that are forgotten. 
Subsequently, events are re-arranged and traditions invented in order to conform to a 
specific narrative. Benedict Anderson has referred to this forgetting as ‘collective amnesia’, 
while Guy Beiner has contended that the deliberate erasing of certain dimensions of the 
past is an integral component of memory.47 Beiner states that this ‘social forgetting’ is 
simply a mode of social memory that hinges on ‘multi-layered dialectical relationships 
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between oblivion and remembrance’.48 This idea is reminiscent of Ernest Renan’s iconic 
statement in Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation?  that collective forgetting is essential to the 
formation of national identity.49 
Nora, however, is perhaps best known for his defining concept ‘les lieux de memoire’ or 
‘sites of memory’, which has transformed the way scholars have approached the question 
of ‘memory’ by significantly expanding the notion of what constitutes remembering and 
opening up the field to comparative analysis.50 He defined these ‘sites of memory’ broadly 
as particular locations, objects or concepts – places, sculptures, museums, images, texts, 
symbols, rituals, people, events, anniversaries, speeches and more – that come to be 
associated with particular ideas about the past.51 In an argument that is now familiar, Nora 
maintained that the purpose of such a ‘site’ is to express the will to remember, whether it 
be on the part of a local community or at the level of a nation-state, and thus, in Nora’s 
own words, ‘stop time, to block the work of forgetting, to establish a state of things, to 
immortalise death [and] to materialise the immaterial’.52 In this, Nora not only highlights 
that memory is a construct, but also contends that it is created by a complex interplay 
between a sense of the past and a sense of the present.53 It is perhaps also worth noting 
that, in his Theatres of Memory, Raphael Samuel made a similar case to that of Halbwachs 
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and Nora. He argued that memory is ‘historically conditioned’ and changes according to the 
influences of the present.54 
The subject of war – in particular the First and Second World Wars - has been at the centre 
of the emergence and development of ‘memory studies’ as a field of historical study. 
Consequently, there now exists an enormous and ever-growing body of scholarship 
dedicated to an examination of the memory of past conflicts and their commemoration. 
This proliferation of academic research has accompanied heightened levels of public 
interest in the phenomena of war memory, as discussed above, and also reflected upon 
these developments. As such, it has contributed to the further widening of public interest. 
The continuing influence of Paul Fussell’s pioneering work The Great War and Modern 
Memory, published in 1975, is testament to this growth of interest in memory and war. 
Focusing on the ’literary means by which [war] has been remembered, conventionalised 
and mythologised’, Fussell opened up the complexities of remembering by analysing the 
ways in which the imagery of the Great War became inscribed within British culture and 
society.55 He convincingly argued that the Great War generated new images which have 
since become part of the fibre of our own lives.56 Despite the fact Fussell was later 
criticised for universalising ‘modern memory’ from the experiences of a socially select 
range of British writers, Leonard V. Smith writes that Fussell’s work remains important for 
its ‘ability to reformulate or re-inscribe pre-existing ways of understanding’.57 
In addition, as Stephen Heathorn has argued, the importance Fussell placed on memory in 
the twentieth century has remained a ‘suggestive insight’.58 A similar approach was taken 
by Jay Winter in his seminal work Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The Great War in 
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European Cultural History.59 As well as drawing on Fussell’s work, the use of ‘sites of 
memory’ in the title highlights that Winter was also influenced by Nora’s ‘les lieux de 
memoire’ paradigm outlined above. In this work, which is important for its use of a 
comparative rather than nationally-focused approach, Winter examines memory as an 
expression of mourning in both its public and private manifestations.60 Through analysis of 
cultural, social and artistic activity during and after the Great War across Europe (primarily 
focused on England, France and Germany), he contends that bereavement was the central 
‘universal’ experience of Europeans in the aftermath of war.61 Significantly, Winter also 
challenges the conventional view that the First World War represented a cultural 
watershed definitively ending the long nineteenth century.62 Rather, he contends that it 
resulted in an ‘avalanche’ of distinctly un-modern commemorative modes because 
traditional frames of reference, with their familiar and comforting images and values, were 
necessary to inspire patriotism and mediate grief.63 For Winter, it was the ‘cataclysm’ of 
the Second World War that modernised memory and, therefore, brought on the ‘culture of 
trauma and silence’.64 Winter’s thesis, then, has powerful implications for the significance 
of commemorative rituals and war memorials as well as highlighting the need to 
understand how the representation of war has been received as a whole.  
Following Fussell and Winter, a number of recent works have also explored war memory.65 
In 1997, for example, Martin Evans and Kenneth Lunn published a collection of essays 
entitled War Memory in the Twentieth Century. This work, originally presented at an 
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interdisciplinary conference at the University of Portsmouth in 1994, sought to examine the 
complexities of war memories in the twentieth century, their function, construction and 
how they ‘relate to concepts of national identity’.66 In this, it aimed to raise fundamental 
questions about different processes of memorialisation. 
This is also exemplified by the scholarship of historians such as Alex King, Catherine 
Moriarty and Adrian Gregory, which is primarily concerned with the ceremonies and 
memorials established to commemorate the war dead. In his detailed work, for example, 
King analyses the production and reception of war memorials in inter-war Britain.67 He 
seeks to examine the variety of ways in which people interpreted commemorative symbols 
and reconstruct the meaning of commemoration for contemporaries by analysing the 
creative processes involved in remembering the dead.68 Ultimately, King concludes that 
commemoration was concerned with far more than mourning those who died and, in fact, 
became essentially a political act.69 
Similarly, Moriarty has analysed the ‘processes and currents of influence at work in the 
building and reception’ of First World War memorials and their commemorative 
ceremonies.70 She argues that as ‘the most public component of the material culture of war 
remembrance’ war memorials ‘occupied a space between the public and the private’.71 This 
created a complex relationship between public and private memories that were 
simultaneously informing and informed by the commemoration of the war dead. It is this 
which leads Moriarty to conclude that memorials were ‘composite sites [of memory]’ 
where it was possible to adopt ‘many possible readings’ beyond just the commemorative.72 
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In The Silence of Memory, Gregory analyses the creation and contestation of meanings 
surrounding commemorative ceremonies, with a particular emphasis on Armistice Day.73 
He argues that Armistice Day and the two minutes’ silence were supposed to be 
transforming experiences, which both unified the nation in a shared remembrance of the 
dead and re-dedicated the nation to honouring their memory.74 Within this study, Gregory 
also highlights the increasing marginalisation of the role of veterans within these 
commemorations as the meanings of Armistice Day evolved.75 
In all of these works it is notable that an analysis of war memorials is often used as a 
starting point for a wider discussion of commemorative activity. In addition to this 
literature, a number of scholars such as Dan Todman, Mark Connelly, and Lucy Noakes 
have sought to examine more broadly the memory and commemoration of the World Wars 
in Britain.76 In The Great War: Myth and Memory, Todman wrote about the evolution of 
public perceptions of the Great War, assessing the extent to which memories of the conflict 
have been reshaped to suit the changing needs of society. In this, he convincingly argued 
that in the British popular imagination the First World War has become overwhelmingly 
associated with iconic images such as mud, barbed wire, the trenches and the Tommy on 
the Western Front. 
In contrast to this, Connelly and Noakes have both written about the memory of the 
Second, not the First, World War. In We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second 
World War, Connelly analyses ‘the British myth of the Second World War’.77 Through an 
examination of popular cultural artefacts, such as films, museum exhibits and book, and 
the processes involved in creating them he seeks to explain: how and why the myth came 
about; how it has been reshaped and passed on in the years since 1945; and why the 
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British have been so attached to it. Connelly argues that the British people ‘carry a peculiar 
and particular history and memory of World War Two with them’.78 This, he contended, 
effectively amounted to a collective national memory that continues to have ‘an ongoing 
role in our understanding of events and the world around us’.79 Noakes has also examined 
how the Second World War has featured in British national consciousness. More 
specifically, she analyses the ways in which experiences and memories of the War are 
shaped by gender and, thus ‘how far national identity should be understood as a gendered 
concept’.80 Noakes concludes that ‘British women and men occupy different roles within 
the popular memory of the Second World War’, with the male soldier retaining a 
‘privileged space’ in the images and memories of the War.81 
Ultimately, this scholarship provides an important backdrop against which this thesis is set. 
There can be no doubt that these works have all made important contributions to our 
knowledge and understanding of war memory and patterns of remembrance. Yet, despite 
the value of these works to the study of World War commemoration, they fall short in a 
number of ways. It is apparent that little work has yet been undertaken regarding the 
commemoration of the World Wars in the United Kingdom since 1994. The United 
Kingdom however, has changed substantially in this period with a number of political, 
constitutional, socio-economic, demographic and cultural shifts. In addition to this, much of 
the scholarship tends to view the United Kingdom as a singular entity, as opposed to a 
multi-national state. Taken together these developments suggest that it is appropriate to 
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ii. ‘Four Nations’ History, the United Kingdom, the Politics of the Union and 
‘Britishness’  
The historiography relating to ‘Four Nations’ History, the politics of the union and 
‘Britishness’ is also instructive for this study. 
The first explicit ‘Four Nations’ agenda was set out by J.G.A. (John) Pocock in his seminal 
article published in 1975 by the Journal of Modern History entitled ‘British History: A Plea 
for a New Subject’.82 Fundamentally, Pocock lamented a lack of ‘histories of Britain’. In this, 
he contended that most historical work on the ‘North Atlantic Archipelago’ was primarily 
English history, which was rarely a genuine and interactive history of the four different 
nations and how they interacted and related to each other.83 In his view, ‘no true history of 
Britain’ had been written, only histories of England in which the Welsh, Scots and Irish 
appear as ‘peripheral peoples’ and, even then, ‘only when their doings assume[d] power to 
disturb the tenor of English politics’.84 Furthermore, he argued that this unevenness was 
compounded by the parallel writing of ‘histories of Wales, Scotland and Ireland, which 
constituted ‘separate enterprises’ and thereby perpetuated the existence of ‘separate 
historiographical traditions’ or ‘sub-disciplines’.85 
Following Pocock, a number of historians have sought to popularise an historical approach 
that fully takes account of the interactions and interrelationships of the constituent parts 
of the United Kingdom and thus problematize ‘Britain’. It is within these works that the 
term ‘Four Nations’ has increasingly come into use. Pocock’s mantle was most 
comprehensively taken up in the 1990s, predominantly by a school of early modernists 
who, in a series of conference proceedings, emphasised the need to place given points in 
history into their ‘British’ context and thus draw attention to hitherto ignored dimensions 
and establish a new, more complete narrative. The edited collections subsequently 
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generated by these symposia led to the emergence of what David Cannadine has called a 
‘school of self-consciously “British” historians’ or, rather, a ‘New British History’.86  
Other works to adopt this framework have included Hugh Kearney’s The British Isles: A 
History of Four Nations and Norman Davies’ The Isles.87 In The British Isles, for example, 
Kearney argued that a single-nation based approach was insufficient. He contended that 
focusing on any one ‘national’ interpretation or history, whether English, Irish, Scottish or 
Welsh, ran ‘the risk of being imprisoned within a cage of political assumptions’.88 Kearney 
argued that by neglecting Scottish, Welsh or Irish history, one ignored the extent to which 
the history of England has repeatedly overlapped and interacted with that of the other 
nations.89 
It should be noted, however, that the majority of these works have focused 
overwhelmingly on the early modern period and little has been done since to further utilise 
their frameworks. Perhaps the most notable exception to this is Naomi Lloyd-Jones and 
Maggie Scull’s Four Nations Approaches to Modern ‘British’ History.90 This volume, which 
was published in 2017, was the first such collection to appear with an explicit emphasis on 
the modern period. It emerged out of the ‘Four Nations History Network’, which was 
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founded in June 2014 to reignite the debate over how we study ‘British’ History and to 
demonstrate the relevance of ‘Four Nations’ frameworks for a range of fields.91 
Indeed, Four Nations Approaches sought to engage with Pocock’s ideas in light of further 
political developments, which provided a backdrop of heightened intra-UK tensions, 
radically altered patterns of socio-political allegiance and a reorientation of the country’s 
international position.92 Significantly, it also aimed to rebalance what Colin Kidd has 
referred to as the “lop-sidedness” of the New British History of the 1990s, in which Wales 
had been afforded limited treatment.93 
In addition to this, there is now an abundance of literature which seeks to explore not only 
the history of the United Kingdom (and the political unions that brought it together), but 
also interrelated issues and questions relating to conceptions of ‘Britishness’. Alvin 
Jackson’s The Two Unions: Ireland, Scotland and the Survival of the United Kingdom, 1707-
2007, for example, is an important work.94 In this, through the adoption of a comparative 
approach, Jackson aims to ‘explain the survival of these two constituent unions of the 
United Kingdom’ over the past 300 years.95 He contends that it is their survival and 
longevity, as opposed to decline, which should be the focus of historical study. This work is 
also important not only for the way in which it successfully captures the complexity of the 
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United Kingdom, but continues to have considerable resonance and relevance for the 
ongoing political debates about the state of the union.96 
In contrast to Jackson, several other commentators have written about the perceived crisis, 
as opposed to longevity, of the United Kingdom. This was in response to a growing sense of 
uncertainty from the 1970s about what it means to be ‘British’, which was being challenged 
by the end of the Empire, immigration and multi-culturalism, European integration and the 
growth of political nationalism.97 Within this, it has been argued that states which contain 
more than one nation are inherently unstable.98 Tom Nairn, for example, predicted the 
‘break-up of Britain’ as early as 1977 as a consequence of the inevitable unravelling of the 
multi-national state.99 In this view, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (later 
Northern Ireland) began an ‘inevitable process of dissolution’ as soon as it was created.100 
This has been accompanied by arguments that ‘Britain’, and thus ‘Britishness’, no longer 
exist(s). In 1999, Nairn declared that we were in a period ‘after Britain’ while Christopher 
Harvie argued that ‘Britishness’ had only been a brief moment in the first place.101 Similarly, 
Andrew Marr has since referred to The Day Britain Died, whilst Peter Hitchens and John 
Redwood have both written on the ‘Abolition’ and ‘Death’ of Britain respectively.102 
In fact, the fundamental question of what it means to be ‘British’ has been subject to 
considerable scrutiny by historians such as David Cannadine, Linda Colley and Hugh 
Kearney.103 Richard Weight and Robert Colls, in Patriots: National Identity in Britain 1949-
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2000 and Identity of England respectively, have also recently written on ‘Britishness’.104 In 
these works, they both argue that ‘Britishness’ and the British state have been in continual 
crisis from, at least, the 1940s onwards. 
In Patriots, Weight seeks to examine ‘not only how the British defined themselves but also 
how the sources of those definitions changed’.105 In this, it is avowedly a book about ‘why 
the people of Britain stopped thinking of themselves as British and began to see 
themselves as Scots, Welsh and English’.106 The focus of Patriots, then, is the decline of a 
sense of ‘Britishness’ from what he perceives as its ‘high-water mark’ during the Battle of 
Britain in 1940 through the 1960s, with the emergence of political nationalism in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales, to the 1990s.107 This emerges from his central argument that 
the United Kingdom and ‘Britishness’ were functions of capitalism, imperialism and 
Protestantism and that, therefore, British national identity was enforced upon the lower 
classes, colonies (including Scotland, Wales and Ireland) and non-Protestants.108 
Furthermore, for Weight, the UK was primarily established to further the quest for empire. 
As such, when the empire disappeared so too did the ‘original raison d’être’ of the UK 
along with many of the ideologies and institutions around which ‘Britishness’ had been 
constituted since the eighteenth century.109  
In a similar vein to Weight, in his Identity of England, Colls has focused on the question of 
national identities in modern Britain and the perceived crisis of ‘Britishness’. He argues that 
the existence of multiple identities within the United Kingdom have been so unstable as to 
be doomed to inevitable destruction.110 Colls, in fact, concludes that all national identities 
are fundamentally unstable.111 Furthermore, he views ‘Britishness’ as a far weaker force 
than Weight, contending that there existed a British state but not, in ‘any real sense, a 
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British collective identity’.112 In this, he suggests that after the Acts of Union what was left 
‘was a set of British peoples with a sense of their own nationality but not quite sure of how 
to talk about themselves as nations [...] For over 300 years, the people of these islands 
have been uncertain’.113 
The literature review, outlined in the paragraphs above, has highlighted areas of historical 
scholarship which lend themselves to further study and suggested useful avenues of 
enquiry. It has demonstrated how a study of World War commemoration across the United 
Kingdom between 1994 and 2016 could contribute further to our understanding of official 
commemorative practices, the politics of the union and policy-making, and how it has not 
yet attracted sustained attention from historians.  
It should also be noted, however, that this overview is by no means exhaustive. 
Consequently, each chapter will also provide a more detailed discussion of those works 
relating specifically to the World Wars and their representation and commemoration in 
each of the ‘Four Nations’ under consideration throughout this thesis.  
 
Terminology and Methodology 
i. Terminology 
At this juncture, it is important to provide clarification with regards to the area under 
discussion in this thesis. This, however, presents a number of semantic difficulties as terms 
such as the ‘United Kingdom’, ‘Britain’ and the ‘British Isles’ have historically been, and 
remain, in a state of flux as well as contested.114 The composition of the United Kingdom 
has shifted over time. The United Kingdom, as a collective term for England, Wales, 
Scotland and Ireland, only became the official umbrella designation in 1801.115  This 
followed Acts of Union first with Scotland in 1707 and, later, Ireland in 1801. Its name was 
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changed again in 1922, from what was formerly the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland to the official term that exists today: the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. This is further complicated by the fact that in contemporary usage, the 
‘United Kingdom’ has often been substituted for ‘Britain’ or ‘Great Britain’ while ‘England’ 
and ‘Britain’ have also been used synonymously.116 This has meant that quoted sources 
may refer to the one term when another is meant. However, this thesis views it as 
important to reflect the exact language being used. In this thesis, ‘Britain’ or ‘Great Britain’ 
is used to refer to what many consider ‘mainland’ Britain – England, Scotland and Wales. 
The British Isles is understood as the geographical entity that comprises England, Scotland, 
Wales, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.  
In addition, it should be noted that although this thesis inevitably engages with questions 
and complexities relating to conceptions of national identity and ‘Britishness’, it is not 
intended as a direct contribution to an already extensive body of literature which 
surrounds the question of what it means to be ‘British’, as outlined above. Indeed, scholars 
have thus far failed to come up with a definitive answer. In part, this is due to the 
numerous different factors which are involved in the construction of identity such as 
gender, religion, language and region. These difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that 
the terms ‘British’ and ‘English’, much like ‘Britain’ and ‘England’, have often been used 
interchangeably. This has meant that many have confused ‘Britishness’ with ‘Englishness’, 
and vice versa. 
With regards to ‘Britishness’, it is perhaps sufficient to adopt Paul Ward’s non-theoretical 
definition, which suggests that ‘Britishness is what people mean when they identify 
themselves individually and collectively as “being British”... this identification relates to the 
political, economic, social, cultural and personal surroundings they find themselves in at 
the time they choose to think about their Britishness’.117 For Ward, then, Britishness is a 
‘flexible’ identity.118 This is an important idea, as it allows for different, shifting and 
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competing meanings and conceptions of Britishness. It also acknowledges both, as Linda 
Colley has said, that ‘identities are not like hats, human beings can and do put on several at 




To address the questions and omissions that the secondary literature raises, this thesis 
draws on the methodology of ‘Four Nations History’. It should, of course, be noted that it 
utilises this framework in full awareness that it is neither uncontroversial nor without its 
own limitations. Perhaps one of the strongest critiques of the ‘Four Nations’ is that it 
creates the danger of focusing too much on similarities and not enough on differences.120 
Colley, for example, has warned that if ‘pushed too hard or too exclusively’, this 
methodology could conceal not only ‘the fact that the four parts of the United Kingdom 
have been connected in markedly different ways and with sharply varying degrees of 
success’.121  
Furthermore, in its historical and historiographical understandings, ‘Four Nations’ is 
generally taken to refer to England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland.122 This nomenclature, 
however, raises questions about how Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland fit into 
this framework. From what date should they be included and how should these nations be 
understood? In this thesis it is Northern Ireland that is incorporated into the ‘Four Nations’ 
due to its position as a constituent nation of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the 
Republic of Ireland cannot be ignored altogether. This is due to the intertwined and 
complex nature of the island’s history, which has meant that political developments in the 
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Republic of Ireland have frequently interacted with those taking place in Northern Ireland 
and vice versa. 
Despite its limitations, this thesis argues that ‘Four Nations History’ provides a nuanced 
framework through which one can reveal multi-layered patterns and complexities across 
and within the national boundaries that are part of the United Kingdom.123 It can be 
employed, as Lloyd-Jones and Scull have argued, not only to study and understand points 
of convergence and interaction, engagement and development, but also to highlight 
differences and ask why these exist.124 In the words of Raphael Samuel, such an approach 
‘widens the scope of scholarly enquiry’ and, therefore, allows for a better cultural, political 
and social understanding of variations across the United Kingdom.125 Ultimately, when 
combined with ‘collective memory’ paradigms discussed above, it offers a distinctive 
means through which one can explore to what extent the politics of the union, and the 
multi-national nature of the United Kingdom, has interacted with the commemoration of 
the World Wars. This, in turn, allows for a more complex understanding of memories of the 
World Wars throughout the United Kingdom and, therefore, helps to incorporate more 
readily the ‘four nations’ into academic discussions about ‘British’ remembrance and 
commemoration of the World Wars. 
 
The Sources 
This thesis will draw on a wide and varied range of primary sources in order to create a 
complex and nuanced picture. It combines an analysis of the press, contemporary news 
and online media and ‘sites of memory’ with an examination of government sources, 
political speeches and parliamentary debates amongst others. 
It should be recognised, as scholars often have, that there are potential problems when 
analysing the press. These include, amongst others, factual inaccuracies and 
incompleteness, inherent biases, and difficulties discerning the extent to which readers 
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agreed with the claims advanced by editors. This thesis, however, contends that 
newspapers remain a crucial historical source. Newspapers contain a variety of different 
source material including news reports which can offer an organised chronicle of events, 
the text of speeches, press conferences, news briefings and authoritative records of 
government action and activity. They also publish editorials. This editorial commentary 
offers not only analysis and criticism of contemporary events, but also can simultaneously 
shape and reflect public opinion. Additionally, newspapers contain letters to the editor. 
These are a potentially rich source material, which can provide insight into the public 
response to both contemporary events and the viewpoints being advanced by editors. They 
can also act as a means of exploring the issues and events that appeared of the most 
importance during a particular historic time period. 
This study has consulted a range of newspapers, national, regional and local, from across 
the United Kingdom. In addition to this, it has also drawn on publications circulated 
exclusively in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In this way, the press can shed light 
both on commemorative events and the debates surrounding them. It can also provide 
evidence of variations in national and regional interpretations of events as well as illustrate 
continuities and changes in historical representations across this period. 
Yet, the press is by no means the only source used to elucidate the relationship between 
the political climate in the United Kingdom and the commemoration of the World Wars. 
This thesis also draws on so-called ‘sites of memory’, which can act as indicators of the 
official and public recognition of, and engagement with, historical events. These include 
memorials such as the Island of Ireland Peace Tower, the Scottish and Welsh Memorials in 
Flanders as well as events such as the 1995 VE Day anniversary, the First World War 
centenary and the Queen’s Royal Visit to the Republic of Ireland in 2011. The treatment of 
these sites as historical sources is, therefore, a crucial component of this study. This, 
however, poses the problem of how best to interpret and represent this particular type of 
source material. The past presented at these sites is a highly refined one - a result of 
combined processes of management, budgeting and interpretation rarely accessible to the 
public. Consequently, they often convey specific ideas of the past through a variety of 




the content and character of the sites themselves and the processes involved in their 
development. This thesis also utilises visual evidence, in particular photographs, in order to 
illustrate some of the commemorative events and ‘sites of memory' under discussion. 
These sources have been complemented with an analysis of political speeches, biographies, 
autobiographies, and parliamentary debates drawn from the National Assemblies of 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as well as the Houses of Parliament in Westminster. 
In addition to this, this thesis has consulted election manifestos, research briefings and 
radio and T.V. broadcasts as well as commemorative programmes and the minutes from 
meetings of committees such as the First World War Centenary National Advisory, the 
Cymru’n Cofio - Wales Remembers 1914-1918 and the WW100 Scotland Boards. While the 
minutes from the Scottish Commemorations Panel were available in the public domain, the 
records from the other panels were not. As such, several Freedom of Information requests 
were also submitted. It is striking, however, that while the Welsh Government was 
forthcoming, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, on behalf of 
Westminster, rejected the submission. This was justified on the basis that releasing the 
records may ‘prejudice relations between the United Kingdom and any other state’, whilst 
it was also viewed as necessary for members to be able to ‘discuss the complex, sensitive 
and emotive issues at hand’ in a ‘safe space’.126 The Northern Ireland World War One 
Centenary Committee was contacted directly and failed to reply to any enquiries. 
It is also worth highlighting here, that this thesis is deliberately not based on oral history 
interviews. It was felt that due to the ‘four nations’ approach of this study it would not be 
possible to conduct enough interviews in order to obtain a representative sample that 
covered not only the four nations and different regions but also demographic groups such 
as age, gender, race and religion. Furthermore, it should be noted that this thesis is written 
in full awareness that further source material relating to (at least some) of the period 
covered will soon become available through the National Archives and other repositories 
across the United Kingdom. It was determined however that, given the overwhelming 
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availability of sources already in the public domain, this should not act as a deterrent to 
undertaking this research. 
Cumulatively, the range of evidence used in this thesis can illuminate the multifarious ways 
in which the commemoration of the World Wars has interacted with and been affected by 
the politics of the union in the British Isles. When used in isolation, each source can offer 
only a limited insight however, when analysed in tandem they can provide a new and more 
detailed insight into what is a complex subject matter. 
 
Synopsis: The Politics of the Union and World War Commemoration 
This thesis comprises two parts, consisting of five chapters in total. The first part is 
concerned principally with the key institutions of the overarching state of the United 
Kingdom; the second part analyses approaches to World War commemoration in the 
component nations of the United Kingdom.  
This thesis first investigates the approaches to commemoration adopted by successive 
governments in power at Westminster. Chapter One outlines the narratives, tone and 
format of official, state-led commemorative events and analyses the utilisation and 
appropriation of memories of the World Wars for political purposes. Chapter Two explores 
the role of the modern ‘British’ monarchy within commemoration. It considers the 
involvement of the monarch (and by extension the wider royal family) in their capacity as 
‘Head of State’ and thus a key institution of the United Kingdom. It also examines the 
relationship between the monarchy and commemoration and considers to what extent 
their involvement is restricted by the formalities of their constitutional role or whether it 
can be viewed as far more significant than has previously been assumed. 
The following three chapters then offer a nuanced analysis of World War commemoration 
in the three constituent nations which now have devolved governments, beginning with 
Northern Ireland, then Scotland and finally Wales. They are considered in no particular 
order. These chapters will examine to what extent commemorative approaches have been 




critical to understanding the relationships between each of these nations and the wider 
United Kingdom and, in turn, how they have shifted over the course of the period under 
consideration in this thesis. 
Chapter Three considers the extent to which commemoration has been influenced by, and 
is reflective of, the changing political climate both within Northern Ireland and in the 
relationship between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom (and thus Northern 
Ireland). It analyses the impact of the Peace Process and subsequent Good Friday 
Agreement as well as developments in Inter-Irish and Anglo-Irish relations including the 
Queen’s Royal Visit in 2011. As already noted, this chapter focuses predominantly on 
Northern Ireland as the complexities of Ireland’s past means that a detailed examination of 
commemoration in the Republic of Ireland would require its own study and as such is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Chapter Four examines the commemoration of the World Wars in Scotland. It explores how 
successive Scottish Governments, in the post-devolution period, have approached 
questions of remembrance whilst simultaneously dealing with the issues and debates 
surrounding Scottish sovereignty, such as devolution and independence. It also draws out 
how far Scotland’s past martial, religious and imperial traditions have interacted with both 
World War commemoration and identity politics.  
In the final chapter Wales is the subject of analysis. This chapter explores how the gradual 
development of the devolutionary process interacted with the commemoration of the 
World Wars. It also considers how far Wales’ religious and pacifistic traditions as well as 
regional and linguistic tensions and divisions have resonated within commemorations.
 
 
Chapter One: Official State Commemorative Traditions, 1994 – 2016  
 
The World Wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, and the memory of those wars, continue to 
provoke historical controversy throughout the United Kingdom.1 In the decades since the 
Wars there have been numerous public and politicised disputes over how best to 
commemorate the victims and veterans of these two conflicts. In the lead up to the First 
World War centenary, for example, debate erupted when Conservative suggestions that 
the War should be celebrated as a notable British victory and a triumph of democratic 
values brought forth an intense rebuttal from Labour politicians and their allies in the 
press. Writing in 2012, The Guardian’s Seamus Milne rejected David Cameron’s suggestion 
that the Centennial should be a ‘focus of national pride’, and accused him of trying to 
‘hijack’ the commemoration of the War for narrow partisan ends.2 Rather, he argued that 
‘it does no service to the memory of the victims to prettify the horrific reality’, noting that 
we should ‘remember the suffering of the soldiers – rather than the cowards who sent 
them to die’.3 
This debate provides an illustration of how the idea of the ‘nation-state’ – through the 
initiatives of the Government and opposition as well as the media responses to these - 
continued to play a central role in the ‘politics of war commemoration’. At the outset, it is 
worth noting that the concept of a ‘nation-state’ was never unproblematic and was even 
less so in 1994, particularly in the case of the United Kingdom, which is multi-national in 
composition. In using the term ‘nation-state’, this chapter is referring to those polities 
which are recognised as independent within the international political and legal order. 
Internally, such states may be multi-national in composition, or federal in structure. Here, 
the United Kingdom is one such ‘nation-state’. 4  
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It is with the ‘nation-state’ and the central government of the United Kingdom, therefore, 
that this chapter is concerned.5 The role played by the devolved governments of Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, representing distinct studies in themselves, will form the 
subject matter of later chapters. Primarily, this chapter will analyse state traditions and 
government ideologies about World War remembrance and commemoration, how they 
have evolved in the United Kingdom and the extent to which there is continuity or 
discontinuity across the various governments.6 It is concerned with the regimes of official 
memory and forgetting instituted by the nation-state – and with the memories and 
identities constructed via the public commemorations orchestrated by the nation-state. It 
considers how the memory and heritage of the World Wars have been drawn on by the 
state and invoked as a means of expressing place and politics.  
If we are to understand the complex issues thrown up by the remembrance and 
commemoration of the World Wars in the United Kingdom, however, it is not enough to 
treat this memory as fixed. Rather, memory itself must be considered as both historically 
evolving and contingent. Neither official nor unofficial forms of war commemoration have 
proven static or universal in their participation and meanings, which are open to 
renegotiation, reinterpretation and sometimes contestation. Indeed, memories are 
consciously stimulated and appropriated by political forces, while traditions and myths are 
constantly renewed in different political and ideological contexts.7 As such, there is a need 
to consider how memories of the Wars are encoded and continually re-inscribed by 
subsequent events, political commitments and other changes in society and culture. 
Moreover, since the 1990s, a number of political, social, economic and cultural shifts have 
required different narratives to bind the state and citizen – from devolution and the ‘crisis 
of the union’ to demographic shifts, the growth of ‘multi-culturalism’ and involvement in a 
number of military conflicts, and the changing nature of domestic and international 
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terrorist threats. Remembrance and commemoration play an important role in the renewal 
of national narratives. 
Throughout this chapter, the term ‘national’ or ‘official’ memory and memories will be 
used to refer to what Beaumont has defined as the ‘discourse, rituals and practices 
performed in the public sphere and sponsored by the state’ or what Ashplant et al. have 
referred to as ‘those dominant or hegemonic narratives which underpin and help to 
organise the remembrance and commemoration of war at the level of the nation state’.8 
Indeed, for Bodnar, ‘official’ memory is created for the purpose of the stabilisation of the 
status quo.9 This ‘official memory’ is expressed most explicitly via permanent memorials 
and through a calendar of ceremonies and rituals (both annual and war anniversaries) 
which repeatedly recall key wartime events, and mediate on their meaning.10 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first addresses the question of how the decline 
of the union, and responses to it, have affected commemoration by the state from 1994-
2014. As such, it is concerned with how state-sponsored commemoration of the World 
Wars has affected questions of national belonging and to what extent their memory has 
been consciously or unconsciously mobilised as a part of a wider politics of legitimising the 
union. The second section deals with the impact of growing diversity and multi-culturalism 
on commemoration and whether the historical narratives of the Wars have been adjusted 
in response to this. This section focuses primarily on the years from 2001 to 2014. Finally, 
the third section will analyse how far the United Kingdom’s engagement in recent military 
conflicts has affected official commemoration. Overall, in adopting a thematic approach, 
this chapter will draw on ‘snapshots’ of evidence, and consequently will not treat each of 
the different governments equally within each section. This is reflective of the episodic 
nature of commemoration in this period and the concentration of evidence not only 
around major commemorative anniversaries but also the changing political environment. 
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This chapter will argue that the central governments of John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon 
Brown and David Cameron all sought to manipulate and appropriate the commemoration 
of the World Wars as an instrument of policy in an attempt to foster an inclusive and 
overarching ‘British’ identity and, therefore, bind the United Kingdom more closely 
together. While the priorities and political agendas of each varied, it is apparent that there 
was an increasing emphasis on recognising a more diverse range of experiences and, more 
importantly, incorporating those into ‘British’ narratives of the Wars. 
 
The Decline of the Union, Devolution and Responses to ‘Crisis’ 
By the 1990s, although the World Wars themselves were becoming increasingly distant, a 
string of high-profile war anniversaries appeared to project them to the forefront of 
consciousness. These included the fiftieth anniversaries of D-Day and Victory in Europe Day 
in 1994 and 1995 respectively, and the eightieth anniversary of the start of the First World 
War in 1994. In stark contrast to the somewhat reluctant commemorations undertaken by 
the Thatcher Government in 1984 and 1985, John Major’s Government sponsored a 
widespread programme of events for the fiftieth anniversaries. Within these 
commemorations, the centrepiece was a three-day weekend festival of events held in Hyde 
Park from 6 – 8 May 1995. The 8 May 1995, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of VE 
Day, was declared a public bank holiday – an illustration of the centrality which the Second 
World War had acquired by then for the conception of British national identity being 
promoted by the Government. At the opening of VE Day commemorations, for example, 
Major noted that the commemorations represented ‘an affirmation of the links that bind 
us together as a nation, across the generations’.11 Similarly, in announcing government 
plans for the D-Day anniversary, Major said that he hoped that they would ‘unite the 
nation’ amid growing calls for devolution in both Scotland and Wales which he believed 
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would ‘ultimately lead to the separation of England and Scotland’ and be ‘damaging for the 
whole of the United Kingdom’.12  
The politicisation of these commemorations, however, and their linking with the promotion 
of the union of the United Kingdom is perhaps best illustrated by a dialogue between Dame 
Jill Knight and Major which took place during Prime Ministers Questions on 11 May 1995, 
following the conclusion of the VE Day commemorations. Here, Dame Jill Knight asked 
Major:  
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the size and scale of public rejoicing on 
Monday stoutly reaffirmed the love that the British people have for this country? 
They were waving Union Jacks… Is it not appropriate to remind people that 
Labour’s devolution policy would split this country more irrevocably and 
fundamentally than all Hitler’s armies could possibly have done?13 
In response to this, Major commented that ‘last week’s celebrations were a remarkable 
occasion’, which ‘struck a perfect balance between commemoration and celebration’ 
before going on to state: ‘I believe that they also showed that the sentiments that unite us 
as a nation are far stronger than those sometimes presented as though to disunite us. That 
is very healthy for the nation as a whole: it is an enormous strength for this country’.14  
The fiftieth anniversaries of the Second World War also witnessed a significant shift in 
focus from the military to a civilian experience made accessible to everyone regardless of 
what they were doing in 1945 or, in fact, whether they were even alive [See Figure 1.1]. 
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This image is illustrative of the shift from a military to a civilian focus within 
commemorations, with the front cover depicting not military figures, but civilian 
celebrations of VE Day. Yet, while this programme of events represented a dramatic growth 
in the scale of anniversary celebrations, the commemorations were certainly not 
unproblematic. In April 1994, for example, Major became embroiled in controversy over his 
D-Day commemoration plans. This followed announcements that a ‘Family Day’ party for 
Figure 1.1: A photograph of the cover of the Official Government 
Programme to mark the 50th Anniversary of the End of World War II. Taken 




up to 300,000 people would be held in Hyde Park to honour ‘the immense effort made by 
the whole civilian population leading up to D-Day and beyond’ as the key event of the week 
long fiftieth anniversary commemorations.15 Major’s focus was described by Labour MP 
Peter Mandelson as being ‘frivolous and trivialising’. Similarly, a Commons motion, also 
sponsored by Mandelson, referred to the plans which included street parties, firework 
displays and even spam fritter contests as ‘inappropriate and in bad taste’ and called upon 
the Government to scrap its programme and ‘to hold, instead, a single, respectful, dignified 
national service of thanksgiving’.16 Significantly, these criticisms focused on the perceived 
‘light entertainment tone’ of the ‘celebrations’ and argued that the D-Day Anniversary 
should be a ‘solemn occasion’ and not an occasion for appropriating the memory of the 
War in a ‘patriotic jamboree’.17  
These D-Day commemorations also appeared to become mixed up with controversy over 
the 1994 European elections. Opposition MPs accused Major of using the ‘patriotic good 
feeling’ that would be generated as a means of not only benefitting the Conservative 
party’s Euro-election campaign, but also to distract attention from the expected Tory 
disaster.18 In fact, the 1994/1995 commemorations became entangled more broadly with 
the internal Conservative party controversies related to the European Union. In April 1995, 
for example, Teresa Gorman, one of the eight ‘euro-rebels’ to have the whip withdrawn by 
Major in November 1994, upon her re-admittance to the parliamentary party made a blunt 
call for Britain to leave the European Union (EU), commenting that ‘our only hope for the 
future is to leave the European Union’. She went on to link this explicitly with the Second 
World War, stating that ‘the approach of VE Day offers us a chance to reflect on what we 
fought for… above all the freedom from foreign domination’.19 Similarly, The Times 
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reported on 12 May 1995 that the lessons drawn from VE Day by prominent Euro-sceptic 
Michael Portillo appeared to be of a ‘patriotic, proud and dignified’ Britons who had fought 
to restore to sovereign nations their violated independence’.20 Significantly, the next day 
The Times noted that for the euro-sceptics, the ‘new nationalists’, VE Day ‘stood only for 
victory’.21 This contrasted sharply with Major’s official government announcement earlier 
that year that the theme of the fiftieth VE Day commemorations would be ‘reconciliation, a 
celebration of fifty years peace in Europe and hope for the future’.22 Furthermore, it was 
within the context of this theme that as early as March 1994 of the previous year Major 
had stated in a Commons written reply ‘we very much hope Germany will play a full part 
and be represented at a high level in the 1995 commemorations’.23 
While the commemorations became embroiled in internal party controversies, it can also 
be seen that although the rhetoric behind many of these commemorative ceremonies in 
1994 and 1995 concentrated on bringing the nation together, in actuality they appeared to 
focus on the extension of the pre-existing dominant Anglo-centric narratives of the War to 
Britain’s post-war generations. Writing ahead of the VE Day commemorations in May, Alan 
Massie of the Daily Mail, noted the lack of excitement in Scotland over VE Day 
celebrations, argued that the difficulty for many lay in the fact they ‘no longer feel they 
belong to the nation that fought the war’.24 Moreover, the official commemorative 
ceremonies were predominantly located at venues of high national standing concentrated 
in the English capital, such as Westminster, Buckingham Palace and St Paul’s Cathedral.25  
It is interesting to compare and contrast the attitudes displayed by the Conservatives while 
in office with the approach adopted by its successors, the ‘New Labour’ Government. On 1 
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May 1997 Tony Blair swept to power in an electoral victory which heralded the start of a 
period in which there would be a discernible shift in the tone and focus of state-sponsored 
commemoration.26 Yet, the secondary sources – including biographies of both Blair and his 
cabinet colleagues – have hitherto neglected New Labour’s approach to commemoration. 
Upon coming to power, Blair, who was bequeathed a legacy of inflamed tensions within 
the United Kingdom by the Conservatives, embarked on a programme of national renewal. 
He believed that these tensions could be stabilised through the adoption of a policy of 
limited social and political engineering. In Wales and Scotland, for example, this led to the 
advent of devolution and the introduction of new executives and elected assemblies in 
Edinburgh and Cardiff, which took responsibility for their devolved powers on 1 July 1999 
(cf. Chapter Four and Chapter Five).27 Through devolution, however, Blair was seeking to 
strengthen the union by renegotiating its terms in order to better accommodate the multi-
national nature of the state. The 1997 Labour Party manifesto stated that ‘a sovereign 
Westminster parliament will devolve power to Scotland and Wales. The Union will be 
strengthened, and the threat of separatism removed’.28 Increasingly, therefore, Blair was 
ever-more insistent that the United Kingdom was greater together than the sum of its 
parts. On 12 November 1998, for example, at the launch of Labour’s campaign for the 
Scottish Parliament elections to be held in May of 1999, he commented that ‘Scotland, 
England and the rest of the UK’ were ‘stronger together, weaker apart’. Here, he invoked 
images of the English and Scots standing together on Remembrance Sunday as a symbol of 
shared history, going on to say that ‘we are all united in remembering the great sacrifices 
that the nations of these islands have together made in times of great peril. We stood 
together to defeat Fascism’.29 
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Similarly, this approach to strengthening the union also applied with regards to Northern 
Ireland. In 1997, Blair’s first official trip outside London following the election was to 
Belfast. He declared it was his aim ‘to see a fair political settlement’, yet he also stated that 
it was not his agenda to see the creation of a United Ireland. Rather, he stated that 
‘Northern Ireland is part of the UK, alongside England, Scotland and Wales. The Union binds 
the four parts of the United Kingdom together. I believe in the United Kingdom. I value the 
union’.30 However, the subsequent advances in the Northern Ireland Peace Process, which 
culminated in the signing of the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April 1998, saw not only the 
establishment of a devolved government, but also declared that the people of the region 
would determine whether to join a united Ireland or remain a part of the United Kingdom. 
It must be borne in mind that this approach continued policies initiated by the Major 
Government and was fully supported by the Dublin Government (cf. Chapter Three).  
Following the passing of devolved powers to Scotland and Wales in 1999, the Blair 
Governments were characterised by a growth in confidence that there was no crisis in the 
United Kingdom and that the union was, in fact, strong. This confidence was only 
strengthened further by the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, which appeared to 
solve the old, festering issue of Northern Ireland. Consequently, it is perhaps due to this 
that the Blair Governments made little reference to commemoration in overtly national 
terms or as a means of highlighting the significance of the union from 1999 onwards. 
Rather, as will be seen in sections two and three of this chapter, commemoration 
increasingly became a means of promoting ‘multi-culturalism’ and affirming support of the 
armed forces. One might think that these are two incompatible aims, but both, in fact, 
were closely associated with the Blair agenda in domestic and foreign policy.31 
It was not until the later years of the Blair administration that a shift in contemporary 
political discourse marked a return to the use of World War commemoration as an 
instrument of wider policy concerning concepts of national identity and the union. This was 
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a result of shifts inadvertently caused by devolution which had failed to ‘kill the SNP by 
kindness’. Rather, devolution injected a sense of ‘responsibility and mobility’ into Scottish 
politics.32 Scottish independence was now being articulated in economic and fiscal terms, 
instead of being considered by many as a one-dimensional constitutional issue associated 
with national identity.33 Indeed, the limits of the Scottish Parliament had become most 
apparent in the economic sphere. The economy represented one of Scotland’s 
fundamental problems, yet the parliament had no real economic powers. Furthermore, an 
opinion poll published in 2005 indicated that just 14% of Scots defined their identity as 
British, compared with 79% who viewed themselves as Scottish.34 It was Gordon Brown, 
however, a Scot himself and alert to the weakening of ‘Britishness’, who wanted to resume 
the initiative.35 In his role as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Brown delivered an address to 
the Fabian New Year Conference in London in January 2006, which outlined the 
endangered state of British national identity and noted that ‘we should also think what 
more we can do to develop the ties that bind us more closely together’. He went on to 
refer to both Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday as days of national unity and 
patriotism: 
[W]hat is the British equivalent of the US 4th of July, or even the French 14th of July 
for that matter? [...] What is our equivalent for a national celebration of who we 
are and what we stand for? [...] Perhaps Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday 
are the nearest we have come to a British day that is in every corner of our country 
–commemorative, unifying and an expression of British ideas of standing firm in 
the world in the name of liberty, responsibility and fairness.36 
While Brown’s suggestion that either Armistice Day or Remembrance Sunday should be 
developed into a ‘national day of patriotism to celebrate British history, achievements and 
culture’ proved controversial, his speech drew on the way in which these two days of 
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remembrance and, more broadly, the World Wars had become deeply engrained within 
the concept of British national identity.37 Indeed, as Adrian Gregory highlights, from the 
1920s onwards Armistice Day (and later Remembrance Sunday) have functioned in the UK 
as days of national unity, with the aim of confirming national belonging and expressing 
patriotic sentiments. In his address, Brown exploited this function for the rhetorical 
production of citizenship and to stress the values of ‘British’ identity. This was in turn being 
used to demonstrate the significance of the wider union of the United Kingdom and to 
bolster ‘Britishness’ as a means of extending a more inclusive conception of national 
identity to all people throughout the United Kingdom, including the English, Scots, Welsh 
and Northern Irish. 
Strengthening the appeal of ‘Britishness’ was to become a major theme of Brown’s own 
premiership in the expectation that this would bring the United Kingdom back together. 
This resulted from a sea change in devolution politics in 2007 which had seen the Scottish 
National Party, Plaid Cymru and Sinn Fein all enter government in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland respectively. In Scotland, the SNP emerged as the largest party, winning a 
total of forty-seven seats, and went on to form a minority government. Although closely 
followed by the incumbent Scottish Labour Party in second place with forty-six seats, the 
SNP had gained significantly from the 2003 election results when they had won only 
twenty-seven seats.38 In Wales, Plaid Cymru made gains at the expense of Labour, winning 
three more seats in 2007 than 2003, while Labour lost four.39 Although Labour remained 
the largest party, a coalition government was formed between Labour and Plaid Cymru. 
The Northern Ireland Assembly elections of 2007 not only resulted in an increased number 
of seats for Sinn Fein, four more than in 2003, but also saw them enter government, due to 
a power-sharing deal made with the Democratic Unionist Party, which led to a restoration 
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of the Assembly’s devolved powers.40 When Brown became Prime Minister in 2007, he was 
faced with renewed fears that the United Kingdom might break up. Consequently, 
throughout his premiership Brown frequently focused on rhetorical and symbolic attempts 
to build up a positive ‘culture of unionism’. Upon assuming office, for example, he 
announced his intention to create a new “British Day” aimed at ‘bring[ing] together citizens 
throughout the United Kingdom as well as new immigrants’.41 Significantly, coming in 2007, 
this also coincided with the year of the 300th anniversary of the Act of Union between 
England and Scotland.42 To this end, he commissioned a citizenship review, which led to the 
publication of a pamphlet entitled ‘A More United Kingdom’ by think-tank Demos in 2008, 
about how best to celebrate British national identity. Within this, “27 ways to celebrate a 
national day” were included, one of which suggested ‘decking public spaces with posters of 
Winston Churchill’.43 The image of Churchill, and therefore the Second World War, was 
deemed suitably unifying to bring together all the peoples of the United Kingdom.    
Under the premiership of Brown, as in the days of Major, the UK Government sought again 
to use war remembrance, specifically of the World Wars, as a means of highlighting the 
value of British national identity. Furthermore, state commemoration increasingly sought 
to recognise the shared experiences of the World Wars and their continuing relevance to 
all four nations of the United Kingdom. The same approach was continued by Brown’s 
successor, David Cameron, both under the Coalition Government and in the Conservative 
Government of 2011. 
A recognition of the growing need to appeal to all four nations appears to have influenced 
the Governments’ approach to the centenary of the Great War. In October 2012, at the 
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Imperial War Museum (IWM) in London, Cameron announced the Government’s plans to 
commemorate the anniversary cycle of the centenary of the First World War, 2014-2018. In 
this speech, he stated that every part of the United Kingdom should recognise the sacrifices 
made in the War, while commemorations should mark the impact the War had on the 
development of Britain today.44 Indeed, Cameron claimed that his ambition was to 
recognise the durable emotional connection of the conflict through the development of: 
A truly national commemoration, worthy of this historic centenary […] a 
commemoration that captures our national spirit, in every corner of our country, 
from our schools and workplaces, to our town halls and local communities. A 
commemoration that, like the Diamond Jubilee celebrated this year, says 
something about who we are as a people.45  
The reference to the Diamond Jubilee celebrations within this speech is significant. The link 
drawn by Cameron between the First World War centenary and the Queen’s Diamond 
Jubilee is indicative of the Government’s desire to generate a further outpouring of 
patriotic sentiments similar to those of the summer of 2012. On 9 June 2013, The 
Telegraph noted that ‘ministers will hope the commemorations will harness the patriotic 
spirit which came to the fore last year with the twin celebrations of the Olympic Games and 
the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee, when the country wrapped itself in the Union flag’.46 The 
monarchy and its formal and symbolic roles in commemoration will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter Two of this thesis.  
Cameron’s Government sought to renew the significance of the United Kingdom at a time 
when the union appeared ever weaker, especially with the growing threat of the possibility 
of Scottish independence. In 1914, the Great War had kindled a new feeling of ‘Britishness’ 
in England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales at a time when the United Kingdom had seemed 
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close to disintegration due to campaigns for Home Rule in both Ireland and Scotland and 
for the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales. Catriona Pennell, for example, 
has demonstrated that by the end of 1914, the populations of England, Scotland, Wales 
and Ireland had largely embraced the War. She goes on to note that there were ‘similarities 
of experience and responses to the start of the First World War’, which, in fact, ‘made the 
kingdom, at this point, genuinely united’.47 It was to this sense of unity, and the patriotic 
sentiments it inspired, that government commemorations of the Great War appeared to 
allude. Indeed, in the absence of a ‘unifying’ conflict, the Government instead sought to 
use the memory of the War as a means of uniting co-nationals around a unifying set of 
values. Writing in The Scotsman in 2013, for example, historian Michael Fry noted that 
‘Cameron has already said the centenary of the First World War will be a good time for 
everybody in Britain to reflect on what has held us together for the past 100 years’.48 
Furthermore, the UK Government’s decision to mark the start of the First World War in 
commemorations on 4 August, coming just six weeks before the Scottish independence 
vote to be held on 18 September, was interpreted by some as ‘a cynical political ploy to 
wrap Britain once again in the Union flag just weeks before the independence referendum 
in Scotland.’49 The Telegraph made this link explicitly when commenting that ‘senior figures 
in the Government are also crossing their fingers that the First World War programme 
gives a political boost to the campaign for a “No” vote in next year’s referendum’.50 
Cameron and the UK Government connected war remembrance to the demonstration of 
British national identity by explicitly introducing the commemoration of the First World 
War as a vehicle for forging patriotic feeling, emphasising shared experiences of the War 
and thus their central importance for national history and identity.  
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Commemoration of the First World War centenary in Northern Ireland also highlights the 
Government’s appropriation and use of the memory of the conflict to further the union of 
the United Kingdom. In Northern Ireland, the centenary was part of a wider series of high-
profile commemorations between 2012 and 2021 that mark events such as the Home Rule 
disputes, the Irish Civil War and the Battle of the Somme, all of which could draw attention 
to the contemporary resonances of historical events surrounding Ireland’s partition and the 
difficult and potentially divisive nature of these commemorations. In response to these 
commemorations, the UK Government sought to extend the established narratives 
underpinning the centenary to Northern Ireland in a way that emphasises a shared focus 
on British participation in the First World War. It is worth noting that this was facilitated by 
significant changes in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (cf. Chapter Three). 
For instance, Theresa Villiers, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, stated that 
‘World War One profoundly affected the whole community across Northern Ireland and 
involved terrible sacrifice… it is important that a century on, this generation recognises and 
pays tribute to those who gave so much for our country.’51 Furthermore, the Northern 
Ireland Office has stated that it aims to ‘ensure Her Majesty’s Government’s programme 
for the World War One commemorations is implemented in Northern Ireland in a manner 
that promotes reconciliation and enhances prospects for a peaceful, shared future’.52 These 
references to ‘reconciliation’ and a ‘peaceful, shared future’ are indicative of the way in 
which the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and formal end of the ‘Troubles’ in 
Northern Ireland have affected commemoration by helping to rehabilitate the memory of 
the First World War amongst nationalist communities (cf. Chapter Three). Just as this 
changed political environment has made such commemoration possible, so too has 
commemoration been used to further the political aspects of the Peace Process. Indeed, 
state commemoration has come to centre on not only the themes of reconciliation and 
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peace, as seen above, but also on promoting the remembrance of shared history and 
experiences. 
This section has demonstrated that commemoration of the World Wars was used by the 
Governments of Brown and, in particular, Cameron to stress not only a shared sense of 
‘Britishness’, but also the historic and enduring links between the component nations of 
the United Kingdom at precisely those moments when the integrity of the union appeared 
under threat.  
 
Diversity, Multi-Culturalism and State Commemoration 
Official World War commemoration by the UK Government, then, has been significantly 
affected by the numerous questions and issues that have arisen from the multi-national 
nature of the state in recent years. This ‘crisis of the union’, indicated by devolution and 
the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, however, has not been the only significant 
contextual development to take place since 1994. Indeed, the Government also had to 
respond to a post-imperial Britain, ever-growing diversity and the rise of ‘multi-culturalism’ 
within its borders and the impact of this on the wider state. In the years since the end of 
the Second World War, British society has witnessed a fundamental alteration in its racial 
mix. Between 1945 and 2000, large numbers of migrants from throughout the world 
moved to the United Kingdom on an unprecedented scale. This migration, which took place 
in a series of waves, had profound consequences for all aspects of British life. Changes 
became increasingly more apparent in the 1990s, as it became clear that British society at 
the end of the twentieth century had become far more diverse than that of 1945. Indeed, 
by the time that Blair and ‘New Labour’ came to power in 1997, the concept of a ‘multi-
cultural Britain’ had become increasingly accepted in both government and public 
discourse.  
Despite this widespread migration to the United Kingdom in the post-war period, in the 
years leading up to 1994 national state commemoration of the World Wars failed to pay 




though British Imperial and Commonwealth involvement in and contribution to both the 
First and Second World Wars was crucial. When Britain declared war in 1914, she did so on 
behalf of the Empire. 1.3 million men volunteered from the so-called ‘White Dominions’ 
(Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa); 1.44 million from the Indian Sub-
Continent (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka) with 13,000 decorated with 
medals, including 12 Victoria Crosses; 55,000 from the African colonies; and a further 
15,000 from the West Indies.53 Similarly, in the Second World War, the whole British 
Empire was once again involved from the outset. The ‘White Dominions’ were free to 
choose, unlike during the First World War, yet they all joined the conflict within a week. 
Here, 2.5 million Indians, 1.75 million volunteers from the ‘White Dominions’ and a further 
380,000 from both the African colonies and the West Indies fought alongside Britain.54 
Moreover, while the Empire’s main contribution was arguably its mobilisation of military 
personnel, its role extended far beyond this. Indeed, the British Empire and 
Commonwealth also provided financial and military resources for the war effort including 
supply centres and military bases as well as raw materials and foodstuffs.55 
Following the general election of 1997, Prime Minister Tony Blair repeatedly called for the 
establishment of a more inclusive ‘New Britain’ based on a ‘new modern patriotism’ which 
aimed to reshape the nation in order to integrate ethnic minorities more centrally within 
national identity.56 Furthermore, on 2 November 1999 the Culture Secretary, Chris Smith, 
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opened a debate with the apparent purpose of redefining facets of British identity. He 
called for ‘a more complete version of the truth’ regarding British history and spoke of ‘the 
need to look at heritage through more than one pair of eyes’.57 This contrasted sharply 
with the narratives prevalent under Major, which notably excluded those who had fought 
under imperial flags. During the 1995 commemorations, for example, the emphasis 
remained overwhelmingly on civilian celebrations of VE Day and not VJ Day. Furthermore, 
those celebrations of VJ Day that did take place focused almost exclusively on the horrific 
experiences of former prisoners of war at the hands of the Japanese army. This focus on 
suffering, rather than the military, however, meant that the memory of Asians fighting and 
suffering alongside the British was not part of the official UK commemoration. Yet, as many 
as 65% of the soldiers in Slim’s 14th Army were not ‘white’, and 16 out of 29 Victoria 
Crosses awarded in the Far East went to Indians, Nepalese and Tibetans. This emphasis on 
VE Day, combined with the focus on human suffering, ensured that VJ commemorations 
not only fitted with a traditional narrative of a united (and predominantly white) stoic, 
British people, but also avoided drawing attention to the end of the Empire and the 
resultant dramatic loss of status for Britain in the wider world which was viewed as 
equivalent to ‘defeat’.58 In fact, it was not simply the war experiences of Imperial and 
Commonwealth subjects that were marginalised within government narratives of the 
World Wars, but also those of Jewish minorities. David Cesarani, for example, highlights the 
manner in which D-Day commemorations frequently failed to recognise the contribution 
the Allied landings made in saving Jewish lives.59 
Under Labour, however, this illusion of recognition for soldiers drawn from the Empire was 
addressed. In the early 2000s, three memorials were established in different corners of 
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Hyde Park Corner which sought to retrospectively commemorate the efforts and 
experiences of contingents from Africa, the Caribbean and India (unveiled in 2002), 
Australia (2003), and New Zealand (2006) who fought alongside Britain during the two 
World Wars. Of these, the establishment of the ‘Memorial Gates’, also known as the 
‘Commonwealth Memorial Gates’ in 2002, is perhaps the most interesting [See Figure 1.2]. 
The memorial, which is situated at the Hyde Park Corner end of Constitution Hill in London, 
is dedicated to the ‘five million people from the Indian Sub-Continent, Africa and the 
Caribbean who served or lost their lives in the World Wars’.60 Unveiled by the Queen on 6 
November 2002, it consists of four stone gate pillars, two on each side of the road, each 
topped by a bronze urn and gas flames, which are lit on occasions such as Remembrance 
Sunday and Armistice Day.61  The pillars are carved with the country names: India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Caribbean, and the Kingdom of Nepal. In addition, on the north side 
of the road is a domed pavilion (or chattri) on which the names of the 70 Victoria and 
George Cross recipients are inscribed, while the names of the major campaigns are 
engraved on two stone benches.62  
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While this project was initiated by Baroness Flather and the Memorial Gates Trust, 
government attitudes to the memorialisation of Imperial and Commonwealth subjects can 
be indicated by the inclusion of a letter of support within the planning application materials 
from Prime Minister Tony Blair. In this letter, dated November 1999, Blair stated: ‘I whole 
heartedly support this proposal… to commemorate the contribution made by the hundreds 
of thousands of men and women from the Indian Sub-Continent, Africa and the Caribbean, 
who came to the aid of this country during the First and Second World Wars.’63 Moreover, 
Blair explained that this memorial would serve not only as a permanent recognition of their 
‘invaluable help in securing the survival of freedom in this country’, but more significantly 
of the ‘on-going contribution made by them and their descendants, to the continuing 
health and richness of our culture and society.’64  
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Figure 1.2: A photograph of the Memorial Gates Monument in London. 
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The contribution and sacrifices of troops from the Indian subcontinent, Africa and the 
Caribbean, therefore, proved a growing dimension of war commemoration under Blair’s 
Labour Government. Official recognition of these previously excluded groups continued 
under subsequent governments. Throughout its First World War centenary 
announcements, for example, the UK Government sought to recognise not only enduring 
Commonwealth ties, but also the contribution of ethnic minority communities and the 
impact of the War on multi-cultural Britain. According to Cameron, the First World War 
marked ‘the beginnings of ethnic minorities getting the recognition, respect and equality 
they deserve’. Moreover, he also noted that it was vital to recognise the ‘extraordinary 
sacrifice’ and ‘catastrophic’ death toll of ‘our friends in the Commonwealth’.65 Indeed, as 
part of the commemorations, the 175 overseas recipients of the Victoria Cross from the 
First World War were explicitly remembered by engraving their names on bronze memorial 
plaques to be presented to their home countries.66 In launching these plaques, Baroness 
Sayeeda Warsi, the Senior Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
Minister for Faith and Communities, commented that they demonstrated the ‘rich diversity 
of our shared history’ and that ‘this commemoration is relevant to us all’.67 
Furthermore, in November 2013 Baroness Warsi announced that in order to commemorate 
the Commonwealth contribution to the First World War, a series of lectures, exploring ‘the 
role played and sacrifices made by soldiers from Africa, Australia, India, the West Indies 
and beyond’, would be part of the Government’s programme.68 Earlier in April 2013, on a 
visit to World War One battlefields in France and Belgium, she paid tribute to the 1.2 
million men from the Indian Army who had fought alongside Britain. Here, she noted that 
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‘our boys weren’t just Tommies; they were Tariqs and Tajinders too’, arguing that the 
centenary offered opportunities to acknowledge that ‘so many men from so far away came 
to Europe to fight for the freedoms we enjoy today. Their legacy is our liberty, and every 
single one of us owes them a debt of gratitude’.69  
This proposition that subjects from across the Empire sought to defend British domestic 
liberties is questionable and overlooks the fact that empire was a non-democratic system 
based on British domination and the related pervasive influence of racial categorisation 
and discrimination of troops from the British colonies. However, it is demonstrative of the 
aims of the UK Government to extend the appeal of the centenary commemorations, by 
addressing the ‘neglect’ of this chapter of ‘our history’, and more significantly to provide a 
contemporary resonance for the First World War in a multi-cultural Britain.70 This can be 
further illustrated by House of Lords debates in June 2013 and in December 2013. On 20 
June 2013, Lord Taylor of Warwick commented in a debate about the centenary 
commemorations that: 
Much has been said about Britain’s disaffected youth, and in particular black youth. 
It is my personal view that part of that disaffection is a feeling of not belonging to 
Britain, and I suspect that the majority of these young men do not know that their 
ancestors played a full part in the First World War and Second World War. That is 
why young children need to know about their own heritage.71  
He continued: ‘it becomes increasingly important that the Government’s initiatives should 
ensure that the contribution of people from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean to British efforts 
                                                             
69 Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘Baroness Warsi Kick-Starts Campaign to 
Remember Commonwealth Servicemen of the First World War’, GOV.UK, 16 April 2013. Accessed at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/baroness-warsi-kick-starts-campaign-to-remember-
commonwealth-servicemen-of-the-first-world-war [Date Accessed: 06/05/2013]; S. Warsi, ‘The First 
World War: The Commonwealth Contribution’, Speech, 8 November 2013. Accessed at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-first-world-war-the-commonwealth-contribution 
[Date Accessed: 06/03/2016]. 
70 Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘Commonwealth Contribution to First World 
War to be Commemorated’. Emphasis added. 
71 Lord Taylor of Warwick, ‘First World War: Commemorations’, Hansard House of Lords 




in the First World War is recognised’.72 In response to this, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara 
added: 
It is hoped that […] in our own country, given the diversity and the challenges that 
exist in the moment, we should use this commemoration to bring every one of 
Britain’s communities into some form of discussion and knowledge about the event 
because so many of their forebears were involved in the First World War.73 
This use of commemoration by the UK Government, however, is exemplified perhaps most 
explicitly in House of Lords discussions about the commemoration of the role of armed 
forces and other personnel from the Indian sub-continent in the First World War. In this, 
Lord Parekh commented that ‘we should commemorate in such a way that the multi-ethnic 
character of Britain is highlighted and our people are able to feel at ease with it’.74 This led 
Lord Bates to respond that ‘more countries were involved in the war than not… All should 
be remembered for the part they played’.75 He continued: 
[A]s we came together then, so the centenary gives us an opportunity to come 
together now […] We should come together to reaffirm our shared values, forged 
through experiences that will not be forgotten, and that bind us inseparably. 
Recognition of the important role that those from the Indian sub-continent played 
is an integral part of the Government’s plans for an inclusive commemoration.76 
Ultimately, this is indicative of what Tony Kushner has referred to as a shift from a ‘liberal 
assimilationist ideology’ to a more pluralistic conception of British society, as the 
Government increasingly sought to universalise narratives of the World Wars in order to 
make them relevant to British society as a whole.77 Just as official commemoration of the 
World Wars came to include the war experiences of peoples of the Commonwealth, so too 
was the Holocaust gradually included in Britain’s official memory of the Second World War. 
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In January 2000, Holocaust Memorial Day was officially launched, with the first Holocaust 
‘Remembrance Day’ being held on 27 January 2001. Indeed, on 27 January 2015, at the 
fifteenth annual Holocaust Memorial Day, Cameron urged that it was ‘time for Britain as a 
nation to stand together and say “We Will Remember”’, continuing, ‘we will not let any 
form of prejudice destroy the multi-faith, multi-ethnic democracy we are so proud to call 
our home. We will teach every generation the British values of respect and tolerance that 
we hold dear’.78 In many ways, this speech is indicative of the way in which the 
Government had come to use commemoration as one way to ‘unite’ an increasingly diverse 
country, by emphasising the ‘British’ values of respect and tolerance, and the ‘multi-
ethnic’, ‘multi-faith’ nature of society and subsequently calling for this Britain to ‘stand 
together’.  
The remembrance and commemoration of the World Wars, then, was used as a means of 
fostering a hegemonic British identity. Yet, as this section has demonstrated, this concept 
of national identity was extended as the UK Government sought to produce narratives of 
the World Wars which encompass those groups previously excluded from official 
commemorations. In this way the history of the World Wars no longer focused solely on 
the experiences of the Tommy, but also on his fellow soldiers from the Empire. 
Furthermore, there has been an insistence within mainstream political discourse that the 
dead of these Wars represent our values and our shared ideals. 
 
Contemporary Military Conflicts and State Commemoration 
Thus far, this chapter has explored the numerous ways in which the narratives of the two 
World Wars used throughout state-sponsored commemorations have evolved since 1994. 
Increasingly, the UK Government sought to extend the inclusiveness and relevance of both 
the First and Second World Wars, universalising war experiences to include everyone, 
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especially those in previously overlooked groups. This represented a means of 
reconfiguring British national identity and extending the relevance of the United Kingdom 
in light of the so-called ‘crisis of the union’ and ever-growing diversity within its borders. 
In addition to this ‘pluralisation of commemoration’, the UK Government also appropriated 
the memory of the World Wars for a further purpose – to mobilise public opinion in 
support of its armed services and as a legitimation of the use of war as an instrument of 
policy. Since 1997, British contingents have been deployed in five military conflicts (Iraq, 
1998; Kosovo, 1999; Sierra Leone, 2000; Iraq 2003-2009; Afghanistan, 2001-2014). In 
November 2001, in fact, troops were engaged in conflict overseas on Remembrance 
Sunday for the first time in half a century [See Figure 1.3]. 
 
Figure 1.3: A photograph of a Remembrance Day in Afghanistan. 




The involvement of the United Kingdom in this series of conflicts since the late 1990s, then, 
not only raised the profile of military and veterans’ associations, but also encouraged 
greater recognition of and participation in war commemoration.79 Perhaps most 
significantly, however, it contributed to a fundamental reappraisal of the narratives of the 
World Wars presented within official commemorations, particularly with regards to the 
First World War. 
On 17 July 2014, for example, in a speech at the re-opening of the IWM London following 
the refurbishment of the Great War exhibition for the centenary, Cameron sought to 
discuss ‘the reasons why we fought’.80 He commented that: 
In the century since this conflict began, too many have cast it as a pointless war. 
One fought by young men who didn’t know why they were fighting or what the 
objective was… But we should never forget that those who volunteered and fought 
believed they did so in a vital cause; to prevent the domination of Europe by one 
power; to defend the right of a small country – Belgium – to exist. They were right 
to believe these things, and that is something that I believe should be remembered 
and paid tribute to.81 
Throughout this speech, Cameron was not only seeking to justify the legitimacy of the First 
World War, but by extension appeared to be stressing that it was ‘proper’ both to serve 
and die for your country.82 Thus, by shifting the narrative of the conflict from the slaughter 
of millions in a ‘pointless war’ to one of the ‘sacrifice’ of men who fought and died for their 
country, state-sponsored commemorations appeared to be seeking to redeem the armed 
forces and portray them as both competent and professional. Here, the language of 
sacrifice redeems, while the language of slaughter does not. By highlighting the dedication 
of the military (and those willing to make the ‘ultimate sacrifice’) to the protection of the 
country and the values it holds dear, war appears justified. In this way, contemporary war 
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remembrance and commemoration of the First World War increasingly exhorted us to be 
proud of the men who died and, by extension, of the nation’s role in not only the Great 
War, but all subsequent military conflicts.83  
The continuing lively debate about the legitimacy of British involvement in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan added a further dimension to this re-framing of the World Wars not only in 
support of armed forces involvement in recent conflicts, but more specifically as a means 
of justifying UK Government decisions to go to war. In fact, in a House of Lords debate on 
Afghanistan on 5 November 2001 – just four weeks after the commencement of military 
operations – the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Ministry of Defence Lord 
Bach drew upon the two World Wars in his justification of operations: 
As we approach Remembrance Sunday, 11th November, I am certain that the 
millions who sacrificed their lives during the two world wars and the other conflicts 
of the past century would salute the soldiers, sailors and airmen, men and women 
alike, who make up our Armed Forces today and who are prepared to put their 
lives on the line for their country and for civilised values. Our Armed Forces have 
always fought in defence of civilisation – in the First World War against domination 
by one country; in the Second World War against fascism and Nazi totalitarianism; 
and now against the barbarism, for that is what it was, which revealed itself so 
grotesquely in the attacks of eight weeks ago.84  
The involvement of British troops in the controversial military operations, for example, 
appeared to lead to a revival of the idea of heroism in the First World War, which had been 
confined to oblivion in the interwar period.85 This has also been reflected in scholarship on 
the War. Historiographical reappraisal by historians such as Brian Bond and Gary Sheffield 
has sought to rehabilitate the image of the military leadership in the First World War, 
concluding that the leaders were not, in fact, as incompetent as has thus far been 
contended.86 As part of the Department of Communities and Local Government’s plans for 
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the centenary, for example, commemorative paving stones were installed in the home 
towns of all British Victoria Cross winners (and those with British ties). In announcing this, a 
Government representative commented that ‘the men who gave their lives in the Great 
War will remain heroes forever… No hero will be forgotten.’87 Furthermore, this notion of 
individual heroism was subsequently linked with those fighting in contemporary wars. For 
example, in a House of Commons Debate on First World War commemoration which took 
place on 7 November 2013, the forces serving in Afghanistan were explicitly compared to 
those who fought in the First World War. Dan Jarvis argued that: 
Today our forces in Afghanistan rightly take pride in the job that they do and the 
bands of service that they form, and the same applied to those who fought in 
World War One. During those years, soldiers fought for much. They fought because 
of a belief that their country was threatened, but ultimately, when it came down to 
it, they fought for their regiments and for the man standing next to them in the 
trench. If we want to pay proper tribute to the war dead – as I know that we do – 
and also to those who came through the war, we should seek to remember that.88  
Furthermore, on Remembrance Sunday in 2014, service personnel held a ceremony at 
Camp Bastion in southern Afghanistan to mark the centenary of the First World War, a 
ceremony which was given added poignancy by the deployment of units with battle 
honours from the First World War, such as the 5th Battalion the Rifles and the Queen’s 
Dragoon Guards. During this service, the experiences of troops serving in Afghanistan were 
once more linked with those of the Great War. Brigadier Thomson, for example, noted that 
‘the character demanded by combat has not changed’ and that troops represented ‘first-
hand witnesses of another generation of courageous and committed fighting men and 
women’.89 
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Both the Government and the Armed Forces were eager to underscore the national and 
civic importance of remembering service in the Armed Forces of the State. Consequently, 
commemoration of the World Wars, and especially remembrance days such as 
Remembrance Sunday and Armistice Day, were increasingly used in the contemporary era 
as a means of subtly popularising support for the Armed Forces. Remembrance days have, 
in fact, been closely linked with the concept of British national identity and thus functioned 
as what Danilova has referred to in a telling comparison with Putin’s Russia, ‘days of 
national unity’.90 Here, the public is reminded about its moral obligation to remember the 
fallen of the wars, share in national values and support those armed forces currently 
engaged in military operations. Significantly, such days introduce the values of supporting 
the armed forces, national mobilisation and military preparedness as key national values or 
components of national identity.91  
Contemporary versions of Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday, then, have 
increasingly taken military service as a starting point for commemoration. In this, a shift 
took place from emphasising the ‘war experiences’ of those involved in conflict to their 
‘military service’ in the name of the nation. Those killed whilst on military service became 
the ‘glorious dead’.92 This conceptual change brought about a decontextualization of the 
framing of remembrance, thus allowing the incorporation of the fallen from not only the 
World Wars, but also from current and indeed future conflicts.93 
The involvement of members of the armed forces in commemorative events across the 
United Kingdom designed to mark the centenary of the First World War is indicative of this 
linking of remembrance of the World Wars, national identity and the military. On 4 August 
2014, the hundredth anniversary of the start of the First World War, Defence Secretary 
Michael Fallon commented: 
Today is an opportunity to commemorate the spirit of the British people, our 
determination to fight for what is just, and our willingness to lay down our lives in 
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the name of our country… Our armed forces today, like those of a hundred years 
ago, embody the best of British, and it is right we honour all that they do for our 
country.94 
Here, to be commemorated are neither the ‘dead’ nor their sacrifice, but the ‘spirit of the 
British people’ – something both metaphysical and metahistorical and apparently not 
bound by existential experiences. In this, it is apparent that Fallon is not only seeking to 
legitimise British involvement in the First World War by emphasising the positive ‘spirit’ of 
the British people in fighting for ‘what is just’, but also claiming that this same spirit is 
embodied in those currently serving in the armed forces. This, in turn, appears to extend 
the concept of fighting for ‘what is just’ to contemporary military conflicts. Similarly, on 10 
June 2013, in announcing that battlefield visits for schoolchildren would form a key 
component of government plans to mark the First World War centenary, Communities 
Secretary Eric Pickles commented that ‘we have a duty to educate future generations 
about the First World War to ensure that the role our armed forces played, and continue to 
play, in defending the liberties we take for granted today are remembered’. 95 
Following this, politicians increasingly sought to relate the World Wars both to 
contemporary forms of patriotism and citizenship, and to the renewed need for active 
military service overseas. In his speech, given at IWM London, to launch the First World 
War centenary plans, Cameron, for example, claimed that those who fought and died were 
defending ‘the values we hold dear’. He went on to suggest that ‘we will continue to fight 
for the values they fought for’ – although he defined these only as ‘friendship, loyalty, and 
what the Australians would call “mateship”’.96 Moreover, while the World Wars have been 
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used as templates for the re-framing of modern conflicts, the ‘national master narratives’ 
of these wars as told by government have also helped to normalise modern warfare.97 
Under Blair, and then Cameron, the UK Government demonstrably appropriated the 
memory of the World Wars and re-inscribed these historical narratives as a means of 
garnering public support not only for the military, but also for their involvement in recent 
conflicts and for the justification of government decisions to go to war. In this reading, 
contemporary political discourse has thus viewed remembrance and commemoration as an 
instrument for creating a sense of British national identity, popularising support for the 
armed forces and government foreign policy. 
 
Conclusion 
Throughout the announcements regarding the recent First World War commemorations, 
the UK Government frequently claimed that its role in the centenary was merely to provide 
leadership and encouragement in organising commemorative acts whilst not dictating the 
themes of commemoration itself.98 Yet, this overlooks the fundamental role played by the 
Government in determining the wider framework within which the conflict should be 
remembered and represented, particularly through the narratives of war it chooses to 
emphasise and in its focus on certain acts of commemoration. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, various governments appeared keen to put forward certain historical 
interpretations to suit themselves, therefore appropriating the commemoration of the 
World Wars for their own purposes. 
This chapter has argued that state-sponsored commemoration of the World Wars since 
1994, and in particular since the late 1990s, has evolved in response to a number of social, 
political, constitutional and demographic changes. These changes, which have included 
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broadly the so-called ‘crisis of the union’, the rise of multi-culturalism and the involvement 
of the UK in a series of overseas conflicts, have all required the development of different 
historical narratives in order to bind the citizen and the state. Significantly, this has 
involved a degree of both continuity and discontinuity across the Governments of Major, 
Blair, Brown and Cameron as they have sought to manipulate commemoration as a means 
of responding to specific issues. 
Within this context, however, it is also possible to highlight a gradual shift towards the 
‘pluralisation of commemorative practices’ and the identification of fallen soldiers within 
state commemorations. Or, put simply, that there was a diversification of the war 
experiences reflected in official commemoration of the World Wars. This is demonstrated 
by the growing recognition of Commonwealth involvement in the World Wars and the 
subsequent impact of the Wars on the development of a ‘multi-cultural’ Britain, as well as 
the increasing emphasis on the shared experiences of the four component nations of the 
United Kingdom in those wars. This pluralisation of war experiences, however, is not 
incompatible with the idea of a unified nation. Instead, commemoration and the political 
discourse surrounding it emphasised the manner in which these various sub-groups fought 
and died for the British cause, for the United Kingdom and the Empire, and for British 
values and ideals, represented as our values and our shared ideals, while also linking this 
with contemporary conflicts. World War commemoration, therefore, remained a powerful 
tool in the hands of the state, mobilised by the central government as a means of fostering 
and reshaping allegiances towards a more inclusive yet still hegemonic ‘British’ identity. 
 
 
Chapter Two: World War Commemoration and the British Monarchy, 1994 
– 2016 
 
Over the past two decades, the commemoration of the First and Second World Wars has 
proven a powerful tool in the hands of the state. Increasingly, official commemoration has 
been appropriated and mobilised by the central government of the United Kingdom. On 11 
October 2012, for example, in launching the Coalition Government’s programme of events 
for the First World War centenary, David Cameron explicitly linked commemorations with 
the celebrations for the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee. He commented that it was the aim of his 
government to produce a commemoration that ‘like the Diamond Jubilee celebrated this 
year, says something about who we are as a people’.1 As Chapter One noted, this reference 
to the monarchy in the context of World War commemoration was significant for the way 
in which it indicated the Government’s desire to unite the British population around 
commemoration, as they had united around the Queen throughout the Jubilee. 
This is but one example of the multifarious and often complex ways in which the 
commemoration of the World Wars and the modern British monarchy have been, and 
continue to be linked. Unlike the Westminster Government, the monarchy dictates neither 
the events held nor the tone of commemoration. However, Queen Elizabeth II, and the 
royal family generally, have been ever-present in, and even at the forefront of, many 
official commemorative events. Indeed, the involvement of the monarchy in remembrance 
and commemoration includes not only their presence at the annual Remembrance Day 
service, but also the opening of major First and Second World War memorials such as the 
Flanders Fields Memorial Garden in 2014 and the Women of World War Two Memorial in 
2005. Additionally, members of the royal family have been involved in and represented 
Britain at numerous other commemorative events such as the commemoration of D-Day at 
home and abroad, as well as throughout the recent World War centenary 
commemorations. The iconography of the World Wars has also frequently been utilised 
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during royal events, such as the wedding ceremony of Prince William and Catherine 
Middleton on 29 April 2011, when the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight, which consisted of 
a Spitfire, Hurricane and Lancaster bomber, made a fly-past over Buckingham Palace.2 
It is important for this thesis to extend its focus to the relationship between the modern 
British monarchy and World War commemoration. This is due to a number of intertwined 
factors relating not only to this central role in commemorative events, but also to the 
sovereign’s position as ‘Head of Nation’ and ‘Head of the Armed Forces’ as well as ‘Head of 
State’ which situates it as a central institution in the political life of not only the United 
Kingdom as a whole but also its nation-states. Indeed, at the most fundamental level, the 
United Kingdom consisted of four nations (counting Northern Ireland as one) united by the 
monarchy through parliament.3 The official language of the state, in fact, highlights the 
significance of the monarchy as a source of union.4 This is demonstrated by its very name, 
‘the United Kingdom’, and the fact that the official title of the reigning sovereign is not the 
Queen of England, nor even of Great Britain, but of the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland’. In both instances the centrality of the Crown to the union between 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is clearly established, conveying a sense of 
permanence. The British monarchy, in fact, has remained important in not just political, but 
also as part of the national social and cultural life long after the monarchs ceased to govern 
as well as to reign in the early nineteenth century. Despite only having limited formal 
powers as ‘Head of State’, the monarchy continues to exercise what Joseph Nye has 
referred to as ‘soft power’, drawn from its ability to wield influence.5 Indeed, recognition 
that the monarchy represents a national symbol is ubiquitous within the historical 
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literature.6 Linda Colley, for example, notes that the monarchy has frequently functioned as 
a ‘national cement and emblem’, while Michael Billig has identified the existence of a ‘deep 
equation’ between the monarchy and the nation.7 Both Tom Nairn and Andrzej 
Olechnowicz, however, go one step further in suggesting that the monarchy remains a 
significant part of the British-identity structure, by acting as a means of binding the state 
together and representing, amongst other things, continuity, tradition, history and 
pageantry.8 Similarly, Richard Weight views monarchism as a key element of Britishness, 
referring to it as the ‘last bastion of Britishness’, whilst Paul Ward notes that from at least 
the late nineteenth to the late twentieth century the monarchy was seen as central to 
British national identity. 9  
This body of literature raises numerous questions about the nature of the monarchy’s role 
in the political and public life of the nation. Does the monarchy have a symbolic or a 
representative function – and, if so, what does it symbolise or represent? Has the gender of 
the sovereign affected the institutions constitutional character and the role played by the 
monarchy? Does the monarchy continue to embody national identity, and if so, how does it 
respond to the tension that exists between ‘Britishness’ and distinctive national and ethnic 
identities? More specifically, this chapter will analyse the role played by the British 
monarchy in the commemoration and remembrance of the World Wars. It will consider to 
what extent the monarchy’s central role in World War commemoration is merely a 
formality based on the sovereign’s function as ‘Head of State’, or whether this role is, in 
fact, far more significant than it may appear. It will explore how far the monarchy and the 
royal family, either on its own behalf or at the behest of politicians, has acted as a symbol 
in the commemoration of the World Wars that has sought to emphasise a particular 
‘British’ interpretation of those wars. Furthermore, it will consider how the monarchy’s 
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relationship to World War commemoration has affected expressions of place and politics. 
Primarily, the focus will be on the reigning sovereign, Queen Elizabeth II, however, this 
chapter will also consider the role played by the wider royal family.  Given the continued 
centrality of the monarchy in British political, social and cultural life, and the importance of 
the monarchy to the maintenance of the union, the study of the interplay between 
commemoration and the monarchy provides a further means of analysing the relationship 
between commemoration, remembrance and the politics of the union.  
It is worth highlighting, however, the complexities of analysing the role played by the 
monarchy in commemoration with the available sources. This is due in no small part to the 
constitutional monarchy, under which the monarch as ‘Head of State’ is separate from the 
‘Head of Government’.10 In this, the reigning monarch is required to remain strictly neutral 
with respect to political matters.11 Consequently, the Queen rarely makes political 
statements. During the Scottish independence referendum, for example, Buckingham 
Palace commented that ‘the sovereign’s constitutional impartiality is an established 
principle of our democracy and one which the Queen has demonstrated throughout her 
reign [...] the monarchy is above politics’. It continued: ‘[a]ny suggestion that the                                            
Queen would wish to influence the outcome of the referendum campaign is categorically 
wrong. Her Majesty is firmly of the view that this is a matter for the people of Scotland’.12 
Bearing in mind such difficulties, this chapter will draw on a systematic analysis of the 
rhetoric and narratives used in media coverage of royal and commemorative events in 
which members of the royal family are present. Additionally, royal speeches and addresses, 
political speeches and parliamentary debates as well as royal and commemorative events, 
rituals and ceremonies will be examined. 
This chapter consists of three sections, each of which will analyse a key feature of the 
monarchy in relation to World War commemoration. In this way, the thematic structure of 
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the chapter reflects its conceptual nature and seeks to draw out the links between 
monarchism in modern Britain and the commemoration of the World Wars.  The first 
addresses the issues raised by and the significance of the continuity of the monarchy and 
the longevity of key royal figures, more specifically, Queen Elizabeth II. The second section 
will analyse the impact of the monarch’s symbolic role as ‘Head of Nation’. Finally, section 
three will discuss questions arising from the Queen as a female monarch and the existence 
of the ‘royal family’ and if and how such questions affect commemoration.  
The main argument of this chapter is that the monarch’s role in, and links to, the 
commemoration of the World Wars goes beyond the limited nature of the representational 
duties which comprise the formal role of ‘Head of State’. Rather, this chapter contends that 
the monarchy is of far greater significance than has hitherto been assumed because of the 
ways in which politicians, and arguably members of the royal family themselves, have 
sought to utilise World War commemoration as a means of shaping national histories. In 
part, this chapter reflects a well-established view, first argued by Walter Bagehot in 1867, 
that stresses the continuity of the institution and longevity of key royal figures, in providing 
a sense of stability and establishing the monarchy as a direct link between the past and 
present.13 This, in turn, enables traditional narratives, such as that of a united Britain – 
images that have dominated the popular memory of the Wars - to be reinserted in the 
present. Furthermore, as the embodiment of the nation, when combined with this sense of 
permanence, the sovereign acts not only as a focal point in times of remembrance and 
commemoration, but also transcends national, regional and societal divisions and serves as 
a ‘unifying vehicle’. Similarly, the participation of the wider royal family in World War 
commemoration further enhances the ability of the monarchy to act as a symbol of unity. 
Moreover, the gender of the monarch has proved crucial as a female, specifically a mother 
figure, is arguably not only more relatable, but also easier to conceive of as the 
embodiment of the nation. This further highlighted the significance of the monarchy’s role 
as a symbol in the years since 1994, particularly from the early 2000s, as Queen Elizabeth II 
reached reign landmarks in both the Golden and Diamond Jubilees and - in the face of 
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challenges (such as terrorism and wars) and multiculturalism – acquired even more 
prominence as a symbol of stability and unity in a changing world. These changes have 
been political, socio-economic and cultural, including, amongst others, the decline of 
‘Britishness’, the rise of Celtic nationalism(s) demonstrated by moves for devolution and 
Scottish independence, and a gradual reassertion of more traditional values. 
 
The Continuity and Longevity of the Monarchy  
On 9 September 2015 Queen Elizabeth II became the United Kingdom’s longest-reigning 
monarch, surpassing the reign of her great-great grandmother, Queen Victoria. This 
followed the celebration of her Diamond Jubilee three years earlier, in 2012, which 
recognised her sixty years on the throne. Throughout both occasions, much attention was 
drawn to the continuity of the monarchy and more specifically, the sovereign’s long reign. 
Prime Minister David Cameron, for example, commented on the occasion of the jubilee 
that ‘all my life, and for the lives of most people in this country, she has always been there 
for us’, and went on to refer to the Queen’s reign as a ‘golden thread’ running through the 
generations.’14 Similarly, in a 2015 article in The Independent, historian Kate Williams noted 
that ‘the Queen’s longevity is a great source of her strength and popularity. She has lived 
through World War Two and throughout the twentieth century. Many people will not have 
known a different monarch.’15 
This illustrates the extent to which continuity and longevity are key features of the British 
monarchy today, as in Bagehot’s time. For Robert Hardman, the two most important by-
products of constitutional monarchy are stability and continuity, while Alan Hamilton 
commented in The Times that the monarchy’s ‘virtue is its essentially unchanging quality’.16 
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In particular, this continuity is seen to be established through the hereditary principle of 
Britain’s constitutional monarchy, which creates a sense of stability and permanence as 
well as providing a tangible link to the past. Here, as Billig has argued, it is the biological 
family line and so-called ‘royal family’ which is significant, acting as a symbol of continuity 
in the national consciousness and representing ‘both the past’s continuity into the present, 
and the continuity of the present into the future’.17 The perceived permanence of the 
biological line, therefore, allows for the imagining of the historical continuity and past 
heritage of royalty and, in turn, conveys a sense of history in the present. The multi-
generational nature of the Windsor royal family, then, has enabled four generations of the 
same family to represent not only the continuities, but, through the younger generation, 
also the changes in British society. Similarly, it has also meant that many people feel they 
have grown up with the Windsor family. Indeed, this combined with the ‘fame of royalty’ 
and the interest of the media in the royal family has, as Billig argues, meant that ‘our own 
lives seem to run in parallel to theirs’.18 Moreover, as Robert Tombs notes, the birth of a 
son, George, to the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge on 22 July 2013 was also taken as 
projecting the monarchy far into the future.19 Indeed, the wealth of coverage and attention 
which followed first the marriage of Prince William to Catherine Middleton, and then the 
birth of their son was seen as connecting the royal family to a whole new generation.20  
Consequently, the royal family was persuasively represented as ‘a guarantee of stability, 
security, continuity, the preservation of traditional values’ and thus reflects the dialectic 
between the past and present.21 Moreover, the age of the institution and the link that this 
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continuity generates and preserves with Britain’s history itself is often portrayed as an 
important part of the association of royalty to national identity, as a ‘national emblem’ and 
enduring institution.22 Even Tom Nairn (himself a republican socialist and a Scottish 
nationalist) has admitted that the monarchy has made a unique contribution to the 
imagining of the British nation’s past.23  
The stability generated by the ‘effortless continuity’ of Britain’s constitutional monarchy, 
which bridges the discontinuity of party politics in the present while simultaneously 
generating a link with Britain’s past, is a core source of the institution’s strength. In recent 
years, this has been bolstered by the longevity of key royal figures.24 It is the apparent 
changelessness of British royal figures – especially in times of transformation – which 
‘appears to offer reassurance that not all is changing beyond recognition’.25 In the UK, 
therefore, the longevity of and thus public’s familiarity with these individuals can conceal 
the full extent of the changes taking place, creating a semblance of continuity where little 
exists.26 
There are interesting parallels between Queen Victoria’s reign and that of the reigning 
sovereign, Queen Elizabeth II. At the point of her Diamond Jubilee in 2012, for example, the 
sovereign had reigned through the terms of twelve Prime Ministers, which has since 
become fourteen [See Figure 2.1]. Furthermore, throughout her reign, which commenced 
in 1952, Queen Elizabeth II has overseen a period of rapid, and occasionally turbulent, 
change as Britain’s position in the world, the economy and the fundamental structure of 
society have all been transformed. Her reign, for example, has seen a dramatic growth in 
population from 50.5 to 63.1 million as well as borne witness to an unprecedented level of 
decolonisation during which the number of Britain’s overseas territories declined from 70 
                                                             
22 Ward, Britishness since 1870, p.17; A. Jay, Elizabeth R. The Role of the Monarchy Today (London: 
BBC Books, 1992). 
23 Nairn discussed in Billig, Talking of the Royal Family, p.26; Nairn, The Enchanted Glass.  
24 C. Lee, Monarchy: Past, Present… and Future? (London: Bene Factum Publishing Ltd, 2014), p.18; 
see also Colley, Acts of Union, p.50. 
25 Billig, Talking of the Royal Family, p.220. 




in 1952 to just 15 in 2012.27 It is to this ‘loss of empire’ that Colley is referring to when she 
notes that ‘never in history has a polity given up ruling as many diverse parts of the globe 
as rapidly as the United Kingdom has been obliged to do since 1952’.28  
 
A recognition of the nature of the changes that have occurred throughout Queen Elizabeth 
II’s years on the throne was an inherent part of the 9 September 2015 debate in the House 
of Commons regarding “Her Majesty the Queen”. During this the Labour Deputy Leader, 
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Figure 2.1: A political cartoon depicting the 12 different Prime Ministers of Queen Elizabeth II’s 
reign up to September 2015. 
Attribution: Bob Moran, Daily Telegraph, 6 September 2015. British Cartoon Archive, University 
of Kent: 103013. Accessed at: https://www.cartoons.ac.uk/  




Harriet Harman, commented that ‘her reign spans profound changes in all respects: in work 
life, family life, our communities and technology’ and emphasised the ‘reassurance of 
continuity’ that her reign has provided ‘at a time of so much change’.29 In this address, 
Harman also noted that ‘her life has been a great sweep of British history’, pointing to the 
Second World War, the Cold War and fall of the Berlin Wall. Today, the Queen stands out 
as the last Head of State to have worn a uniform during World War Two, while her 
husband, the Duke of Edinburgh, is now the only remaining major figure on the world stage 
who saw active service during the Second World War. Cameron similarly stressed that the 
Queen had been a ‘rock of stability… in an era in which our country has changed so much’ 
before continuing that she provided ‘an enduring focal point for all her people’.30  Ben 
Pimlott, in his biography of Elizabeth II, goes further in suggesting that a crucial component 
of the Queen’s importance is her ability to remain a constant in a changing world.31 Pimlott 
also highlights that Buckingham Palace itself has recognised this, and increasingly ‘focused 
on what had become the Monarchy’s greatest asset’ – that – ‘through good times and bad, 
she had always been there’.32 Hardman has also stressed that the Queen represents the 
‘living incarnation of a set of values and a period of history’, meaning that ‘to millions of 
people around the planet she represents continuity on a scale bordering on the 
incomprehensible’.33  
It is not simply the longevity of Queen Elizabeth II that should be seen to establish this 
sense of continuity and links between the past and present, but also that of Queen 
Elizabeth the Queen Mother. Indeed, throughout the celebration of her hundredth 
birthday in 2000 it was frequently noted that she represented ‘the continuity and strength 
of the monarchy, and its central role in the affairs of the nation’ whilst simultaneously 
highlighting the ‘stability’ that ‘constitutional monarchy brings’.34  
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Moreover, two years later, a number of the tributes which followed the Queen Mother’s 
death emphasised her ‘unchanging’ nature. In the House of Lords debate of 3 April 2002, 
for example, it was noted that ‘her life spanned a century of enormous change in the 
world’ yet ‘she herself never changed. She remained a pillar of stability’.35 Similarly, during 
the equivalent House of Commons debate it was commented that ‘she had become a 
symbol of continuity in our society, and continuity brings with it a sense of security, which 
we all […] need in our lives’.36 This is demonstrative of the emphasis that was placed on the 
stability and continuity that the Queen Mother’s long life had ultimately provided.  
Significantly, in all these tributes reference was repeatedly made to the ‘remarkable part 
played by the Queen Mother as Queen and Consort to her much-loved husband, the late 
King George VI’.37 Indeed, much of the rhetoric surrounding these events focused explicitly 
on such memories of the Second World War as well as their close relationship as a family. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the way in which the courage of their Majesties 
‘inspired and strengthened a nation in a manner which will be remembered always’.38 On 
the Queen Mother’s hundredth birthday, for example, Prime Minister Tony Blair 
commented that: 
Countless people have etched on their minds the wartime pictures of the Queen 
and her husband engaging with the hazards of the capital during the Blitz. 
Sustaining the nation’s morale and strengthening its resolve in the epic battle for 
freedom, she was a source of inspiration which sealed her in our nation’s heart, 
just as, during the First World War, the young Lady Elizabeth had provided care and 
welfare in the hospital at Glamis castle helping others in her direct, straightforward 
and positive way.39 
In referencing such events, Blair was not only highlighting the links between the Queen 
Mother and the Second World War, but also refocusing attention on a time when ‘the 
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nation’ (the UK) was perceived to have stood together. In fact, although this has been 
disputed in academic accounts, the popular memory of the War remains overwhelmingly 
one of national unity – when internal divisions were overcome in the face of an external 
threat.40 Blair was simply reinforcing this popular memory by focusing on entirely positive 
depictions of a nation at war, which spoke to the narrative of Britain’s ‘Finest Hour’, and 
the qualities of strength and resolve during the ‘battle for freedom’. Here, the reference to 
the Blitz is particularly meaningful. As Lucy Noakes has highlighted, the Blitz is especially 
dominant in the public memory of the war years as a time when the British people pulled 
together.41 Throughout the commentary on the Queen Mother’s life, in fact, numerous 
references were made to the decision of the then Queen to remain in London, with her 
family, to face ‘the perils of the Blitz’ and share ‘without hesitation the grief and danger of 
the poorest’.42 
Fundamentally, the monarchy’s continuity with the past and the continuing existence of 
the royal family, the stability this provides and their ability to encapsulate and embody the 
nation’s history allows for the recollection of times of national self-confidence amidst 
ongoing change. However, it is not just the monarchy which seeks to do this. Post-war 
commemoration has often had a nostalgic tone and acted as a way of reinserting older 
narratives into the public consciousness by linking the present with the past and all that 
past is taken to represent. It is this, often referred to as ‘restorative’ or ‘backward-looking’ 
nostalgia, which seeks to reconstruct past traditions and values.43 Both Remembrance 
Sunday and Armistice Day, for example, have traditionally been moments not only to look 
to and remember the past, but to emphasise the links that exist between then and now, 
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‘between those who serve today and those who served in the past’.44 In this, the Queen is 
often regarded and represented as a ‘living symbol of that continuity’, as someone who 
was ‘part of a generation born in the shadow of the First World War and raised amid the 
struggles of the Second’.45 The monarchy’s involvement in commemoration, thus 
represents a further means of reinserting such narratives.  
Furthermore, links between the monarchy and the World Wars have not only been made 
within political debates and discussion of members of the royal family themselves, but 
have also proven a significant and ever-growing dimension of media coverage of and the 
monarchy’s involvement in remembrance. Throughout the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day in 
1995, for example, the monarchy was placed at the forefront of the commemorations.46 
For Hardman, the Queen and the royal family ‘represented the perfect focal points for a 
complex range of national and international emotions’ during these anniversaries which 
involved millions of people all over the country. As such, they in themselves acted as a 
‘phenomenal force for national unity’.47 Significantly, the Queen Mother was ever-present 
during the 3-day weekend as the woman who, rather than evacuate London, remained in 
Buckingham Palace to face down the Blitz. In what must have been a well-considered 
government and royal decision, it was the Queen Mother, as opposed to the Queen, who 
joined the Prime Minister, John Major, in Hyde Park on 6 May to formally open the 
weekend of events.48 Indeed, in reporting on the commemorations, The Independent 
newspaper, for example, noted that she represented the ‘living symbol of a nation’s 
fortitude in oppression’.49 Moreover, in the House of Commons debate regarding the 
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address to be presented to the sovereign on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary, Major 
noted that: 
[I]t is no surprise that Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother continues to 
hold such a special place in the affection of the British people [given that] when 
Britain stood alone, the courage and determination of the King and Queen offered 
strength to the British people and to countless millions beyond our shores.50  
Major also drew attention to the role of the reigning sovereign in commenting that ‘the 
then Princess […] played her full part in furthering the war effort’ before continuing that 
since then ‘Her Majesty has continued to set an example of duty and service to the nation 
and to the Commonwealth through the 50 years since then’.51  
This linkage of the past and present remained prominent throughout the entire weekend of 
commemoration and celebration. An examination of the Radio Times for the week 
commencing 6 May, for example, reveals that a programme entitled HRH the Princess 
Margaret: Memories of VE Day was broadcast on VE Day, 8 May.52 In this, the Princess 
recalled her memories of the War and, in particular, the night of VE Day itself when her and 
her sister went out to join the celebrations in the streets of London. Similarly, in the Official 
Commemorative Programme the Message from the Queen also highlighted this link with 
the past noting: ‘As we look back to those wartime years which so many of us remember so 
clearly, let us commemorate with dignity those who contributed to the victory and 
celebrate with joy what they won’.53 The significance of the continuity between the 
commemorations of 1995 and events of 1945 embodied by the senior royals, however, is 
perhaps best highlighted by the recreation of the 1945 VE Day balcony scene at 
Buckingham Palace. In the original scene, the King, Queen, their two daughters and 
Winston Churchill appeared on the balcony to acknowledge the cheers and gratitude of a 
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spontaneous gathering of people outside the palace. On 8 May 1995, this was repeated by 
the three remaining living members. In recognition of the role she played during the War as 
Queen, the Queen Mother stepped into view on the balcony first to be greeted by a loud 
cheer from the crowd.54 It had been intended that she would remain alone for a few 
moments;  however, she was soon joined by Queen Elizabeth II and Princess Margaret. 
Ultimately, this balcony appearance, as Pimlott has also argued, was deeply affecting to all 
those with a sense of the nation’s history and achievement and significantly, helped to 
‘revive the bond between Monarchy and people’ following the ‘annus horribilis’ of 1992.55 
Significantly, this emphasis on historical continuity throughout the 1995 VE Day 
commemorations coincided with a resurgence of nostalgia for the British Empire, a time 
when Britain was perceived to be ‘great’. The anniversary, in fact, became a celebration, 
designed to provide a reassuring picture of Britain as a united, self-contained island nation, 
the predominant tone was one of patriotic nostalgia. In fact, the whole weekend appeared 
as a swan-song of war culture, demonstrated by the holding of jitterbug classes and street 
parties.56 The historical continuity of the monarchy and its connection with the former days 
of Britain’s perceived greatness also links closely with this nostalgia for the Empire, making 
it easier not only to associate those values with the present, but also to believe that history 
is not entirely lost. 
This attention on the association between the monarchy and the World Wars was not only 
present during the 1995 VE Day commemorations, but has also characterised much of the 
rhetoric surrounding and coverage of World War commemoration and remembrance in 
recent decades. This same period also witnessed a resurgence of academic and media 
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nostalgia for the British Empire, a time when Britain was perceived to be ‘great’, and a 
growth of the idea of continuing British greatness.57 Indeed, the monarchy’s ability to link 
the past with the present and evoke the memory of the World Wars has grown in 
importance as the World War generations die out and the living memory of that period 
fades.  
Not surprisingly, popular representations of the World Wars came to emphasise this link 
between the monarchy and the events of the War themselves. Based on true events, the 
film A Royal Night Out, released on 15 May 2015 after special showings around the country 
on 8 May to coincide with the seventieth anniversary of VE Day, depicted that night in 1945 
when the Princesses Elizabeth (played by Sarah Gadon) and Margaret (played by Bel 
Powley) left Buckingham Palace in order to join the masses in the end of the War 
celebrations.58 In this film, the interweaving of archive news footage within the film, which 
includes Churchill’s Victory in Europe Day announcement and crowds flocking to 
Buckingham Palace, and the focus on the Princess Elizabeth at its heart was but one way in 
which a sense of continuity between the past and present was created. 
Throughout the film, much emphasis was placed on the role played by members of the 
royal family during the War. In a telling scene, Jack Hodges (played by Jack Reynor), a 
fictional airman and staunch republican whom Princess Elizabeth meets during her night 
out, is visibly angered by the King’s official radio broadcast following the end of the War. 
Jack dismisses the King’s use of the word ‘fallen’ and his reference to ‘their sacrifice in the 
face of a merciless enemy’ remarking snidely ‘which he’d know all about’. Such a damning 
indictment of the King, however, draws a strong rebuttal from both the incognito Princess 
Elizabeth and other British citizens listening to the broadcast.59 In the ensuing scene, 
Elizabeth goes on to state ‘well let me tell you… my whole family served in this war’, thus 
highlighting the role played by the royal family.60 Throughout the film, in fact, as Kate 
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Stables notes in her review, ‘the pubs and rammed streets teem with cockney monarchists, 
making much of how the Windsors shared Blitz dangers with their countrymen in Great 
Britain’s “finest hour”’ through the use of phrases such as ‘they [the royal family] got us 
through this bloody war’.61 In this, the film both drew attention to and reinforced the link 
between the past and the politics of the present. A Royal Night Out, therefore, is 
demonstrative of one way in which the memory of the past can be represented. It draws 
on a number of tropes common to films which approach the subject of the British 
monarchy. Indeed, it not only links the monarchy with the Second World War, as does The 
King’s Speech, but also much like The Queen ‘probes the tension between internal palace 
politics and external public relations’.62 Moreover, throughout the film, as many reviewers 
noted, director Julian Jarrold created a sense of 1940s nostalgia using crowd scenes that 
‘carry an authentic sense of clamour and chaos’ capturing the ‘excitement of a liberated 
London after the Blitz in full patriotic splendour’. This included ‘the faces of courageous, 
resilient British people, young and old, celebrating the values they fought the Germans to 
reclaim for King and Country’.63 It is this which led Stables to argue that the film epitomised 
a ‘nostalgic wartime fairytale’ which seemed to be a ‘comforting fantasy valorising an era 
when national identity was less complicated and beer was 8d a pint’.64 Moreover, the 
Britain we see is ‘one happy family, a loyal, monarchy-loving monoculture, where the Royal 
Family play the role of the nations’ dutiful parents, and their subjects that of cheeky but 
grateful children’.65 
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These links between the past and present were further emphasised by the speeches and 
addresses given by members of the royal family during such events and anniversaries. 
During her address on the occasion of the 10 July 2005 Commemorative Event for the 
sixtieth anniversaries of VE and VJ Days, for example, coming only three days after the 7 
July terrorist bombings in London, Queen Elizabeth II noted that ‘sadly, we cannot claim 
that the world has been free from war – or terror – for the last sixty years’.66 She 
continued, ‘it does not surprise me that, during the present, difficult days for London, 
people turn to the example set by that generation – of resilience, honour, sustained 
courage, often under conditions of great deprivation’.67 Moreover, the Queen’s 2014 
Christmas message, which focused predominantly on the overarching theme of 
‘reconciliation’ and ‘forgiveness’, placed images of the Great War at its heart.68 Placed on 
the table behind her at Buckingham Palace, were pictures of her grandparents, George V 
and Queen Mary while next to these was one of Princess Mary’s Christmas boxes of 1914. 
The embossed brass boxes, filled with tobacco or chocolate, which were sent to the Armed 
Forces serving overseas, were paid for by the Sailors and Soldiers Christmas Fund, set up by 
Princess Mary, George V’s daughter. Significantly, the Queen’s discussion of the First World 
War was linked not only to the armed services today, but also to Northern Ireland’s 
Troubles and the Scottish independence referendum. She discussed her visit to the field of 
ceramic poppies display at the Tower of London and dwelt on the centenary anniversary of 
the start of the First World War, noting the manner in which ‘countries on both sides… 
came together to remember in peace’.69 Here, the Queen evoked the First World War 
Christmas Day Truce as an example of reconciliation between two opposing sides and 
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linked this to the present day. Indeed, from there the Queen’s speech went on to 
acknowledge that ‘reconciliation takes different forms’, and in reference to the political 
situation in Scotland, noted that ‘after the [independence] referendum many felt great 
disappointment, while others felt great relief’ before recognising that ‘bridging these 
differences will take time’.70 This ‘call for reconciliation between the people of Scotland in 
the wake of the divisive independence referendum’ was commented on in much of the 
newspaper coverage, particularly in Scotland.71 Ultimately, the speech returned to the First 
World War with the message ‘as the Christmas truce a century ago reminds us, peace and 
goodwill have lasting power in the hearts of men and women’.72 The speech, which was 
watched by 7.8 million people, appeared to have been received in a positive manner with a 
number of people taking to Twitter to comment under the #QueensSpeech. Moreover, 
much of the newspaper coverage of the speech highlighted both the Queen’s theme of 
reconciliation and references to the First World War and her linking of it with the present. 
The Belfast Telegraph under the headline ‘Reconciliation is Key to Future’, for example, 
commented that: 
[C]an anyone who viewed it [the ceramic poppy display] and grasped its 
significance ever doubt the futility of war and why reconciliation is a much more 
powerful weapon than even those weapons of mass destruction which are used so 
routinely throughout the world today? The Queen made that point forcefully in 
recalling her visit to Crumlin Road Gaol in Belfast, where terrorists were 
incarcerated during our Troubles but which today is a symbol of the reconciliation 
between former sworn enemies.73 
Similarly, writing in The Telegraph, Harry Mount noted that ‘she [the Queen] knew whereof 
she spoke when she said how moved she was by the poppies display at the Tower of 
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London this year. The only reaction, she said, to walking through the field of ceramic 
poppies was silence’. 
 
The Monarchy as a ‘Symbol of Unity’ 
World War commemoration, then, places a great deal of emphasis on both the continuity 
of the monarchy as an institution and the longevity of key royal figures. The monarchy is 
identified as a common thread running throughout the generations, providing reassurance, 
permanence and stability, an idea which is reminiscent of Bagehot’s claim that ‘the 
traditional strength of the hereditary monarch is at times of incalculable use’.74 This 
common thread, in turn, creates a sense of history in the present. Moreover, in noting the 
continuity of the monarchy it is frequently the key role played by the monarch and the 
royal family during the Wars which is emphasised. The linking of Britain’s past with its 
present through the monarchy is akin to the way in which commemoration of the World 
Wars, especially Remembrance Day, seeks to establish such connections. Consequently, the 
involvement of the monarchy in commemoration only serves to reinforce this further.  
It is through the monarchy, therefore, that the unifying narratives of the World Wars are 
often linked to the present day. Yet, this is not the sole way in which the monarchy’s 
involvement in commemoration draws attention to a shared history and seeks to establish 
a sense of unity among the different peoples of the United Kingdom. In a statement which 
remains relevant today, Bagehot noted that part of the function of the monarchy is to act 
as a ‘visible symbol of unity’.75 This ‘unifying role’ is identified in the definition of the 
monarch’s role not as ‘Head of State’, but as ‘Head of Nation’, or perhaps more accurately 
as the Head of the various nations which comprise the United Kingdom and the 
Commonwealth. Indeed, the official website of the British monarchy defines this role, 
which was first outlined by Sir Antony Jay in the 1990s, as follows: ‘as Head of Nation, the 
Queen’s role is less formal, but no less important for the social and cultural function it 
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fulfils. These include: providing a focus for national unity and pride; giving a sense of 
stability; recognising success, achievement and excellence, and supporting service to 
others’.76 Furthermore, in noting that ‘the monarchy is a focus for national unity’ the 
website also identifies the monarchy as ‘symbolising the permanence and stability of the 
nation’.77 This is indicative of what Billig has identified as the existence of a ‘deep equation’ 
of the monarchy with the nation.78 Moreover, it also highlights the existence of a symbiotic 
relationship between the continuity of the monarchy, discussed in the previous section, 
and its ability to act as a symbol of unity. Indeed, it is the continuity of the monarchy, and 
the way it has come to be regarded a synonymous with the nation itself, which enables it 
to represent and highlight the historic and enduring ties that bind the four nations of the 
United Kingdom.79 Writing during the Queen’s Golden Jubilee year, for example, former 
Prime Minister John Major commented that: 
The monarchy remains the most powerful symbol of one unified nation and, as 
unwise legislation dissolves the country into regional fiefdoms, the Queen may yet 
be the single most vital element to keep us united. Would the residual demand for 
independence in Scotland and Wales be containable if the head of state were to be 
an English president, as opposed to a hereditary monarch with historic affiliations 
to each part of the kingdom?80 
Here, Major drew attention not only to the significance of the Queen as a symbol uniting 
the four nations of the United Kingdom, but also to the fact that part of this ability to do so 
is strongly linked to the age of the institution and the continuity provided by the hereditary 
monarchy. 
Moreover, as Vernon Bogdanor has argued, it is the monarchy’s political neutrality which 
makes it a powerful symbol and allows the Queen to act as ‘Head of Nation’.81 This political 
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neutrality then enables the sovereign, at times of national commemorations such as World 
War anniversaries, to speak for everyone regardless of political or other allegiances. This is 
a theme drawn out in popular representations of the monarchy. The popular feature film 
The King’s Speech (2010), for example, also highlights this unifying role and the notion that 
the monarch ‘speaks for’ and represents the nation.82 In this, King George VI (played by 
Colin Firth) simultaneously recognises his own decorative role and political impotence, yet 
the importance of this symbolic function. ‘If I am to be King… where is my power? May I 
form a Government, levy a tax or declare a war? No! Yet I am the seat of all authority. 
Why? Because the Nation believes when I speak, I speak for them’.83 Here, The King’s 
Speech not only draws on cultural representations of the Second World War as a time of 
unparalleled national unity, but also highlights that it is through the monarchy that such a 
sense of unity was established. Whilst a fictional film, The King’s Speech alludes to 
something which has been argued in a number of biographical accounts of King George VI: 
that he did, indeed, help to unify Britain.84  Throughout the War, as the representative of 
all the British people, King George served to counteract the divisions that threatened 
societal unity, whilst his broadcasts and direct interactions with his subjects were seen to 
promote a sense that all Britons were in it together. 
As this illustrates, the monarchy has sought to act as a force encouraging a sense of 
‘Britishness’, by serving as a national cement and emblem.85 For Bogdanor, this unifying 
role of the monarchy has become ever more important in recent decades with the advent 
of devolution, which has highlighted the United Kingdom as an explicitly multi-national 
state.86 Indeed, he argues that it is the monarch alone who is ‘in a position to interpret the 
country to itself’ and ‘who can belong, not to any single one of the nationalities comprising 
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the United Kingdom, but to all of them’.87 The sovereign herself has also recognised this 
role. This can be exemplified by an analysis of the Diamond Jubilee celebrations of 2012. 
During her Jubilee address, the Queen dedicated herself ‘anew to the nation’ and 
referenced explicitly the ‘power of togetherness’ which she looked ‘forward to seeing in 
many forms as we travel throughout the United Kingdom and the wider Commonwealth’.88 
This came in the context of not only the Jubilee, but also against the background of the 
Scottish National Party’s commitment to hold a referendum on Scottish independence 
(published in the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary Election Manifesto) and the subsequent 
negotiations between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Scottish Parliament 
to provide the latter with the powers to hold such a referendum [See Figure 2.2].89 Despite 
this context, throughout the jubilee there was both organised and spontaneous festivity on 
a large scale throughout the United Kingdom which ranged from street parties to the 
Thames Diamond Jubilee Boat Pageant. The jubilee celebrations, therefore, appeared to 
witness a reassertion of a consciously British identity amongst sections of the population 
articulated around and symbolised by the Crown. Furthermore, the celebrations suggested 
that the Queen was able to represent ‘diversity within unity’, something which was 
extensively commented upon as early as her coronation in 1953. 
Indeed, as Ward contends, the monarchy, and events involving the monarchy, provides a 
way in which unity and diversity can be celebrated through participation, allowing for the 
validation of different social and national identities while simultaneously stressing unity 
within the kingdom.90 Ward also argues that the celebration of monarchy is not only 
compatible with a sense of ‘Welshness’, ‘Scottishness’ and some forms of ‘Irishness’, but 
also has explicitly provided opportunities for establishing this compatibility between these 
distinctive national identities and a sense of British identity.91 To this end, through regular 
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royal visits, the reigning sovereign has been able to act as a focus for national unity and in 
doing so, validate the national distinctiveness of each of these component nations. During 
Queen Elizabeth II’s Golden Jubilee year, for example, it was noted by then Prime Minister 
Tony Blair that ‘the Queen and Duke of Edinburgh will be travelling as widely as possible 
around the United Kingdom during this year, including visits to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland… Their itinerary will enable them to meet as many people as possible 
throughout the country’.92 This tour of the United Kingdom, in fact, lasted for thirty-five 
days and incorporated a far more inclusive set of events than in the past. Ultimately, the 
Jubilee enabled the royal family to reassert the more traditional notions of ‘Britishness’ 
which they had sought to represent, at the end of which the Queen thanked her subjects 
for their loyalty:  
I have been profoundly moved by the affection shown and by the warmth of the 
response to my Golden Jubilee. It has been for Prince Philip and me a summer of 
great joy and happiness, and a celebration of all that binds us together as a nation: 
the heritage of our past, the values of our present, and the shared challenges of 
the future that lies ahead. I thank you all for your loyalty and support.93 
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The concern of the monarchy, therefore, was for the unity and social cohesion of the 
nations of the United Kingdom. Indeed, the sovereign must be seen to treat the whole 
‘nation’ (used here to refer to all members of the four component nations of the United 
Kingdom) as a single unit.94 Following this, the British monarchy has sought to overcome 
other divisions within society such as class, ethnic and gender divisions, in order to unite 
the country. Indeed, throughout her reign the Queen has overseen what Hardman has 
referred to as the ‘greatest demographic change in the country’s history’ – immigration.95 
He contends that the importance of the Queen as a force for unity cannot be overstated in 
this context. 
In fact, part of the strength of the monarchy is drawn from the fact that the British Empire, 
which ‘pivoted ideologically and organisationally on the monarchy’, was always a multi-
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Figure 2.2: A political cartoon which depicts the idea of the Queen as a symbol of unity.  
Attribution: Paul Thomas/Daily Express, 16 September 2014. British Cartoon Archive, 
University of Kent: PTD0167. Accessed at: 
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ethnic enterprise, meaning that a familiarity with different races is inbuilt.96 Malcolm 
Rifkind, for example, has commented that ‘the Queen has perhaps found it easier, and at a 
much earlier date, to contemplate the fact that Britain is a multi-racial society because her 
family ruled a multi-racial empire, and she is Head of the Commonwealth’.97 Consequently, 
people of all nationalities and ethnicities within the United Kingdom have this common 
bond of monarchy which enables them to share in the symbols of ‘Britishness’ and, 
therefore, feel part of British society. The monarchy has, therefore, acted as an integrative 
factor incorporating the working class as well as the middle class, Scotland, Wales, parts of 
Ireland and immigrants into the United Kingdom, especially at times of national 
celebration.98 As Nairn has stressed, the ‘single and vital unifying ideology of British 
royalism’ is a focal point of British culture and a ‘common language spoken in widely 
different dialects’.99  
In this, the monarchy appears to have increasingly become a substitute for arguments in 
favour of the Union, as many of the institutions and factors around which it was built have 
failed or disappeared altogether. Indeed, as Weight has noted, the Union is no longer 
bolstered by war and Protestantism, nor by the British Empire, its ‘original raison d’étre’.100 
Moreover, while historically the Union was associated with economic success, this ended 
with the downturn in the British economy beginning in 2007. Indeed, throughout the 
Scottish independence referendum, the ‘Better Together Campaign’ failed to articulate a 
positive vision for Scotland remaining in the Union or express what its purpose was and 
why it remained beneficial. Rather, much of David Cameron’s articulation of why he 
wanted Scotland to remain as part of the Union appeared to be based on a kind of 
nostalgia for the idea of a United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In this, 
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the ‘Better Together Campaign’ appeared reliant on the endurance of any social or 
emotional sense of commonality, including a sense of shared history and shared 
institutions. Here, the significance of the monarchy became apparent. Indeed, amidst the 
almost deafening silence of alternative arguments in favour of ‘Britishness’ and the Union, 
the monarchy has retained its currency and credibility over the decades. Ipsos MORI polls 
conducted in May 2012, for example, showed that 80% of British adults’ favoured Britain 
remaining a monarchy (with only 13% saying they wished to see it become a Republic), and 
90% (82% in 2002) of British adults stated that they were satisfied with the way the Queen 
is doing her job. This, in fact, represented the highest level of satisfaction with the Queen 
that Ipsos MORI had recorded since 1992.101 It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that as 
was widely reported in the press, the Queen was encouraged to intervene in the 
independence referendum by the Government. The Telegraph, for example, reported that 
‘David Cameron is under growing pressure to ask the Queen to speak out in support of the 
Union as ‘senior MPs have suggested an intervention from Her Majesty could “make all the 
difference” as a TNS poll shows the Yes and No campaigns running neck and neck’.102 
Moreover, her comments to a member of the public on 14 September, only four days 
before the vote, that she hoped people would ‘think very carefully about the future’ were 
widely interpreted as a deliberate intervention in favour of a No vote, despite Buckingham 
Palace’s insistence that her remarks were politically neutral.103  
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It is this unifying ability which has led Jackson to comment that the monarchy transcends 
both class and nation, a point that also recurred in media commentaries in the 1990s.104  In 
this way, the monarchy bears a striking resemblance to World War remembrance, 
especially as it has developed over the last three decades. During both World Wars, 
soldiers were killed on a large scale irrespective of class, nationality, ethnicity and religion. 
Consequently, World War commemoration, in memorialising those who gave their lives 
while fighting for the United Kingdom, overcomes these divisions. Moreover, as Chapter 
One demonstrated, state commemoration of the World Wars has frequently sought to play 
a comparative unifying role. The involvement of the monarchy in commemoration, 
therefore, not only reflected commemoration’s ability to transcend societal divisions, but 
also reinforced the sense of unity which it meant to convey, creating a shared affinity that 
bridges the gulf arising from accidents of birth.105 
The power of the monarchy, therefore, is in overcoming internal divisions and to represent 
not just a government but an entire nation.106 This can be illustrated through an analysis of 
the rhetoric and language used in newspaper coverage of, and parliamentary debates 
about, commemorative events. In much of the coverage of Remembrance Day over the 
years, for example, attention has been drawn to and an emphasis placed on the Queen 
‘leading’ the nation. In this, numerous headlines state that ‘Queen Leads Cenotaph 
Ceremony’, ‘Queen Leads Weekend of Commemoration’, ‘Remembrance Sunday: Queen 
Leads Tributes’ or even ‘Queen Mother Leads War Tributes’.107 Here, it is apparent that the 
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Queen is leading the nation in mourning in channelling the grief of the nation, something 
which was also apparent during the funeral of Princess Diana (although it should be noted 
that the responses of the British public to Diana’s death were far more diverse and complex 
than the media accounts of a nation united in grief suggested).108  
The ability of the monarch to represent the entire nation was perhaps most clearly 
articulated during the British State Visit to the Republic of Ireland, which took place from 
17 to 20 May 2011. This visit built on an earlier, and the first, public meeting between 
Queen Elizabeth and President Mary McAleese, at the opening of the Island of Ireland 
Peace Tower in Messines in 1998 (cf. Chapter Three). Significantly, the royal visit to the 
Republic of Ireland was the first by a British monarch to an independent Ireland. Prior to 
this, the last visit had come a century earlier in 1911, when King George V travelled to an 
Ireland still united under British rule within the Empire.109  
The Queen’s first substantive public engagement during the visit was the wreath-laying 
ceremony at the Garden of Remembrance in Dublin’s City Centre. Located in Parnell 
Square, the Garden, which is dedicated to ‘all those who gave their lives in the cause of 
Irish Freedom’ between 1798 and 1921, represents, as Nuala Johnson has argued, the 
‘most significant commemorative space’ to the Easter Rising of 1916.110 During the 
ceremony at the Garden, the Queen stepped forward to lay a laurel wreath at the foot of 
the memorial, before stepping back and bowing her head. On 18 May, President McAleese 
and Queen Elizabeth visited the Irish National War Memorial at Islandbridge. There, they 
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performed an almost identical act of homage to the Irish soldiers killed in the War, both 
Nationalist and Unionist. As Edward Madigan has argued, this unprecedented action and 
the ‘reverential demeanour’ of the Queen at the Garden of Remembrance was ‘truly 
historic’.111 Here, the actions of the Queen demonstrated that she was prepared to bow 
her head in recognition of the sacrifices made by those who fought for Irish independence 
from British rule, in much the same way that she bows her head at the Cenotaph each year. 
This gesture, which the Taoiseach Enda Kenny referred to as ‘symbolism beyond words’, 
became the dominant image of the visit.112 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the visit received 
extensive coverage in both the British and Irish press, much of which focused primarily on 
what it symbolised for contemporary Anglo-Irish relations. As Marina Dekavella and Kevin 
Rafter have highlighted, there was a tendency to stress its ‘enormous historical and 
political significance’ as well as both its ‘historic’ and ‘conciliatory’ nature.113 Hardman, 
writing in the Daily Mail, for example, referred to the Queen’s actions as an ‘unspoken but 
colossal gesture’. He continued by suggesting that ‘for the large majority of Irish people… 
the sight of the British Sovereign laying a wreath here, bowing her head and marking a 
minute’s silence, was a profound and welcome shift in the bilateral narrative’.114  
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Just as the monarchy has served as a unifying device, commemoration of the World Wars 
in the United Kingdom has also been seen to emphasise unity and national solidarity. This is 
in contrast to other European countries such as France, where the Second World War was 
characterised by defeat, occupation, collaboration, resistance and persecution. 
Consequently, the collective memory of the Second World War has been defined by 
competing and contested narratives and has played a role in shaping the sense of the past 
held by various segments of French society.115 This, in turn, has meant that the official 
memory and commemoration of the War has been characterised by messiness, 
politicisation and a ‘multi-directional tug and pull’.116  
By contrast, in the United Kingdom the willingness of both the Crown and the Government 
to work together for the sake of unity, and thus create a sense that they shared in the 
nation’s sacrifices, allowed the fabric of the country to survive. Hugh Kearney, for example, 
notes that the common feeling of ‘Britishness’ which was created by the First World War in 
part turned around the monarchy.117 Here, the symbiotic relationship between the 
monarch the nation was crucial. Furthermore, during the address to the sovereign on the 
fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, Major stated that ‘[t]hroughout the War, the royal family 
symbolised the unity of the nation and of the Commonwealth, and the willingness to make 
whatever sacrifices were necessary to ensure victory and the preservation of a free way of 
life’.118 This is an idea which was reinforced by, as Queen Elizabeth II commented, the 
‘tradition of very long standing that the Sovereign, and members of the Royal Family, are 
intimately associated with the Armed Forces and have been proud to serve in all three 
                                                             
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/queen-pays-tribute-to-irish-dead-
2285163.html [Date Accessed: 17/09/2019]. 
115 See O. Wieviorka, Divided Memory. French Recollections of World War II from the Liberation to 
the Present (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
116 J. Ebel, ‘Book Review: Divided Memory: French Recollections of World War II from Liberation to 
the Present by O. Wieviorka’, French Forum, Vol 39:1 (2014), p.163; See also R. Fathi, ‘French 
Commemoration: The Centenary Effect and the (Re)discovery of 14-18’, Australian Journal of 
Political Science, 50:3 (2015), pp.545-552. 
117 H. Kearney, ‘The Importance of Being British’, Political Quarterly, 71:1 (2000), p.21.  
118 J. Major, ‘Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World War II’, Hansard House of Commons 




services’.119  Queen Elizabeth II, for example, is not only ‘Head of the Armed Forces’ as the 
reigning sovereign, but she also served as an active member of the Auxiliary Territorial 
Service during the last year of the Second World War in 1945. Similarly, the Duke of 
Edinburgh also served in the Royal Navy between 1939 and 1952 and features in several 
war despatches for his actions in the Battle of Matapan during the Second World War.120 
Queen Elizabeth’s father, King George VI, fought at the Battle of Jutland.121 More recently, 
Prince William served as a Regimental Officer in the British Army before undertaking 
attachments to the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy while Prince Harry served in the British 
Army for ten years. The monarchy’s involvement in commemoration is, therefore, 
simultaneously a reminder of and draws attention to that willingness to sacrifice for the 
common good. 
Fundamentally, the presence of the monarchy, as the embodiment of the nation, in 
commemorative events acts both as a focal point for channelling emotions and as a 
‘unifying vehicle’, drawing together the four nations of the United Kingdom, as well as 
transcending other societal divisions such as class and ethnicity. This ability to act as a 
symbol of unity is derived from a number of sources. The continuity of the institution and 
longevity of key royal figures, which in establishing direct links between the World Wars 
and the present day, both highlights the significant role played by the monarchy during the 
Wars and enables past narratives of a country ‘in it together’ to be reinserted into the 
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present day. Furthermore, the apolitical nature of the monarchy allows the sovereign to act 
as ‘Head of Nation’ and unequivocally represent the entire populace.   
 
The ‘Royal Family’ and the Role of Women in the Monarchy 
Thus far, this chapter has demonstrated that the role of the monarch and the monarchy in, 
and their links to, commemoration of the World Wars is of far greater significance than 
simply fulfilling representational duties as the ‘Head of State’. However, much of the 
popularity of the monarch, and their ability to act as a unifying figure, is derived not simply 
from their role as ‘Head of Nation’, but also from the perception that the sovereign is the 
‘Head of a National Family’. For Ward, it is the representation of the monarch as Head of 
the National Family that has enabled them, in part, to overcome internal social and 
geographical divisions.122 Throughout the Second World War, and in subsequent 
representations and popular memory of the War, for example, King George VI and Queen 
Elizabeth were frequently portrayed as the ‘nation’s dutiful parents’. 123 Perhaps more 
significantly, as the head of a family, the monarch ultimately becomes a more relatable 
figure. In The English Constitution, Bagehot noted this, commenting that: ‘a family on the 
throne is an interesting idea. It brings down the pride of sovereignty to the level of petty 
life’, and this intuition retains an enduring significance.124 This has become increasingly the 
case in the last three decades as younger members of the royal family, such as the Duke 
and Duchess of Cambridge and the Duke and Duchess of Sussex, have become more 
prominent in public life. The culmination of this were the Royal weddings of 2011 (Prince 
William and Catherine Middleton) and 2018 (Prince Harry and Meghan Markle), which had 
viewing figures on average of twenty-four and eighteen million in the United Kingdom 
respectively.125 This new generations of royals, and events such as these, are seen as 
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connecting the institution of the monarchy to younger generations and, as a result, 
extending its appeal.  
The sovereign’s role as ‘Head of the National Family’, therefore, is part of the wider 
charisma of the British monarchy. The concept of a ‘royal family’ provides a way in which 
ordinary people can relate their own lives to those who represent the monarchy. As both 
Nairn and Ward argue, a ‘royal family’ can create a sense of ‘they’re just like us’.126 It also 
holds additional appeal with those to whom the notion of ‘familyness’ and ‘family values’ 
appeals. It is worth noting, however, that the royal family appears to be held to a ‘higher’ 
standard by the British people than that to which they hold themselves, as if the public 
expect them to set an example and be a ‘perfect’ family.127 It is apparent, for example, that 
in contrast to the lives of Queen Elizabeth II and the Duke of Edinburgh, the perceived 
‘imperfection’ of Prince Charles’ lifestyle has contributed to the weakening of his personal 
appeal. Indeed, there has been a persistent public dissatisfaction with Prince Charles, a 
substantial part of which appears to relate to his divorced status. In the decade before his 
marriage to Camilla Parker Bowles in April 2005, for example, over 40% did not want a 
remarried Prince of Wales to become king while between 70 and 76% did not want the 
new Duchess of Cornwall to be eventually recognised as Queen.128 Furthermore, during the 
2012 Diamond Jubilee there was widespread discussion in the British media that succession 
should skip a generation so that the Duke of Cambridge, Prince William, would become 
king upon the Queen’s death.129 
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Significantly, the wider royal family also play an important role in the commemoration of 
the World Wars. Indeed, it is not just the Queen who represents the monarchy at 
commemorative events, but also other family members. This can be exemplified by the 
numerous publications on the official website of the British monarchy which detail the 
commitments of members of the royal family.130 The emphasis on family is significant 
because it enables the monarchy to appeal to and represent a far broader span of society – 
across different generations and genders. At a practical level, it also enables the monarchy 
to attend commemorations across the four nations of the United Kingdom, and even 
abroad.  
It has frequently been the female members of the royal family, however, who have 
featured the most prominently in World War commemoration and the coverage of such 
events. Here, it was the Queen Mother prior to her death in 2002, then Queen Elizabeth II 
and, more recently, the Duchess of Cambridge that have been featured more prominently. 
This may be due, in part, to the fact the sovereign herself is female, but it is also 
demonstrative of the importance of gender for the monarchy generally and, as discussed 
below, their role in commemoration more specifically. Perhaps more significantly, the 
British monarchy in the twentieth century has predominantly had a feminine face.131 This is 
due, in part, to the longevity of the Queens Consort, Mary and Elizabeth, in comparison to 
their respective husbands, George V and George VI, but also to the fact George VI had two 
daughters, one of whom, more significantly, has sat on the throne since 1952. The 
columnist and former editor of The Daily Telegraph Charles Moore has even claimed that 
Britain is the most matriarchal society in the modern world, in that the four most famous 
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public figures since the Second World War have been women – Princess Diana, Margaret 
Thatcher, the Queen Mother and Queen Elizabeth II.132 Significantly, three of these four 
figures identified by Moore are (or were) members of the royal family.  Indeed, with the 
succession of these dominant and charismatic women (as well as Queen Victoria), the 
modern British monarchy itself has often been regarded as a matriarchy. It is this which has 
led David Cannadine to write that ‘it might…be that the constitutional monarchy is in fact 
emasculated monarchy, and thus a feminised version of an essentially male institution. For 
constitutional monarchy is what results when the sovereign is deprived of those historic 
male functions of god and governor [sic] and general, and this in turn has led – perhaps by 
default, perhaps by design? – to a greater stress on family, domesticity, maternity and 
glamour.’133  
For Campbell-Orr, the British monarchy is a feminised institution in which royal women 
appear better accomplished in combining the elements of ‘feminine’ as well as ‘masculine’ 
role-playing demanded of modern royal persons, as demonstrated by Queen Elizabeth II. 
This points to a wider view – that the values of the monarchy are, in fact, better embodied 
in and represented by a female. In fact, historically, there is a strong association of the 
British Crown and the British national image with female figures.134 Considering Boadicea, 
Queen Elizabeth I, Queen Victoria and the current sovereign, Hardman has noted that the 
British monarchy has tended to thrive under its queens who have all been particularly 
symbolic monarchs.135  
Yet, it is not just the monarchy that has had a strong association with women historically, 
but the nation more broadly. On the most fundamental level, many nations have been 
personified or portrayed as female, for example, as a ‘mother country’ such as ‘Mother 
Russia’. Britain is no exception. Britannia is an ambiguous figure, in that while she is seen 
carrying weapons for her defence, the centrality of a female figure simultaneously 
encourages men to protect her. As Ward notes, to love one’s country, one must assign that 
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country features worth defending.136 In this, the easiest and least problematic way to do so 
is to represent and define the embodiment of the nation as something in need of 
protecting – a woman. Significantly, it is for this reason that her image is particularly potent 
and common in times of war [See Figures 2.3 and 2.4]. Moreover, she is also seen to 
represent both British democracy and British liberties and values. Indeed, Madge Dresser 
has argued Britannia is the incarnation of a common British identity.137 
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Figure 2.3: World War One Recruitment 
Poster ‘National Service Victory N S 
Industrial Army’ depicting Britannia, 1917.  
© IWM (Art.IWM PST 13276) 
 Accessed at: 
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Figure 2.4: World War One Recruitment 
Poster ‘Remember Scarborough! Enlist Now’ 
depicting a martial Britannia, 1915.   
© IWM (Q 33151) 
Accessed at: 
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Furthermore, in most countries while the nation is often personified as female, the figure 
of a woman also frequently constitutes the actual symbolic figuration of ethnic and 
national groups.138 The nation is represented as a loved woman in danger or as a grieving 
mother who lost her sons in battle. This, in turn, leads to calls for men to fight ‘for the sake 
of our women and children’ or to ‘defend their honour’. Moreover, it is women, often 
mothers, as both biological and cultural reproducers of the nation, who symbolise the spirit 
of the collectivity. In this, women are associated in the collective imagination with children, 
and therefore with the collective, as well as the familial future.139 Furthermore, as Yuval-
Davies notes, this ‘burden of representation on women of the collectivity’s identity and 
future destiny has also brought about the construction of women as the bearers of the 
collectivity’s honour’.140 In this capacity, the important role of mothers in the 
representation of continuity has meant that women can and are constructed in the role of 
‘carriers of tradition’ and even as ‘bearers of memory’. It is not just ordinary women that 
guard and transmit these reminiscences, but rather, as Campbell-Orr has highlighted, also 
royal women.141  
Consequently, the fact that the current British monarch is female (both a mother and 
grandmother herself) is significant. Indeed, the association of the nation with a female 
figure, both in its personification and symbolic figuration, makes it far easier to view Queen 
Elizabeth II as the embodiment of the collective national organism. It is this, in fact, which 
has led commentators such as Hardman to argue that following the death of the Queen 
Mother in 2002, Elizabeth II effectively became ‘the mother of the nation’. 142 Here, the 
idea of the ‘mother’ and mothering ideals is particularly significant. Writing on Queen 
Victoria, Thompson has argued that ultimately Victoria’s non-white subjects were better 
able to accept a female head of state, noting that the matriarchal figure she presented in 
the later years of her reign which facilitated her transformation into the figure of the 
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‘mother of Empire’ may actually have been more acceptable to many of the subject 
peoples within the British Empire.143 Moreover, female figures are ultimately icons and 
symbols to which people can more readily relate. This is partly due to the connection of 
women with mothers and mothering ideals, but also links to the prominent role played by 
and the common experience of women as mourners.144 Campbell-Orr, for example, has 
argued that the prominence, strength and longevity of the Queens Consort during the First 
and Second World Wars, was actually representative of many ordinary women’s 
experiences in a century of war, as a result of which single women and war widows soon 
outnumbered men. 145  Similarly, the devotion of the Queen Mother to both her family and 
her country during the War, and subsequently, acted as a reminder of the sacrifices made 
by people’s own parents and grandparents. Furthermore, female figures have less 
association with militaristic values and militarism. This contrasts sharply with men, who are 
strongly associated with military service. 
The gender of the reigning monarch, and the fact she is the head of a wider royal family, 
has demonstrably affected the symbolic role played by the British monarchy in World War 
commemoration. The association of women, and mothers more specifically, with the 
nation and the spirit of the nation not only makes it easier to conceive of the monarch as 
the embodiment of the nation, but is also connected with the key role women play as both 
mourners and the carriers of memory. Moreover, both a female monarch and the 
involvement of the wider royal family in commemoration ultimately make them more 
relatable and also more universally appealing. This, in turn, enables them to represent and 
draw together the British population. 
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Over the last three decades members of the British royal family have been ever-present in 
events commemorating and remembering the First and Second World Wars. While the 
monarchy plays no role in determining the nature of the official state commemorative 
events to be held – this is the preserve of the national (and devolved) governments of the 
United Kingdom - much of the sovereign’s role involves carrying out the representational 
duties required of them as the ceremonial ‘Head of State’. This includes, amongst other 
things, the laying of wreaths at the Cenotaph on Remembrance Sunday, the opening of 
national war memorials and attending commemorative services and other events abroad 
as Britain’s representative.   
Yet, while this formal role may be limited, focusing too much attention on this aspect 
ignores the significance of the monarchy’s involvement in the commemoration of the 
World Wars symbolically. In fact, as this chapter has demonstrated, the continuity of the 
monarchy and longevity of key royal figures, the function of the monarchy as a ‘symbol of 
unity’, and the ‘familyness’ and female gender of the modern British monarchy have 
ultimately enabled the Crown to play a significant symbolic role in World War 
commemoration.  
The hereditary nature of the constitutional monarchy, and more specifically the longevity 
of the Queen Mother and Queen Elizabeth II have ultimately created stability and 
permanence especially in times of change, as well as conveying a sense of history in the 
present. In this, the monarchy connected Britain’s past with the present day. In particular, 
the royal family’s connections with the Wars drew attention to the critical role the 
monarchy played in not only the Second, but also the First World War. This, in turn, draws 
upon memories (both public and private) of the British nation at war.  Consequently, the 
linking of the past and present allows for the reinsertion of traditional narratives into the 
public consciousness, with positive depictions of the strength, resolve and courage of a 
nation united in war.  
This notion of ‘unity’ is a crucial one, and is indicative of the way in which the continuity of 




Nation’. The seeming antiquity of the institution allows it to not only embody and 
represent the nation, but also to draw attention to the shared history and ties that bind all 
its citizens together. Moreover, the ability of the monarchy to represent the nation and act 
as a symbol of unity is also derived from its political neutrality. Significantly, it is this same 
political neutrality which allows the sovereign at times of national commemoration to 
speak for everyone – to unequivocally represent the entire population. Indeed, the 
monarchy transcends both national and societal divisions and has therefore acted both as a 
‘symbol of unity’ and an integrative factor in a political context of disintegration, enabling 
people of all nationalities, ethnicities, classes and religions to share in the symbols of 
‘Britishness’ through the common bond of monarchy. The Crown’s involvement in national 
war commemoration, then, highlights this further (whilst bearing a striking resemblance to 
the way commemoration itself has often been used) and provides a way in which unity and 
diversity can be celebrated through participation in commemorative events, much like 
royal events. 
Furthermore, the gender of the monarch has also proved crucial to the symbolism of the 
monarchy in that it is easier to conceive of a Queen as the embodiment of the collective 
national organism due to the strong associations of the nation with women, particularly 
mothers, and their links to bearing and transmitting memories. 
Ultimately, these three features of the modern British monarchy have meant that the 
presence of the Crown at commemorative events both represented and drew attention to 
symbols and narratives of unity.
 
 
Chapter Three: Reconciliation and Commemoration: World War Memory in 
Northern Ireland, 1994 – 2016 
 
On the 29 June 2016, ahead of the 1 July Somme centenary commemorations, Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland Theresa Villiers gave a speech entitled ‘The Somme and 1916 
Centenaries’. In this, she stated that ‘the centenary has particular resonance for many in 
Northern Ireland because [of] the deeds of the 36th Ulster Division’. She continued by 
acknowledging that ‘the history of Ireland and the Great War is not just about the 36th 
Division. We must also remember the incredible heroism of the 16th Irish Division […]. Their 
contribution and their sacrifice was immense and we should never forget it’. Yet, Villiers 
acknowledged that ‘in the decades following partition, the Irish contribution to the Somme 
and to the First World War more generally often seemed largely hidden’. She posited that 
‘part of the reason for that lies in the consequences of another seminal event in Irish 
history […] the Easter Rising’, noting that ‘in the post-independence era, two conflicting 
narratives of the year 1916 began to take shape […]. [I]f anything, in the period after the 
Second World War and during the long years of the Troubles, these attitudes hardened. It 
is one of the many examples of the power history has to sustain long-held divisions and 
antagonisms on this island.’1  
Villliers’ speech is indicative of the complex ways in which memories of the World Wars in 
Northern Ireland, and also on the island of Ireland, are intertwined with identity politics. 
Throughout her speech, Villiers repeatedly acknowledged the complexities of Ireland’s 
twentieth century history and, consequently, the difficulties attendant in commemorating 
it. Indeed, a recognition of these difficulties is pervasive throughout the historical literature 
on modern Ireland. In his introduction to History and Memory in Modern Ireland, Ian 
McBride stated that ‘the interpretation of the past has always been at the heart of national 
conflict’ in Ireland, where nationalist and unionist identities have focused on a series of 
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dates that recall inter-Irish conflict.2 Similarly, for Nuala Johnson, narratives of war 
commemoration in Ireland were, and are, consistently in dialogue with the narratives 
attendant on the national question. 3 Guy Beiner has also argued that ‘Ireland is deeply 
troubled by evocative memories of its past’.4  
Significantly, the island of Ireland has not been immune to the recent upsurge of interest in 
the World Wars, especially the First World War. In fact, one of the most dynamic areas of 
current research concerns the impact of the Great War on Ireland. Much attention has 
focused on the study of the commemoration of, and attitudes towards, the World Wars in 
the island of Ireland. Few of these studies, however, examine commemoration during and 
after the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Rather, the majority focus not only on the inter-war 
and post-war years, but also on the Irish Free State (later the Republic of Ireland). Tom 
Burke, David Fitzpatrick, Jane Leonard and Ann Rigney, for example, have all surveyed War 
remembrance in the Irish Free State.5 Leonard argues that ex-servicemen continued to 
publicly commemorate the Great War, noting that it was not until the outbreak of The 
Troubles that commemoration became more overt. In his article, Burke explores official 
governmental responses to remembrance in Dublin between 1925 and 1933 arguing that 
commemoration had become politicised by 1927. Similarly, Fitzpatrick analyses war 
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remembrance in the interwar period arguing that Sinn Fein’s opposition to the war made it 
impossible to divorce politics from ‘issues of personal suffering'. He continues by 
suggesting that subsequent republican governments perpetuated this. Rigney focuses on 
commemoration by outlining the history of the Irish National War Memorial, which was 
built in Dublin in the 1930s but was not formally dedicated until 1988.  
On the other hand, commemoration in Northern Ireland has received considerably less 
attention. Here, Catherine Switzer is the primary scholar. She examines the Protestant-
Unionist population, arguing that unionist identity is central to much of the 
commemoration in, and by, Ulster.6 Within the historical literature a few studies have also 
sought to address commemoration in the contemporary period. Guy Beiner, for example, 
has analysed the relationship between the memories of the Somme and the Easter Rising in 
modern Ireland, pinpointing 1916 as the locus of sectarian conflict over the memory of the 
First World War era.7 Helen Robinson, on the other hand, explores commemoration during 
the Troubles.8 She argues that remembrance during that period became increasingly 
sectarian and divorced from the War itself, instead becoming progressively more 
concerned with contemporary politics.9 Richard Grayson and Keith Jeffery, however, are 
two scholars who have come closest to an exploration of World War commemoration and 
remembrance in the contemporary period. In his article on contemporary republicanism 
and the First World War, for example, Grayson discusses the recent surge of Republican 
interest in the War. He notes that it was after Enniskillen that there was both a burgeoning 
public interest in the War and an increase in the number of nationalist gestures towards 
reconciliation carried out by the Irish Government and nationalist communities within 
Northern Ireland.10 Jeffery, writing in John Horne’s Towards Commemoration, traces the 
chronology of Irish commemoration from the end of the First World War to the twenty-first 
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century.11 The short nature of Jeffery’s chapter, however, has meant that any discussion of 
the 1990s and twenty-first century is inherently limited. This chapter seeks to go beyond 
these limits in discussing commemoration in Northern Ireland, and the island of Ireland in 
general, in the contemporary period. 
It is important to focus on World War commemoration in Ireland because it has a highly 
charged national and political significance not seen elsewhere in the British Isles.12 The First 
World War had profound consequences for the development of modern Ireland. For Keith 
Jeffery the Great War represented ‘the single most central experience of twentieth century 
Ireland’, while Boyce has referred to the First World War as a ‘turning point in the making 
of modern Ireland, and of Irish and Ulster identities’.13 According to David Fitzpatrick’s 
calculations, for example, it is likely that approximately 210,000 men from both the 
unionist and nationalist parts of Ireland enlisted. Of these, according to Neil Richardson, 
who has revised previous estimates by Fitzpatrick, approximately 63,000 were from Ulster 
and over 145,000 from the South.14  It has been estimated that between 30,000 and 35,000 
died.15 Of the sixty four UK divisions that served in the major theatres of war during the 
Great War, two were Irish (the 10th and 16th) and one Ulster (36th). Furthermore, Irishmen 
also joined the Irish Guards and the London Irish, as well as other English, Scottish and 
Welsh regiments, the Navy and the Air Corps. The rate of participation in World War One, 
in fact, was higher than in any other conflict in Irish history.16 Despite this, in the years 
following the Armistice, the Great War became politicised on both a national and regional 
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level, as it became a symbol of the battle between the two opposing traditions of Unionism 
and Nationalism.17 As James McAuley has identified, the conflict over the partition of 
Ireland between 1916 and 1923, which institutionalised sectarian, political, social and 
economic relations, exerted a powerful influence on the way in which the Great War was 
remembered and forgotten on the island of Ireland, both in the North and in the South.18 
Furthermore, politics continued to cast a long shadow over commemoration in Ireland 
throughout the twentieth century, reflecting the divided state of the island after 1921. This 
resulted in the divergence of memories of the Great War on the island of Ireland. In the 
Irish Free State, later the Republic of Ireland, and amongst nationalist communities in 
Northern Ireland, remembrance of the War was initially a widespread but politically 
contentious practice. Over time, however, it became increasingly marginalised to such an 
extent that, as Pennell notes, it was ‘either officially ignored or commemorated in a low-
key manner’ owing to the ‘lapse in official national memory’.19 Moreover, it was mainly – or 
exclusively – commemorated within the southern Protestant community. For the majority, 
instead, it was the Easter Rising of 1916 and War of Independence that came to provide 
the official narrative of the new state and featured prominently within commemorations. 
In contrast to this, in Northern Ireland memories of the Great War were ‘actively and 
regularly maintained and reproduced by Unionists. The Battle of the Somme, in particular, 
became a key reference point in a grand Unionist narrative. 
This raises numerous questions about the nature of the relationship between the present 
and the past in Ireland. This chapter will examine and analyse how the World Wars have 
been remembered and commemorated on the Island of Ireland, and the roles that such 
memory and commemoration have played in the reinterpreting and reaffirming of Ireland’s 
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changing identity. It will ask: how far has the tone of commemoration and remembrance 
between 1994 and 2016 changed? To what extent has commemoration been influenced by 
the changing political relationships between the Republic of Ireland and the United 
Kingdom (and thus Northern Ireland), as well as within Northern Ireland? How have 
successive governments (both central and devolved) negotiated the borders and 
complexities of Irish history, identity and politics when it comes to commemorating the 
World Wars in Northern Ireland? Furthermore, this chapter will also explore how 
developments in World War commemoration fit within wider UK trends, examining the 
extent to which they are unique to Northern Ireland. It will also consider the interaction of 
World War memory with expressions of identity in Ireland.  
Primarily, the focus of this chapter will be on Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, it will also 
include discussion of World War commemoration within the Republic of Ireland where it 
relates to Northern Ireland, and by extension to the United Kingdom, due to the inter-
related nature of these state's recent histories. Indeed, political movements and changes in 
the Republic of Ireland have frequently led to further shifts and developments in Northern 
Ireland and vice versa. This can be illustrated by the fact that the outbreak of political 
conflict and the militant republican campaign in Northern Ireland during the Troubles led to 
what has been described as a period of ‘revisionism, remembrance and forgetfulness’ in 
the Republic of Ireland.20 Additionally, and in contrast to other chapters, there will be a 
disproportionate focus on the First World War. Primarily, this is because attitudes towards 
the First and Second World Wars in Ireland differ significantly, with the First World War 
being considerably more problematic and controversial. 
This chapter consists of three sections, each of which will examine a specific period in 
World War commemoration in Northern Ireland. Through this chronological structure, this 
chapter analyses the degree to which political developments and changes in inter-Irish and 
Anglo-Irish relationships during this period have impacted on the commemoration of the 
World Wars. The first section will focus on the period from the 1987 Enniskillen 
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Remembrance Day bombing to the opening of the Island of Ireland Peace Park at Messines 
in November 1998. While the Enniskillen bombing technically falls beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it is illuminating to briefly discuss It because several of the developments with which 
this chapter will be concerned can trace their origins to the impact of Enniskillen. Section 
two will then analyse the commemoration of the World Wars from 2001 to 2009. Finally, 
section three will discuss the period from 2010-2016. It will analyse the years leading up to 
and including some of the events of the so-called ‘Decade of Centenaries’, which runs from 
2012 – 2021. 
Ultimately, this chapter argues that shifts in inter-Irish and Anglo-Irish relationships 
fostered significant changes in the nature of World War commemoration in Northern 
Ireland, and on the island of Ireland, between 1994 and 2016. It will be shown that the IRA 
ceasefires of 1994 and the ongoing Northern Ireland Peace Process, which culminated in 
the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998, helped to establish a new climate of 
reconciliation in which it became possible for first nationalists and later republicans to 
engage in the commemoration of the World Wars. This encouraged a greater recognition 
and acceptance of a shared Irish history, which, in turn, reinforced the developments 
taking place as a consequence of the Peace Process. This was apparent in the royal visit of 
Queen Elizabeth II in 2011, which encouraged a new era of Anglo-Irish relationships 
reflected in the subsequent ‘Decade of Centenaries’ commemorative programme.  
 
From Enniskillen to Messines, 1987 – 1998 
On the morning of 8 November 1987, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
detonated a bomb at a Remembrance Sunday service in Enniskillen, County Fermanagh. 
The explosion killed eleven people and injured a further sixty-three.21 The victims of the 
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bombing were all members of the Unionist-Protestant community, and nearly all of them 
were civilians, aged between two months and seventy-five.22 The attack was immediately 
met with widespread revulsion and almost universal condemnation throughout not only 
the United Kingdom, but the Republic of Ireland and globally.23 The day after the bombing 
the London Times reported that ‘the outrage was immediately condemned by leaders in 
[Britain], the Irish Republic and around the world as the most disgusting ever perpetrated 
by the IRA’, while Tom King, a Conservative MP and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
referred to it as ‘one of the most callous and heartless acts of butchery in Northern 
Ireland’s troubled history’.24 In a rare intervention, the Catholic Church joined in the 
widespread condemnation of the IRA and the bombing of the Remembrance Sunday 
service. One week after Enniskillen, in a statement referred to by the Times as the Church’s 
‘strongest mobilisation of its moral authority since the start of the Troubles’, priests and 
bishops across the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland denounced paramilitary 
violence.25 Their statement read: ‘there is no room for ambivalence. In the face of the 
present campaign of republican violence the choice of all Catholics is clear. It is a choice 
between good and evil […] It is sinful to join organisations committed to violence or to 
remain in them. It is sinful to support such organisations.’.26 The outrage caused by the 
bombing, in fact, was so extensive that the attack  was even condemned by Sinn Fein in 
their weekly newspaper, An Phoblacht, as a ‘monumental error’ that would strengthen the 
IRA’s opponents.27 
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This episode provides a clear illustration of the degree to which World War memory and 
remembrance has acted as a source of inter-Irish tension and conflict. For Murphy Temple 
and Graham Dawson, in fact, although the ‘poppy day’ bombing, as it became known, was 
part of the wider ethno-religious civil conflict known as the ‘Troubles’, it also represented 
the ‘apogee of decades of commemoration-related tensions’ between Unionists and 
Nationalists.28 Indeed, the reaction to the bombing, discussed above, was due not only to 
the fact that the victims of the bomb were civilians, but also to the historic and symbolic 
significance of the commemorative event targeted. On 11 November 1987, for example, 
Brian Lenihan, the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, denounced the attack, commenting 
that ‘we all recognise something obscene in the fact that this attack was planned and 
carried out on a day when many ordinary Irish men and women had gathered to 
commemorate those who had died in two World Wars. There is a long Irish tradition of 
respect for those paying tribute to our dead’.29 Similarly, John Hume, leader of the Catholic 
and nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), commented that ‘the choice of 
the occasion yesterday, when people were commemorating the dead of two World Wars… 
was cold and calculated and designed to stir and hit the deepest emotions of the Unionist 
and British people’. While Kevin McNamara, Chief Opposition Spokesman for Northern 
Ireland, stated that ‘the whole nation shares the feelings of revulsion caused by this 
horrible and obscene act… In the past, even the most barbaric have accepted that people 
should be allowed to honour their dead in peace’.30 Here, the references made to the 
heartless and brutal nature of the attack, and to the failure to respect the remembrance of 
the dead that it indicated, were particularly poignant in serving to reinforce the revulsion 
and outrage being universally felt. Moreover, several commentators contrasted the 
behaviour of the IRA with those soldiers who had fought and died in the two World Wars. 
The violence undertaken by the soldiers was viewed as justified and legitimate, in the 
‘defence of freedom’, whilst that of the IRA who had committed such acts against civilians 
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at little risk to their own lives was not.31 In the House of Lords debate held on 9 November, 
for example, Lord Harris of Greenwich commented that ‘it was the ultimate act of 
obscenity on a day of remembrance for those who have died to save the freedom of people 
of Britain and indeed the freedom of the people of Ireland as well’.32 
The Enniskillen attack, therefore, not only represents the most high profile incident in 
which commemoration intersected with the Troubles, but is demonstrative of the way in 
which the IRA identified the remembrance of the War dead with the symbolism of 
Loyalism, Britishness and Imperialism.33 As Richard Grayson argues, prior to Enniskillen and 
by the beginning of the Troubles in the late 1960s, the remembrance and commemoration 
of the World Wars could be characterised by the phrase ‘unionist hegemony, nationalist 
alienation’.34 Indeed, despite attempts to make it more inclusive, commemoration had 
become part of the wider commemoration of the British military and therefore not only fed 
into assertions about British identity, but also was seen to have strong links to the British 
state. The rituals and symbols of Remembrance Sunday were understood to be intimately 
associated with Ulster Unionism.35 Consequently, the bombing at Enniskillen was widely 
interpreted by people of all communities (Nationalist and Unionist, Protestant and 
Catholic) ‘as an attack on the Unionist community in general, and their British way of life’.36 
Seamus Mallon, Justice spokesman for the SDLP, for example, referred to the bombing as 
‘obviously sectarian, because those who planted the bomb knew the vast majority of 
people at the service would be of Protestant faith’. John Hume stated that the attack was 
‘probably the deepest act of provocation to have been committed against the Unionist 
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people…’.37 In this, Enniskillen was viewed differently from the other terrorist attacks that 
had been carried out in Northern Ireland. The Guardian newspaper, for example, 
commented that ‘yesterday’s Enniskillen massacres joins a long list of atrocities which have 
had an impact that sets them apart from other acts of violence committed in Northern 
Ireland in recent years’.38   
While the Enniskillen bombing technically falls beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
illuminating to begin any discussion of World War commemoration in modern Ireland here. 
The horror caused by the attack in Enniskillen, and the reaction to it, created a situation in 
which the violence of the Troubles was no longer defensible. This, in turn, generated 
significant pressures for change on a number of levels and is now commonly regarded as a 
turning point in the Troubles.39  Indeed, the bombing appeared to motivate, as Dawson has 
noted, new and increased efforts towards reaching a political resolution to the conflict.40 A 
number of politicians in both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, in fact, used 
the attack as an opportunity to call for peace and co-operation amongst Republicans, 
Unionists and the British Government. In the special House of Commons debate on the 
bombing, for example, Liberal MP David Alton, a Catholic, suggested that ‘the most lasting 
memorial to the innocent victims of the Enniskillen atrocity [would] be redoubled 
determination and resolve to strengthen co-operation between the British and Irish 
Governments’.41 
Significantly, the poppy day bombing also prompted a degree of self-reflection in the 
Republic, and amongst nationalist and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland, thus 
provoking a wave of interest in the First World War and Irish involvement in that War. 
Consequently, the World Wars, particularly the First World War, became an integral part of 
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political efforts at reconciliation. This began as early as 11 November 1987. During a 
meeting of the Seanad Éireann, the Upper House of the Irish Legislature, John Robb, a 
Northern Irish Protestant senator nominated by the Taoiseach, asked for forgiveness for his 
role – and the role of all Protestants – in perpetuating the resentment and bitterness that 
had led to the Troubles. He acknowledged that Remembrance Sunday, despite its historic 
and symbolic importance in Northern Ireland, had been divisive for the island as a whole, 
but said that he hoped that the poppy would be ‘seen not as a symbol of imperialism but 
rather as an emblem of remembrance, repentance, thanksgiving and forgiving’.42 Robb 
concluded, in an early act of cross-border commemoration, by offering a poppy to Charles 
McDonald, Fine Gael Senator and Deputy Chairman of the Seanad.43 
The Enniskillen bombing, then, has frequently been regarded as planting the early seeds of 
peace and reconciliation by inspiring introspection and expressions of goodwill from 
members of all communities in its immediate aftermath. Despite this, serious Republican 
and Nationalist dialogue about and engagement in World War commemoration did not 
begin until several years later with the cessation of paramilitary hostilities announced by 
the ceasefire of 1994, in which the IRA publicly renounced their armed campaign. Indeed, it 
was only with the development of a new climate of reconciliation that an increasing 
number of nationalist politicians felt able to attend commemoration ceremonies in 
Northern Ireland. As Catherine Switzer convincingly argues, the SDLP played a crucial role 
in making a nationalist presence at such events more visible.44 Significantly, the first 
engagement by the Belfast SDLP in commemorative events came in November 1994 when 
Alex Atwood, an Upper Falls Councillor and party leader on the City Council, attended the 
first Remembrance Sunday ceremony to follow the signing of the IRA ceasefire in August 
1994. Atwood himself drew a direct link between this changed climate and his party’s 
attendance, commenting that ‘in the environment in the city at the moment, we felt that it 
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was important that a further symbolic step be made’.45 By 1997, the SDLP position had 
shifted markedly with the members of the party now playing a full part in remembrance 
ceremonies, although the party leader did not take part until later in 2002. Indeed, in 1997, 
Alban Maginness of the SDLP was elected as the first nationalist mayor of Belfast. 
Maginness adopted a full role in the City’s commemorative events, including the laying of a 
wreath during the annual commemoration of the Battle of the Somme on 1 July. During 
this ceremony, Maginness stated that ‘it is important that we reconcile this city, and the 
two communities in this city’.46 Consequently, he hoped Unionists would interpret his 
attendance as ‘a genuine act of reconciliation’, noting that ‘there has recently been a 
discovery of the history of the Great War, in terms of how it affected Ireland and the Irish 
people and how there should be a recognition of the fact that people from both political 
traditions died in the Battle of the Somme’.47 Moreover, in November of the same year, 
Maginness became the first nationalist to lead the annual Remembrance Sunday service. 48 
His attendance at both of these events, then, was significant. Indeed, he had previously 
avoided the ceremonies, claiming that the political climate was not amenable to his being 
there.49   
It is also worth highlighting that early shifts within Sinn Fein, and changing attitudes to 
remembrance within republicanism, can also be traced to this period. In 1995, Tom Hartley, 
a Sinn Fein councillor for the Lower Falls in Belfast, attended a Second World War 
commemoration at Islandbridge in Dublin. While this was a Second World War 
commemoration, and not for the First World War, Hartley’s presence indicated a change in 
attitude taking place by signalling the engagement of Sinn Fein in an arena that they had 
previously boycotted. Indeed, Hartley subsequently continued to engage with 
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remembrance as well as with Protestants and Unionists, through an interest in local 
history, by organising and conducting tours of West Belfast. Despite these early 
developments, however, Sinn Fein did not make any further official moves until the early 
2000s, as will be discussed later in the chapter.  
The paramilitary ceasefires, then, played an important role in creating a new climate of 
reconciliation in which it was possible to consider the First World War as part of nationalist 
Irish history. Despite this, it was the historic breakthrough in the Northern Ireland Peace 
Process signalled by the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast 
Agreement) in April 1998, and the smoothing of sectarian bitterness and tension, that 
prompted significant shifts in attitudes towards and engagement in World War 
commemoration. The Good Friday Agreement, which established a devolved government 
for Northern Ireland and declared that ‘the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely 
exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether 
they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united 
Ireland’ would be recognised, marked significant progress towards the building of a 
credible political settlement between Nationalists and Unionists.50 Under the terms of the 
Belfast Agreement, in fact, both sides committed to working in a cross-community power-
sharing political arrangement by agreeing to ‘partnership, equality and mutual respect as 
the basis of the relationship within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and 
between these islands’.51 This is indicative of the way in which the concept of ‘parity of 
esteem’, which had become a political buzzword in Northern Ireland from the beginning of 
the 1990s, became not only a cornerstone of the Good Friday Agreement, but also a crucial 
component of developing approaches to commemoration.52 The Agreement aimed to 
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equate the responsibilities of cultural, religious and national identification among the two 
communities of Northern Ireland by allowing them equal expression. Speaking on the day 
of the signing of the Agreement, for example, Mary McAleese commented: ‘[This] is a 
momentous day which heralds a new phase in developing relationships between the 
peoples of these islands […] It offers a new beginning […], an opportunity to build bridges 
and partnerships based on mutual respect for all traditions, cultures and creeds on this 
island’.53 
Advances made in the Peace Process, then, helped to rehabilitate the memory of the War 
amongst nationalist communities in the North and South of the island. This led not only to 
an increased recognition of and interest in Irish nationalist war service, but also, as Switzer 
notes, contributed to the ‘re-imagining of the Great War in terms of the service of both 
Irish traditions, and the potential of this symbolism in the present day of reconciliation’. 54 
Writing in the Irish Left Review, for example, Fergus O’Farrell commented that the ‘first 
stages of the Peace Process allowed for a reinterpretation of recent Irish history, resulting 
in a new found appreciation of the role played by Irishmen in British uniform during the 
First World War.’55  
The Peace Process, therefore, in helping to establish a climate of peace and reconciliation, 
decisively shaped the politics of commemoration from 1994. As the Peace Process 
gathered momentum, the commemoration of the First World War - which had frequently 
been symbolic of the gulf between and within each of the ‘two Irelands’ – increasingly 
became a forum for both dialogue and reconciliation. World War remembrance was 
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identified as an arena in which peace could be further advanced. On the 12 November 
1998, for example, members of the Seanad spoke at length about the Great War. Daniel 
Cassidy, a Fianna Fail politician, asserted that ‘Ireland’s Great War dead should be 
cherished alongside all patriots who struggled and suffered’.56 He suggested that 
recovering their stories and adding them to Republican history would help to aid the 
Northern Irish Process as commemoration of the First World War would act as a reminder 
of a time when Irishmen fought alongside one another. In this, one principle which became 
increasingly important within commemoration and the wider Peace Process concerned the 
identification of the Great War as a shared Irish experience and history with a common 
narrative of sacrifice for both Nationalists and Unionists.57 It was believed that such shared 
experiences and shared suffering would transcend local Irish political and sectarian 
differences. Consequently, increased attention was directed towards commemorative 
initiatives designed to promote ‘shared’ or ‘unified’ commemoration. 
On 11 November 1998 – just months after the Good Friday Agreement was signed - the 
Island of Ireland Peace Tower at Messines, in Belgium, was jointly inaugurated by then Irish 
President Mary McAleese, Queen Elizabeth II and King Albert II of Belgium. Its opening 
represents perhaps the clearest example of both the drive towards unified 
commemoration, and the new era in World War remembrance that was emerging as a 
result of conciliation between Northern Ireland’s political parties and Anglo-Irish 
rapprochement, discussed above. For Keith Jeffery, in fact, the park not only was 
demonstrative of the conciliatory turn signalled by the Good Friday Agreement, but also 
suggested an ‘apotheosis in the memory of the Great War in Ireland’, which represented 
the ‘most outstanding manifestation of this new engagement’.58 
The project had been initiated by the cross-community ‘A Journey of Reconciliation Trust’ 
based in Derry, under the leadership of the former Fine Gael TD from Donegal, Paddy 
Harte, and Derry Community Leader and former political adviser for the Ulster Defence 
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Association, Glen Barr. Here, the stated aim was to bring together people from both the 
‘orange’ and ‘green’ traditions, indicating the extent to which reconciliation lay at the heart 
of the Peace Park from the outset.59 In an interview given to The Irish Times, for example, 
Paddy Harte explained the motivations which lay behind the initiative. He commented that: 
‘the two communities in Ireland […] have many things that divide them, but they have one 
thing that they share, and that is the sadness and grief of what happened in the First World 
War… I believe that sadness and grief can be a bridge between both communities.60 In this, 
Harte explicitly outlined his belief that the suffering shared by all Irish soldiers during the 
War, and sadness it caused, could act as a means of bringing people from different 
traditions together across the Island of Ireland.  
The Peace Tower was built to commemorate all the Irish Great War Dead (approximately 
30,000 – 35,000, although Ireland’s Memorial Records lists 49,000), both North and South, 
Protestant and Catholic, Unionist and Nationalist [See Figure 3.1].61 As Jonathan Evershed 
has highlighted, the Peace Park was laden with symbolism.62 The location of the park, for 
example, reflects the notion of a ‘shared experience’. It is situated close to the site of the 
Battle of Messines, where the 36th (Ulster) and 16th (Irish) Divisions both fought in June 
1917, and so draws attention to the fact Irish men from across the Island fought and died 
side by side. Moreover, the form of the 110ft tall tower, around which the Park is centred, 
was specifically designed to further this message of reconciliation. The traditional Irish 
round tower was chosen so the monument’s style would predate the Protestant 
Reformation and the related political divisions in Ireland, thus avoiding some of the more 
contentious symbols of more recent times. In his memoirs, for example, Harte noted that 
the design was such that ‘[n]o religion or political party could claim ownership of it’ and 
that it represented a ‘true symbol of ancient Ireland that the people of Ireland had no 
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reason to dispute’.63 Furthermore, the tower was constructed, by young people from 
across the island of Ireland, using stones taken from every county on the island of Ireland.64 
For Glen Barr the involvement of young people was particularly important as he ‘felt they 
should be aware of the great sacrifice that was made on their behalf… the bare facts were 
that they died for us... and regardless of all the political manipulations and distortions of 
history, tens of thousands were slaughtered and forgotten’.65 Taken together, then, the 
location, construction and symbolism of the Peace Tower was intended to further 
emphasise that it commemorated ‘all those from the Island of Ireland who fought and died 
irrespective of politics, cultural or creed’.66 
Significantly, the Park has also been strongly influenced by the Northern Ireland Peace 
Process. This is demonstrated perhaps most clearly by the ‘peace pledge’ which appears on 
a plaque at the Park’s centre. The pledge, which begins with a repudiation of violence, goes 
on to state:  
As Protestants and Catholics, we apologise for the terrible deeds we have done to 
each other and ask forgiveness. For this shared shrine of remembrance, where 
soldiers of all nationalities, creeds and political allegiances were united in death. 
We appeal to all people in Ireland to help build a peaceful and tolerant society.67  
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It then continues: 
Let us remember the solidarity and trust that developed between Protestants and 
Catholic Soldiers when they served together in these trenches. As we jointly mark 
the armistice of 11 November 1918 – when the guns fell silent along the Western 
Front – we affirm that fitting tribute to the principles for which men and women 
from the Island of Ireland died in both World Wars would be permanent peace.’68  
The pledge clearly draws a link between remembering the Irish dead of the two World 
Wars and building upon the newly established Peace Process. Furthermore, the ‘peace 
pledge’ also illustrates the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the Peace Process 
and World War commemoration, referenced above. Indeed, while the changed political 
environment made it possible for such an act of unified commemoration to take place, 
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commemoration and the memory of the Great War has been increasingly mobilised within 
the Peace Process. This can be further exemplified by reference to several speeches given 
during the opening of the Park. After the service, President McAleese delivered a speech 
with a message to this effect: 
[F]or much of the past eighty years, […] the very idea of such a ceremony would 
probably have been unthinkable […] Today […] we are keenly aware that if we are 
to build the culture of consensus promised by the Good Friday Agreement [,] then 
we need to create a mutually respectful space for differing traditions [and] 
differing loyalties […] which would help […] to change the landscape of memory […] 
None of us has the power to change what is past but we do have the power to use 
today well to shape a better future. The Peace Park does not invite us to forget the 
past but to remember it differently.69 
Similarly, David Trimble, First Minister of Northern Ireland, proclaimed he was ‘glad that 
the Irish Republic [was] recognising those who fought for freedom along with Northern 
Irish soldiers’ and stated that the ceremony was ‘part of a new beginning’.70 Both Trimble 
and McAleese, then, appeared to suggest that commemoration formed a crucial part of the 
Peace Process, representing one area in which a mutually respectful space could be 
established. 
For both Edward Madigan and Catriona Pennell, then, the creation of the Island of Ireland 
Peace Tower represented a ground-breaking moment in the history of commemoration on 
the island of Ireland.71 Here, the presence of the two Heads of State at the opening was 
particularly notable. As Chapter Two noted, this was the first public appearance between 
President McAleese and Queen Elizabeth II. Paddy Harte, himself, recognised the 
significance of this, when speaking before the unveiling, he commented that ‘the fact you 
will have the Queen and Irish President making their first public appearance together is a 
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supreme gesture of hope’.72 Similarly, he later wrote that their ‘attendance... at the 
opening was a strong message of reconciliation... It helped to change the politics of 
Ireland’, while reflecting in his memoirs that the ceremony ‘must rate as one of the most 
significant moments of true reconciliation between all the peoples of Ireland and Great 
Britain’.73 
Much of the newspaper coverage of the event adopted a similar tone, appearing to 
recognise both the ceremony and memorial’s symbolic significance both for the past and 
the present. The Belfast Telegraph, for example, commented that ‘eighty years on, the 
symbolism of yesterday’s Armistice Day ceremony at Messines can have been lost on no 
one… it was a day laden with memories of the sacrifice made by the soldiers… Protestant 
and Catholic from North and South found common cause, and death did not discriminate 
between different denominations’.74 It continued, ‘while the emphasis was on the past, 
nobody could ignore the message which was contained for today – and for the future… The 
Irish Peace Tower should act as a spur to this and future generations to commit themselves 
to the path of reconciliation’. The article concluded by stating that ‘[t]oday we must draw 
inspiration from the example set by those soldiers… we will always have more in common 
than divides us’.75  Similarly, The Independent commented that they [Queen Elizabeth and 
President McAleese] ‘stood together in a powerful symbol of armistice and reconciliation’ 
which represented a ‘remarkable development in the history of Anglo-Irish relations’.76  
This section has demonstrated that the Northern Ireland Peace Process significantly 
affected approaches to World War commemoration. The IRA ceasefires, and subsequent 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998, contributed to the establishment of a 
new climate of reconciliation. This helped to rehabilitate the memory of the War within 
nationalist communities, both North and South of the border, by creating a psychological, 
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physical and institutional space within which individual memory could be freed from long-
dominant (and violence-related) community-enforced “memories” of the War. This, in turn, 
allowed for increased engagement with and sustained debate about the Great War. 
Significantly, the commemoration of the First World War was also increasingly identified as 
a forum for further dialogue and progress. In this, attention was focused on the 
identification of the Great War as an example of shared Irish history which would serve to 
highlight common narratives of sacrifice and suffering for both ‘green’ and ‘orange’ 
traditions.  
 
2001 – 2009 
Between November 1987 and November 1998, then, World War commemoration on the 
island of Ireland was significantly affected by the Northern Ireland Peace Process and 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement. Here, the changed political environment and new 
climate of reconciliation created new spaces in which it became possible to consider the 
First World War as part of a nationalist Irish history. Consequently, it is in this period that 
the first nationalist engagement in official commemorative events can be identified. 
Moreover, there was an increasing recognition of and emphasis on the First World War as a 
shared Irish history and experience that stressed common narratives of sacrifice for both 
Nationalists and Unionists. This, in turn, influenced approaches to commemoration which 
increasingly focused on shared or unified commemoration most demonstrably at the 
opening of the Island of Ireland Peace Tower in Messines. Furthermore, the 
commemoration and remembrance of the World Wars was not only influenced by the 
Peace Process, but was also identified as one arena in which the Peace Process could be 
further advanced.  
Sinn Fein did not take its next official step in its engagement with the commemoration of 
the World Wars until November 2001 when, as Mayor of Dungannon, Francie Molloy held a 
reception for the local British Legion on Remembrance Sunday. One year later, in 2002, a 




Sinn Fein Lord Mayor, Alex Maskey.77 The Lord Mayor, as the City’s chief representative 
and ceremonial figure, plays an integral part in the commemoration of the Battle of the 
Somme in Belfast on 1 July. Upon his election, Maskey had pledged to work ’for all the 
people of Belfast’ stating that ‘by the end of my twelve months no citizen will be able to 
say they were excluded by me’. 78 He declared that ‘I will do my best to represent everyone 
in this city’ and would spend the year in office trying to bring the Nationalist and Unionist 
traditions together in particular using equality, reconciliation and inclusiveness as guiding 
principles.79 Consequently, Maskey wanted to make a significant gesture of reconciliation 
at the Battle of the Somme commemoration. However, he faced the same dilemma as the 
SDLP Lord Mayor, Alban Maginness, had in 1997. Traditionally, Republicans had refused to 
take part in commemoration of the Battle of the Somme, arguing that they, and other 
wreath-laying ceremonies, were too closely associated with the British military 
establishment. A number of Unionists, on the other hand, told Maskey that if he attended 
the commemoration at the Belfast Cenotaph, people would walk away.80 
Ultimately, Maskey decided against participating in the main ceremony, which he referred 
to as a ‘military commemoration’, concluding that ‘the bolder the step I chose to take, the 
more damaging it could have been for everyone’.81 He did, however, choose to lay a laurel, 
not poppy, wreath at the Cenotaph outside the City Hall, at 9am on 1 July, two hours prior 
to the main ceremony.82 The Lord Mayor was accompanied by a number of Sinn Fein 
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colleagues, including former Sinn Fein Councillor Sean McKnight and Liam Maskey, Alex’s 
brother, but upon reaching the Cenotaph he stepped forward alone, laying the wreath, 
before retreating a few steps and standing for a minute’s silence before departing.83 Some 
took the view that Maskey had ultimately failed in his duties, by not adopting his primary 
role in the official commemoration.84 However, several commentators have argued that his 
actions should be recognised as the furthest he could go from an Irish Republican 
standpoint. For Richard Grayson, for example, Maskey’s actions represented both ‘the 
minimum and the maximum that Sinn Fein could do’.85 He argues they were the minimum 
in terms of physically being involved in commemoration, but the maximum in terms of 
what its own supporters would allow.  
Indeed, this action alone made Maskey the first Republican political representative and 
Sinn Fein politician to lay a wreath to commemorate the Battle of the Somme. Jim Gibney, 
for example, commented that ‘in over eighty years, no one else in Republican Ireland had 
ever walked the distance [from the City Hall to the Cenotaph in its grounds] or even 
thought about walking the distance’.86 Consequently, both the ‘walk and the walkers were 
resplendent of symbolism’ breaking the ‘mould of nationalist and republican history’.87 
Similarly, Maskey’s biographer, Barry McCaffrey, commented that ‘he had rewritten one of 
the unspoken tenets of Irish republicanism’.88 Indeed, after laying the wreath Maskey 
stated that ‘this is a major step for Republicans and Nationalists on this island… I hope that 
this initiative will be seen at face value and as a positive gesture’. Moreover, he 
subsequently told The Irish Times that he had viewed the Battle of the Somme 
commemorations as a ‘very important opportunity to say to the Unionist community 
“here’s how I can reach out to you”. And at the same time commemorate all those people 
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who lost their lives at the Battle of the Somme’.89  Significantly, Maskey also chaired a 
special meeting of the City Council, which was regarded as a crucial part of the day’s 
events.  This meeting required Maskey to read out a tribute to both the British Monarchy 
and the Commonwealth, as well as to the British soldiers who died at the Battle of the 
Somme. This was in spite of the fact that, in his view, the motion ignored the Irish 
nationalists who had died there.90 
In approaching the remembrance of the Battle of the Somme in this way, Maskey was 
acutely aware that he was dealing with the role that history plays in forming identities and 
contemporary politics. Maskey’s thoughts on this were apparent in a speech, entitled ‘The 
Memory of the Dead Seeking Common Ground’, given at Belfast City Hall on 26 June 2002. 
Here, he outlined the approach he would adopt with regards to the commemoration on 1 
July, noting that ‘in respect of the commemoration of the Somme, I am guided by a desire 
to use this occasion to unite and include rather than divide and exclude’.91 Within this 
speech, Maskey situated his actions in ‘the issue of memory and the role personal memory 
has played in the shaping of Ireland’s history’.92 He argued that ‘history helps define us as a 
people. And it is people by their actions who make history… We inherit history. It is then up 
to us to make sense out of it for the times that we live in. The history of the people of this 
island is complex, layered, has many strands and indeed, many versions of those strands.’93 
Indeed, he acknowledged that in parallel with the history of Irish rebellion, ‘there is 
another history; the history of those in Ireland who joined the British Army’, before 
recognising that ‘for many nationalists those who joined the British Army are dismissed as 
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not warranting esteem’.94 Furthermore, Maskey explicitly linked this historical complexity 
with the Somme, noting that: 
[A]s we approach the 86th anniversary of the Battle of the Somme on July 1st it is 
worth recalling that the complexity of this island’s history was indeed reflected, 
perhaps encapsulated, in this period…The diversity of Irish political allegiances was 
reflected on the battlefield. Although divided by political aspirations at home in 
Ireland they died together side by side at the Somme. 95 
Significantly, with regards to commemoration, and his own role as Lord Mayor, Maskey 
argued that: 
There is a duty and responsibility on all who hold public office to represent all of 
the electorate. This is what we collectively need to explore. That is, to seek to 
identify common ground which we can willingly share so that our 
commemorations, at this level [of democratically elected government], of those 
who lost their lives can be a unifying source and a calming influence on the course 
of future political developments; or at least a means of minimising division.96 
He continued: ‘I am laying this wreath in memory of and tribute to all the men who made 
the supreme sacrifice at the Battle of the Somme and during the First World War’, before 
stating that ‘my initiative on this issue is equally in recognition of the sorrow, hurt and 
suffering left behind for their relatives, friends and comrades’.97 Furthermore, Maskey 
argued that, in the long term, ‘my objective… is to seek to identify common ground for all 
of us in this generation’.98 
Finally, Maskey concluded the speech by saying:  
Historical events properly understood, especially in a divided society, can be a 
source of inspiration for the living… Let not our children accuse us of distorting 
history, thereby perpetuating division, when we have the chance of establishing a 
new beginning. Let us seek to ensure that the history we bequeath to our children 
enhances all of their lives.99 
                                                             









Throughout this speech, Maskey used the language of outreach, generosity and inclusion, 
which became an increasingly important part of the rhetoric within official 
commemorations throughout the 2000s. Another strand is also apparent – the 
identification of World War One as a shared history with a common narrative of sacrifice. In 
fact, Maskey’s actions and rhetoric reflected a growing awareness amongst policy-makers 
that the sense of shared history and respectful commemoration of events generated by 
these strands could be used to build bridges between the two traditions in Northern 
Ireland. Indeed, Maskey followed this action in November of that year by laying a laurel 
wreath at the Ulster Tower in Thiepval, Belgium, and, more significantly, holding a small 
reception for members of the Royal British Legion in Belfast. The latter action was praised 
by Legion members as a ‘brave and enormous contribution to crossing bridges’, particularly 
in the context of the ‘extremely sensitive situation’ in which Maskey operated.100 
From the point of view of ‘parity of esteem’, a cornerstone of the Good Friday Agreement, 
Maskey’s actions in 2002 were arguably more significant than the opening of the Island of 
Ireland Peace Tower in Messines four years earlier. For David McKitterick, for example, his 
actions were seen as ‘breaking important new ground not only for his year as Mayor, but in 
the general disposition of republicanism in recognising and respecting other traditions’. 
Then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland John Reid welcomed ‘changing nationalist 
attitudes’ to remembering the dead of the First World War and described it as ‘a sign of 
encouragement and hope for the future’.101 Similarly, Fern Lane, writing in An Phoblacht, 
highlighted two ways in which Maskey’s actions were important: 
Firstly, on behalf of republicanism, he acknowledged the scale of loss and grief 
experienced by the Protestant community at the Somme… Secondly, he took a vital 
first step in the process to enable the Nationalist and Republican communities in 
the Six Counties, and on the island of Ireland to acknowledge those members of 
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their own families who, for very different reasons, fought and died on the British 
side.102 
Since Maskey’s actions, Republicans have become more closely involved in war 
commemoration throughout Ireland as Sinn Fein started to take part in local ceremonies in 
towns outside Belfast. Furthermore, his decision to participate in commemoration, and the 
implication that official republican attitudes towards commemoration were changing, also 
opened up new spaces in which Republicans were able to engage with the First World War 
on their own terms. Significantly, Maskey’s actions can also be regarded as having wider 
implications for the political process in Northern Ireland. Colin Knox, for example, has 
argued that as a party Sinn Fein aimed to use Maskey’s tenure as Mayor to prove to 
Unionists that Sinn Fein in power provided no threat to them.103 Similarly, Gibney stated 
that: ‘We wanted to use Alex [Maskey] as a kind of ambassador… to prove to Unionists that 
they would be under no threat whenever Sinn Fein was in power, whether that was in 
Belfast or in a united Ireland’.104  
Despite this progress, Sinn Fein did not have to address the issue of mayoral participation 
in commemoration again until 2008, when Tom Hartley was elected as Lord Mayor. In 
1995, Hartley had been the first person to signify a shift in attitudes to remembrance by 
Sinn Fein and during his tenure, chose to adopt a similar approach to Maskey, electing to 
lay a wreath two hours before the main ceremony. Hartley stated that he believed his 
action would consolidate and build on initiatives taken previously:  
It clearly shows that Republicans are committed to engaging with the Unionist and 
Protestant people and that we are prepared to meet them on common ground no 
matter how difficult it is for us as republicans to do so. This is what making peace is 
all about. I am keen to show the continued commitment that Republicans in this 
city have to building bridges into the Unionist and Protestant community. 105 
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Significantly, Hartley also renewed calls for a debate on the shape of official 
commemoration in the City. He argued ‘we should not shy away from the reality that the 
formal Somme commemoration here in this city will primarily appeal to only that section of 
the people of our city, who are from a Unionist and Protestant background’. He added: ‘we 
need to have an open and rational debate about how we commemorate these events in 
our shared past in an inclusive and non-threatening fashion’.106  
As seen in this section, in the years between 2001 and 2009 commemoration was 
characterised by increasing, although limited, Republican engagement in official 
commemorative events. First Alex Maskey, in 2002, and later Tom Hartley, in 2008, of Sinn 
Fein took part in a number of high profile and arguably ground-breaking acts. As the Lord 
Mayors of Belfast, both elected to lay laurel wreaths at the Cenotaph prior to the annual 
Battle of the Somme ceremony, as well as hold receptions for members of the Royal British 
Legion in November. In this, Maskey and Hartley sought to reach out to the Unionist 
communities of Belfast, using the same language of shared history and inclusivity 
throughout, which had emerged in the earlier period as a means to build bridges between 
the two communities.   
 
The Beginning of the ‘Decade of Centenaries’, 2010 – 2016  
Thus far, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that the commemoration of the World 
Wars in Northern Ireland, and on the island of Ireland, has been significantly affected by 
changes in both inter-Irish and Anglo-Irish relationships. This was predominantly a result of 
the Northern Ireland Peace Process, which not only improved relationships between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as well as with the United Kingdom, but in 
doing so helped to establish an environment in which it became increasingly possible for 
nationalist communities to recognise the Great War as part of nationalist Irish history. It 
has also been shown that it was in this atmosphere of reconciliation that nationalist and 
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later republican, albeit peripheral, engagement in commemorative events began to take 
place. 
It was in this spirit of reconciliation occurring within the Island of Ireland, discussed above, 
that Queen Elizabeth II was able to undertake the first Royal Visit to the Republic of Ireland 
since 1911 (cf. Chapter Two). Given the nature of the troubled historic relationship 
between the two islands the Queen’s visit was seen by many commentators as a ground-
breaking symbol and landmark transformation of the normalisation of British and Irish 
relations.107  Professor Diarmiad Ferriter, of University College Dublin, for example, referred 
to it as ‘the last piece of a jigsaw that has slowly been put together over the course of the 
Peace Process’.108 Indeed, the presence of both Foreign Secretary William Hague and Prime 
Minister David Cameron appeared to indicate the seriousness with which it was regarded 
by the British Government. During this ‘historic’ visit, a number of the sovereign’s official 
engagements involved a sensitive but direct and unflinching acknowledgement of the very 
mixed history of Anglo-Irish relations. In this, both the Queen and President Mary 
McAleese displayed a willingness to approach the past in a spirit of mutual respect and 
understanding.109 The Irish memory of the First World War, and the commemoration of 
these experiences, were at the forefront of attempts at conciliation. This was particularly 
evident at the wreath-laying ceremonies held at both the Garden of Remembrance in 
Parnell Square and the National War Memorial at Islandbridge.  
During these two wreath-laying ceremonies, the Irish combatants who fought both for and 
against the British State during the decade of the First World War were honoured with the 
same solemn reverence (cf. Chapter Two pp.91-92). The ceremonies, therefore, 
represented a very public and official recognition that whether Irishmen served in the 
British Army or the IRA, or both, many of them quite sincerely believed that they were 
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fighting for Ireland.110 Furthermore, the implication was that the sacrifices of those who 
died were equally valid, equally painful for their families and equally worthy of respect and 
commemoration.111 Indeed, as Pennell and Madigan have noted, to Irish communities 
worldwide, this obvious ‘parity of esteem’ shown to the dead of all traditions throughout 
the Queen’s visit, served as a reminder that ‘one group of Irish combatants does not have 
to be remembered at the expense of another’.112 These two acts of remembrance also 
provided evidence that even the commemoration of divisive events, such as the First World 
War and the Easter Rising, could have a powerful symbolic and conciliatory impact when 
approached in the right manner.113 The Queen’s Visit, in fact, ultimately paved the way and 
set the tone for the state-led commemorations of the First World War centenary in Ireland, 
North and South. 
In Northern Ireland, the centenary of the First World War was part of a wider series of 
high-profile and contested commemorations, collectively known as the ‘Decade of 
Centenaries’, which mark the hundredth anniversaries of the events that gave birth to the 
two states on the Island of Ireland.114 The descriptive ‘Decade of Centenaries’ was coined 
by then Taoiseach Brian Cowen during his address to the 2010 Institute for British-Irish 
Studies Conference at University College Dublin. He stated that ‘the events of the decade 
between 1912 and 1922 were momentous and defining one for all of the people of this 
island, and indeed for these islands’.115 Cowen continued ‘[t]his was the decade of the 
covenant and the gun, of blood sacrifice and bloody politics, a time of division and war, not 
only on this island but across the world. It was the decade that defined relationships on 
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these islands for most of the last century’.116 Broadly, the Decade of Centenaries covers 
events such as the Home Rule Crisis (1912-1914), the Easter Rising and Battle of the 
Somme (1916) as well as the Partition of Ireland (1920), War of Independence (1919-1921) 
and Irish Civil War (1922-1923).   
This context was unique in comparison to the other nations considered in this thesis. As 
Catriona Pennell has noted, on the Island of Ireland, the First World War centenary had to 
share the commemorative spotlight with other, more important (at least to a large section 
of the population) events in Irish History.117 This is indicative of the degree to which the 
circumstances surrounding the First World War and its aftermath are complex and 
potentially divisive in Northern Ireland. Consequently, these anniversaries all have the 
potential to draw attention to the contemporary resonances of historical events 
surrounding Ireland’s partition. 
The official ‘Decade of Centenaries’ programme of commemorations commenced in 2012. 
Although overseen by the Commemorations Unit of the Department of Culture, Heritage 
and the Gaeltacht in the Republic of Ireland, it has significantly influenced attempts to 
provide conceptual frameworks for remembering.118 It has been suggested that the 
programme could ‘reinforce the development of a shared future… and help us [Northern 
Ireland] become a more mature, inclusive and accepting society’. 119 It has also been 
regarded as being well placed to enhance public understanding of the broader historical 
context surrounding the events of the First World War, and consequently, the inter-
dependent nature of Unionist and Nationalist traditions.  
Throughout the state-led commemorations, in both the North and the South, the emphasis 
was on the War as a moment of shared experience that suggested Irishmen had fought in 
the War and shared similar experiences regardless of their political persuasion. This is a 
process that Phillip Orr has described as a ‘greening’ or ‘de-Orangification’ of First World 
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War history.120 Discussions of commemorating the centenaries, as well as state-led 
approaches to those commemorations, were dominated by an emphasis on a ‘parity of 
esteem’, ‘inclusiveness’, ‘equality of sacrifice’, ‘mutual respect’ and ‘maturity’. In March 
2012, for example, Downing Street issued a joint statement from British Prime Minister 
David Cameron and Irish Taoiseach Enda Kenny, which outlined a joint vision for better co-
operation between the UK and the Republic of Ireland over the coming decade. The 
statement noted that ‘2012 […] marks the beginning of a decade of centenary 
commemorations of events that helped shape our political destines’, which would offer the 
people of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom (and thus, by extension, 
Northern Ireland) ‘an opportunity to explore and reflect on key episodes of [their] past […] 
in a spirit of historical accuracy, mutual respect, inclusiveness, and reconciliation’.121 It 
continued: ‘we want to ensure that this is a decade not only of remembering but also of 
looking forward; a decade of renewed and strengthened co-operation between our two 
countries’. The statement also stressed the role of both governments in promoting and 
guaranteeing the Peace Process in Northern Ireland and linked this to the 
commemorations, acknowledging that: 
Above all, we stand together with the people of Northern Ireland and its Executive 
in our determination to make sure that society there is never again blighted by 
violent conflict […] [O]ur aim […] is a society that is not only peaceful, but stable, 
prosperous, and based on a genuinely shared future for all […] We will maintain 
our efforts to promote reconciliation, underpinning the Executive’s objective of 
creating a cohesive, shared and integrated society in Northern Ireland. We will 
work together, with the Executive, to encourage the marking of forthcoming 
centenaries in a spirit of mutual respect, and the promotion of understanding.122 
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There are also numerous other examples of this emphasis on reconciliation and shared 
experiences. On 15 March 2012, for example, the Northern Ireland Executive ‘unanimously 
agreed that the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Investment and the Minister for Culture, 
Arts and Leisure will jointly bring forward a programme for a decade’ which would ‘offer a 
real opportunity for our society to benefit economically and continue its transformation 
into a vibrant, diverse and enriched place to visit’.123 It continued by outlining that the 
commemorative programme was to be organised under the principles of ‘educational 
focus, reflection, inclusivity, tolerance, respect, responsibility and interdependence’.124 In 
2013, the Executive published its Good Relations Strategy Together: Building a United 
Community, which explicitly reaffirmed the principles of the 2012 Executive Statement in 
noting the ‘intent to mark significant anniversaries throughout the decade in an inclusive 
way and in a manner that will… help our society to benefit economically and continue its 
transformation into a vibrant, diverse and enriching place to visit’.125 It continued by 
stressing that: 
Our most recent past is only one aspect of an intricate and complex history that 
has shaped the identity of many within our community today […] The decade of 
commemorations presents an opportunity to celebrate our shared differences in a 
way which will position Northern Ireland as a powerful example in conflict 
resolution and transformation on the world stage […] [W]e believe that exploring 
our past can be enormously helpful in building a better future.126  
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Similarly, the Irish Government’s Decade of Centenaries website discusses the need to 
promote a ‘constructive dialogue’ and ‘deeper mutual understanding among people from 
different traditions on the Island of Ireland’.127 
As Richard Grayson has argued, the adoption of such language appears to indicate a far 
more conciliatory approach to commemoration across the board than had previously been 
implemented. Throughout its centenary announcements, for instance, the UK Government 
indicated that commemorations offered further opportunities for reconciliation with the 
Republic of Ireland .128 In a Northern Ireland Press Release, one of the stated aims for the 
‘Decade of Centenaries’ was to ‘foster ever-closer relations with the Irish Government and 
work together to promote greater understanding of our shared history’.129 Similarly, Dr 
Andrew Murrison, Special Representative to the UK Government, indicated that the 
anniversaries would reflect Irish involvement in the First World War, commenting that the 
‘commemorations will provide an opportunity to explore and reflect on history shared by 
the UK and Ireland, and by the communities in Northern Ireland’. 130 
Furthermore, the extent of co-ordination which took place between Belfast, Dublin and 
London with regards to the centenary also represented a significant departure from 
previous approaches to commemorative events.131 Expert Advisory Groups and Planning 
Boards, for example, were established at various levels. This included, amongst others: the 
National First World War Centenary Advisory Board; the Northern Ireland World War One 
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Centenary Committee; the Republic of Ireland Expert Advisory Group on Commemorations. 
There were also community bodies such as the Unionist Centenary Committee and Belfast 
Somme 100.132 It is also worth noting that the Special Representative for Northern Ireland 
on the National Centenary Advisory Board, Jeffrey Donaldson, MP for Lagan Valley 
representing the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), also chaired the Northern Ireland 
Centenary Committee.  
Most obviously, this degree of co-operation has led to an emphasis on the need for a more 
pluralistic remembrance of historic events, in terms of both ‘what’ is remembered and the 
tone in which such commemoration is conducted. Speaking at the 99th anniversary of the 
Battle of the Somme, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Theresa Villiers commented 
that ‘we have been working together across government in Whitehall and with the 
Northern Ireland Executive and indeed with the Irish Government to try to ensure that 
these commemorations are used in a spirit of historical accuracy and objectivity to mark 
the history we share… There is one thing we can learn from these centenaries – there is a 
huge amount we have in common across these islands’.133 
The language used throughout the First World War centenary and wider ‘Decade of 
Centenaries’ is familiar and yet striking. Themes of ‘reconciliation’, ‘mutual respect’ and 
‘building a shared history’ dominated discussions of and approaches to commemoration, 
revealing the extent to which the rhetoric being used was that of the Peace Process – 
indeed, of a ‘parity of esteem’, which formed the cornerstone of the Good Friday 
Agreement. There was, as Evershed has identified, a clear emphasis on ‘cross-communal’ 
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unity and a ‘shared future’ over the political divisions of the past.134 Consequently, the 
language of commemoration used during this period is illustrative of how commemoration 
was used to reinforce messages of continued and improved co-operation, co-ordination 
and understanding. The remembrance of the World Wars, therefore, was one arena in 
which the Peace Process could be consolidated and advanced. 
It should also be highlighted that this period has seen further developments in Sinn Fein’s 
position. In 2013, Máirtín Ó Muilleoir was elected as the third Sinn Fein Lord Mayor of 
Belfast. At the annual Battle of the Somme commemoration on 1 July, he elected to 
continue his party’s practice of laying a laurel wreath at the Belfast Cenotaph during a 
smaller, low-key ceremony held before the official commemoration. On 11 November 
2013, however, O’Muilleoir advanced this position by assuming a formal role and attending 
the Royal British Legion Armistice Day ceremony.  This was a step beyond the actions taken 
by either Alex Maskey, in 2002, or Tom Hartley, in 2008, both of whom had laid wreaths on 
the day of anniversaries, but ultimately declined to take part in official ceremonies due to 
the military connotations of such events. In adopting this position, O’Muilleoir set another 
new precedent, which, in turn, was followed by the next Sinn Fein Lord Mayor, Arder 
Carson, in 2015. O’Muilleoir stated that he saw his presence as honouring the pledge he 
made to be a mayor ‘for all the people of Belfast’. He argued that ‘part of that means 
reaching out to unionism and today really was about peace-making towards unionism’ and 
to show ‘respect to the unionist tradition’.135 Although referring to his action as ‘the most 
difficult decision I have made in 30 years in politics’ O’Muilleoir commented that ‘the 
peace, and building a better Belfast demands that we have to move ourselves into places 
where we are uncomfortable’.136 He stated that ‘we know that remembrance traditionally 
divides the people of Belfast’, but ‘I am arguing people to stand on the common ground 
and part of the common ground is remembering with respect all those who died in the First 
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World War’.137 Similarly, in a video interview with An Phoblacht after Armistice Day, 
O’Muilleoir said: 
What I did today was really reaching out to the Unionist, Protestant community of 
Belfast, for whom Remembrance is a major, major event each year, and in doing so I 
hope to build the peace. [It was] the right place to be if we want to build the peace, 
and build a better Belfast. Remember also the fact that many of those who died, many 
of the Irishmen who died, had joined the British Army to fight for the freedom of 
Belgium and the freedom of small nations: many for independence and Home Rule as 
well, and we need to make sure that they are written into the story.138 
This section has suggested that the commemoration of the World Wars in Northern Ireland 
between 2010 and 2016 was greatly influenced by the adoption of the so-called ‘Decade of 
Centenaries’ commemorative programme. The remembrance of the First World War is 
located within a wider series of events, which have a complicated significance for the island 
of Ireland. It has been argued that official approaches to commemoration have been 
marked by a significant degree of co-ordination between the central UK Government, the 
Northern Ireland Executive, and the Irish Government. This, in turn, led to an increased 
emphasis on the need for a more pluralistic approach to remembrance. Furthermore, 
remembrance has been dominated by discourses which focus on ‘reconciliation’ and 
‘mutual respect’. Moreover, further developments in Sinn Fein’s approach to remembrance 
also took place, demonstrated by the formal role played by O’Muilleoir as Lord Mayor in 
November 2013 in the official Armistice Day commemorative event.  
 
Conclusion  
The politics of World War commemoration on the island of Ireland between 1994 and 2016 
was decisively affected by shifts in inter-Irish and Anglo-Irish political relationships. Of 
these, the most significant was the Northern Ireland Peace Process. The IRA ceasefires of 
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1994, and the cessation of paramilitary hostilities, followed by the signing of the Good 
Friday Agreement in April 1998 helped to smooth sectarian tensions and create a new 
climate of reconciliation. This, in turn, fostered an atmosphere in which it became possible 
to rehabilitate the memory of the Great War amongst nationalist communities North and 
South of the border. It was following these developments that a shift in the SDLP position 
with regards to commemoration took place. This resulted in the first nationalist 
engagement in such events, as seen in the actions of Alex Atwood and Alban Maginness in 
1994 and 1997 respectively. 
The Peace Process, in fact, continued to influence approaches to World War 
commemoration throughout this period. This is apparent in the growing recognition of and 
emphasis on the existence of a ‘shared’ Irish history based upon the belief that narratives 
of common sacrifice and suffering would help to transcend political and sectarian 
differences. Throughout the construction and unveiling of the Island of Ireland Peace 
Tower in 1998, for example, a great deal of focus was placed on notions of shared 
experiences. In addition to this, a dominant discourse of ‘reconciliation’, ‘inclusivity’ and 
‘mutual respect’, based on the language of the Peace Process, was increasingly utilised 
both within commemorations and by policy-makers. Between 2001 and 2009, for example, 
peripheral Republican engagement in World War commemoration began to take place. As 
senior members of Sinn Fein, Alex Maskey and later Tom Hartley, elected to participate in 
the annual commemoration of the Battle of the Somme by laying laurel wreaths before the 
main ceremonies. These actions alone marked significant departures in Republican 
attitudes to remembrance. Notably, in adopting these positions both Maskey and Hartley 
used the rhetoric of both ‘shared history’ and ‘inclusivity’ as a means of building bridges 
between the Unionist and Nationalist communities in Belfast. 
This is also illustrative of the extent to which the commemoration of the First World War 
was increasingly recognised as one forum in which the Peace Process could not only be 
reinforced, but further advanced. It has been shown, for example, that engagement in 
commemorative events lay at the heart of the Queen’s Royal Visit in 2011, which has since 
been widely regarded as a diplomatic success and landmark in the transformation of Anglo-




the First World War centenary and wider ‘Decade of Centenaries’. Throughout, the 
commemorative programme involved a significant degree of co-operation between the 
various governments. This had the most obvious consequence of influencing what was 
being commemorated, and the tone adopted. Indeed, while the language of ‘reconciliation’ 
and ‘mutual respect’ continued to dominate, there was an increased emphasis on 
‘historical accuracy’. This was, in part, drawn out through a pluralistic approach to 




Chapter Four: Devolution, Independence and Remembrance: World War 
Commemoration in Scotland, 1994 – 2016 
 
On 7 June 2013, then Education Secretary, Michael Gove addressed the Scottish 
Conservative party conference on the approaching referendum on Scottish independence. 
Gove commented that ‘we are going to win the referendum next year on Scotland’s place 
within the United Kingdom […] I am optimistic that we shall make an optimistic and 
generous case for the United Kingdom at every turn’.1 He continued by suggesting that 
‘Alex Salmond thinks next year will be a date of added significance because of the 
anniversary of Bannockburn’. Significantly, Gove countered this by stating ‘but next year is 
also the anniversary of the First World War. When English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh 
soldiers stood together to defend our freedoms. And next year will also, of course, be the 
anniversary – the 70th anniversary – of D-Day. When this country liberated Europe from 
totalitarianism it was the stir of the pipes which was heard as the first troops went ashore 
in Normandy… Scottish, British, Irish united under the United Kingdom flag determined to 
defeat tyranny, determined to stand for liberty. That is woven into who I am, but Alex 
Salmond wants to rip it out. Let’s not let him’.2 
Indeed, Gove’s comments contrasted sharply with those made by supporters of Scottish 
independence. Alex Massie, for example, has noted that a number of commentators raised 
concerns that the centenary of World War One was part of a ‘British Nationalist 
propaganda exercise’: a ‘minority of Scottish Nationalists…smelt a British plot to put the 
Scots back in their place. Who “celebrates” the start of a war, they asked? And isn’t the 
timing of the celebration suspicious or even inappropriate since Scotland’s independence 
referendum will be held just a few weeks after the centenary of August 1914 is marked?’.3 
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Similarly, the historian Michael Fry has suggested that the centenary was part of a broader 
UK Government-orchestrated ‘politicised Britfest’ or ‘Britannia Fetish’ that began with the 
Diamond Jubilee and Olympics celebrations in 2012.4 
This is indicative of the extent to which the commemoration of the World Wars in Scotland 
has frequently interacted with changes in the political climate, raising questions regarding 
the issues of ‘Britishness’ and ‘Scottishness’. This chapter will analyse how successive 
Scottish Governments have approached the commemoration of the World Wars while 
simultaneously addressing questions of identity politics and those related to Scottish 
sovereignty. What are the main political implications of identity politics as administered 
through commemoration? How is the idea of ‘Scottishness’ articulated through political 
narratives associated with commemoration, especially in the post-devolution period? In 
what ways, if any, did devolution and the subsequent election of Scottish National Party 
(SNP) Governments in 2007 and again in 2011 affect the ways in which the World Wars 
have been remembered in Scotland? By focusing on the political narratives associated with 
World War commemoration, therefore, this chapter advances our understanding of how 
modern Scotland has redefined its relations with the United Kingdom while also analysing 
the relationship between World War commemoration, remembrance and the politics of 
the union. 
Like Ireland, Scotland shared in the so-called ‘memory boom’ that has gathered ground 
since the 1990s. One consequence of this was the generation of new research into Scottish 
history, with a growth in monographic output and a corresponding increase in the number 
of historians of Scotland based in Scottish universities (and thus, students taking 
undergraduate classes in that country’s history). 5 As The Oxford Handbook of Modern 
Scottish History, published in January 2012, comments, ‘over the last few decades, there 
has been an outpouring of cutting-edge research… [and] major advances in research and 
                                                             
November 2013. Accessed at: https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2013/11/commemorating-the-first-
world-war-is-not-a-festival-of-british-nationalism/ [Date Accessed: 30/03/2018]. 
4 M. Fry, ‘Time to Reflect, Not Celebrate’, The Scotsman, 18 October 2012; R. Seymour, ‘The First 
World War Centenary and the Britannia Fetish’, The Guardian, 12 October 2012. 




scholarship have transformed understanding of the Scottish past’.6 Similarly, The 
Historiographer Royal in Scotland, writing in 2007, noted that ‘Scottish History is pretty 
vigorous; a structure that was rickety and thinly painted a generation ago is reinforced and 
much more thickly painted now. It is, as a subject, more deeply understood’. 7 Amongst 
others, significant works have included T.C. Smout’s Scotland, 1850-1950 (1990); M. 
Lynch’s Scotland: A New History (1991); Caitriona Macdonald’s Unionist Scotland, 1800-
1997 (1998); MacKenzie’s Empire and National Identities: The Case of Scotland (1998) and, 
Tom Devine’s The Scottish Nation (1999).8  
This growth in scholarly interest has resulted in an increased number of historical 
treatments of both World Wars, which, in focusing on Scottish experiences, diverge from a 
‘British-state’ approach. Perhaps the most notable of these volumes is Catriona Macdonald 
and Elaine McFarland’s collection of essays, Scotland and the Great War. This work 
explores the impact of the Great War on Scottish civilian life, highlighting the theme of the 
supposed distinctiveness of the Scottish experience of war while simultaneously reflecting 
the concern that Scotland’s experience of the Great War created a specifically Scottish 
national identity.9 Additionally, Trevor Royle has recently written accounts of Scotland’s 
involvement in and experience of both the World Wars. In Flowers of the Forest and Time 
of Tyrants, Royle has sought to bring together military histories of the First and Second 
World Wars with narratives about Scotland’s political, social and economic role in the 
conflicts.10 Furthermore, the First and Second World Wars have received treatment in 
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Edward Spiers, Jeremy Crang and Matthew Strickland’s substantial edited collection A 
Military History of Scotland as well as the already cited Oxford Handbook of Modern 
Scottish History.11 There have also been broader examinations of this period in recent 
histories of twentieth century Scotland, such as those by Richard Finlay, Christopher Harvie 
and Ewen Cameron, characterised by discussions of Scotland’s relationship to the World 
Wars.12  
Despite this, the historiography of Scotland’s involvement in the First and Second World 
Wars remains underdeveloped, particularly when compared to the extent of scholarship on 
Irish experiences (cf. Chapter Three).13 Both McFarland and Macdonald have noted that 
scholarly interest in Scotland during this period has remained located largely within an 
older social and labour-history framework with a focus on labour relations and ‘Red 
Clydeside’.14 Similarly, Macdonald has referred to the historiography of Scotland during the 
Second World War as a ‘”No Man’s Land” in “serious” Scottish History’ noting that it is 
‘fragmented, patchy and episodic’.15 In fact, the Scottish experience has received little 
focused attention and is seldom disaggregated in British and international overviews. 
Rather, it is frequently incorporated within wider British narratives. Additionally, even 
those accounts which do separate the Scottish from the ‘British’ experience have tended to 
limit this engagement to an individual chapter. This lack of dedicated scholarship is 
particularly striking given the growth of separatist nationalisms and regional identities. 
Furthermore, within the historical literature, few studies have sought to explore 
commemoration in Scotland, much less in contemporary Scotland. James Coleman’s 
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Remembering the Past in Nineteenth-Century Scotland: Commemoration, Nationality and 
Memory remains one notable exception.16 It explores the contested question of Scottish 
identity through an analysis of commemorative activity relating to William Wallace, John 
Knox, the Covenanters, and the Stuart dynasty – namely, issues all of which were either 
associated with anti-English Scottish politics and religion, or were controversial aspects in 
Anglo-Scottish history.17 Jenny Macleod has also written about commemoration in 
Scotland. She analyses the construction of the Scottish National War Memorial in the 
1920s, arguing that it not only reflected the multi-faceted nature of Scottish identity, but 
also indicates the extent to which Scotland’s religious, martial and imperial traditions 
continued to resonate as a means of commemorating the First World War in Scotland.18 
It is also worth noting that Andrew Mycock, Dan Todman and Keith Jeffery have all, albeit 
briefly, discussed World War commemoration in Scotland in relation to the First World War 
centenary.19 In his article on approaches to the First World War centenary and the ‘politics 
of war commemoration’ in the United Kingdom, for example, Mycock discusses Scottish 
responses to the anniversary as well as the impact of both the 2011 SNP election victory 
and the independence referendum.20 Similarly, Jeffery explores commemoration in 
Scotland in relation to the problems inherent in the UK Government’s approach to the 
centenary as well as the issues raised by the multi-national nature of the UK state.21 
Despite this, in each of these articles such discussion of Scotland’s responses to the 
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centenary takes up only one or two paragraphs within a larger article exploring 
commemoration in the United Kingdom as a whole. Consequently, existing analysis of 
commemoration in modern Scotland is limited. 
This is despite the fact that the World Wars touched Scotland in multifarious and significant 
ways. In military terms, Scotland made an important contribution to the British war efforts. 
According to Royle, the precise number of Scottish dead between 1914 and 1918 is difficult 
to calculate.22 At the end of the First World War, the official figure stood at 74,000, 
although it should be noted that this figure was arrived at by a calculation on assumptions 
and estimation, namely by dividing the British total by 10% to reflect the fact Scots 
represented 10% of the British population.23 Later in the 1920s, this figure was revised to 
100,000, or 13% of the British total.24 Some commentators, such as Jay Winter, Tom Devine 
and Niall Ferguson, have gone further than this to suggest that the Scottish death rate in 
the Great War was exceeded only by Serbia and Turkey.25 These claims, however, are based 
on a statistic which suggests that the total number of Scottish casualties as a percentage of 
those mobilised was 26.4%, while in Serbia and Turkey it was 37.1% and 26.8% 
respectively.26 Yet, such a percentage would suggest that, with approximately 690,000 
Scots having been mobilised, the number of casualties would be around 182,000 – a figure 
which has generally been regarded as unrealistic.27 The generally accepted figure is now 
around 100,000, however, and even that, as Royle suggests this should be considered with 
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some caution.28 Nationalist propaganda has subsequently been fuelled by these higher 
figures, allowing the SNP to stress what they view as Scotland’s ‘disproportionate 
contribution’ to the fighting.29 During the Second World War, Crang estimates that by the 
end of 1944, 2.8 million soldiers were serving in the British Army, of whom approximately 
263,000 were born in Scotland, around 10% of the total strength of the army (English-born 
soldiers made up 83%, Welsh born 4%, Northern Irish 1% and Eire-born 1%, with the 
remaining 1% born elsewhere).30 Scottish units served in all major theatres of the War, 
suffering around 34,000 Scottish-born deaths (approximately 11% of the total British 
military war dead).31 Of these, approximately 6000 were serving with the Royal Navy, 8000 
with the Royal Air Force and 20,000 with the Royal British Army.32 
Furthermore, historians such as William Kenefick have argued that the Scottish experiences 
of the First and Second World Wars and their aftermath were different in many ways from 
the rest of Britain.33 While Scotland as a whole was highly ‘patriotic’ during the Great War, 
several of its cities were also leading centres of the anti-war movement as well as 
experiencing significant industrial and civil unrest. Glasgow, in fact, became the focus of 
political radicalism and effectively found itself under martial law during what became 
known as the ‘Red Clydeside’ era. Derek Patrick has also identified another distinctive 
element of the Scottish experience of the First World War – the sense of a historic martial 
tradition, which remains a major component of Scottish identity, and the manner in which 
national, religious, military and imperial traditions intertwined.34 As Brian Glass has argued, 
the exploits of Scottish regiments of the British Army throughout the Empire as well as in 
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conflicts such as the Peninsular, Crimean and Boer Wars had cemented the place of the 
Scottish soldier in Britain’s consciousness, and perhaps more significantly in Scotland’s 
consciousness too.35 Consequently, those Scots fighting in the World Wars were seen as 
entering into and continuing this tradition and, therefore, their experiences were 
incorporated into centuries of Scottish History. Such military achievements also enabled 
Scots to identify with the imperial project.36 For Glass Scotland was a ‘nation inextricably 
linked to the British Empire’, arguing that such connection proved to be one of the 
formative experiences of modern-day Scotland. Similarly, there was a close association 
between Scottish national pride and identity with the Empire, as the image of the Scottish 
soldier became an imperial icon. 37 
This chapter consists of three sections, each of which analyses a specific stage in Scotland’s 
political development and its relations with the United Kingdom. The chronological 
structure of this chapter seeks to analyse and draw out the extent to which political 
developments in the nature of Scotland’s relationship with the political union of the United 
Kingdom have influenced the ways in which the World Wars have been commemorated 
there. The first section will focus on the period immediately preceding the introduction of 
devolution to Scotland, from 1994 to the passage of the Scotland Bill, introducing 
devolution, in 1998. Section two will analyse the immediate post-devolution period, from 
the first Scottish Parliamentary elections, leading up to the election of a minority SNP 
Government in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections. Finally, section three will discuss the 
period from 2007 to 2016.  It will explore how the Scottish Government, governed by the 
SNP, has approached the commemoration of the World Wars, in particular the centenary 
of the First World War. 
Ultimately, it will argue that World War commemoration in Scotland between 1994 and 
2016 was significantly affected by the changing nature of Scotland’s relationship with the 
political union of the United Kingdom. Prior to devolution, commemoration in Scotland was 
driven by the UK Government. As such, it reflected the narratives and tone adopted in 
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these wider events and tended towards a much broader focus on ‘British’ experiences of 
the Wars. The creation of the devolved Scottish Parliament in 1998 and, more significantly, 
the victory of the SNP in both the elections of 2007 and 2011 (the latter with an absolute 
majority) impacted the tone and focus of remembrance. It will be shown that World War 
commemoration in post-devolution Scotland became one means through which a distinctly 
‘Scottish’ identity could be established as separate from a ‘British’ one. This is particularly 
striking throughout the centenary of the First World War: then events, differing from those 
organised by the Westminster Government, focused on not only the distinctive 
contributions made by Scotland to the Wars, but also the futility of war and subsequent 
impact they had on the nation. It will also contend that the commemoration of the World 
Wars has been increasingly politicised, in particular by the SNP who appear to utilise it as a 
means of promoting their political agenda, namely the achievement of Scottish 
independence. In this, it is also apparent that the sectarian tendencies of the SNP as well as 
the difficulties posed by the legacy of the British Empire had an impact on approaches to 
the representation and commemoration of the World Wars.  It will become apparent, 
therefore, that the commemoration of the World Wars was increasingly being manipulated 
for political purposes: Whitehall tried to inspire ‘British’ patriotic emotions, while the SNP 
utilised it towards their agendas – the achievement of independence. 
 
The Last Years of Parliamentary Centralism, 1994 – 1998 
On 8 May 1995, the United Kingdom celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day. 
Throughout the UK, a series of commemorative events, driven by John Major’s 
Conservative Government, were held. These included street parties, the lighting of 
beacons, and a three-day weekend festival held in Hyde Park. Hundreds of thousands of 
people gathered to take part in picnics and dancing, and to witness march-pasts, fly-pasts 
and a ‘spectacular fireworks display’ [See Figure 4.1].38 Iconography such as the Spitfire, V 
signs, Tommies and Union Flags predominated, appearing on the covers of pamphlets, 
programmes and leaflets connected with the commemorations. John Major’s VE Day 
                                                             




commemoration speech at the Hyde Park opening ceremony, however, made no reference 












Consequently, there was a distinct sense that, not only were the received narratives too 
Anglo-centric, but also that more could have been done to mark the event North of the 
border. Shadow Scottish Secretary George Robertson, for example, commented: ‘I think it 
is a pity so many of the events are based in London. I think a bit more effort should have 
been made by the Government to have a bigger celebration’.40 He continued: ‘a lot of 
people here feel that Scotland was missed out, although the Scottish role in both the 
victory and fighting was huge’.41 
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Perhaps more significant than this lack of explicit focus on Scotland, however, was the 
extent to which Scotland’s, and Scottish, engagement with the anniversary was limited. On 
1 May 1995, one week immediately before the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, John Ezard 
noted that ‘Scotland appears to have turned its back on next weekend’s VE Day 
commemorations’.42 Likewise, Alan Massie commented that ‘compared to the VE Day 
frenzy abroad in England, Scotland’s celebrations seem strangely muted’ noting that 
‘although there are various civic commemorations planned, the event has failed to set the 
public imagination ablaze’.43 He continued, ‘the mood seems strangely tepid in Scotland. 
Our indifference appears to suggest that in some way we suppose this commemoration to 
be irrelevant’.44 Massie went on to suggest that this lack of enthusiasm appeared to be a 
‘reflection of two (connected) feelings: Scotland’s hostility to the Tory Government, and 
the weakening of the sense of British identity’.45 These feelings led some ‘to dismiss 
celebration of VE Day as another Tory ramp’ and even ‘to dismiss […] the war itself as, if 
not England’s war…[then] something with which modern-minded nationalist Scots have no 
cause to concern themselves’.46 In this, Massie suggested that the difficulty for many Scots 
was that they ‘no longer feel they belong to the nation that fought the war’ and ‘would 
indeed be happy to deny that there is, or ever was, any such thing as a British nation’.47 
Similarly, writing in The Scotsman, Gary Duncan referred to the anniversary as ‘plucky Little 
England Day’ suggesting that ‘as a national festivity, yesterday was an event imbued with 
all the patriotic paraphernalia in which Little England loves to revel… It is the kind of 
supposedly “British” phenomenon which is particularly and peculiarly anglicised in its 
tone’.48 He continued, ‘In Scotland, by contrast, the commemoration…was marked by a 
more muted tone. Yes, flags were flown, beacons lit, and parades duly processed. But the 
extent to which Scots engaged in all this betrayed limited enthusiasm among some and 
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ennui among others’.49 Duncan suggested that, for the English, VE Day represented a 
‘chance to revel in the sort of nostalgic wartime recollections that are such a powerful 
strand in the complex flux of feelings and folklore that form its national identity… For a 
long, self-indulgent day, the English could wrap themselves in the emotional comfort 
blanket of the Union Flag and snuggle up to reassuring notions of national greatness’.50  
Consequently, he suggested ‘what we witnessed was, in some ways, less Victory in Europe 
Day than Victory for England Day’.51 In contrast, he argued that ‘for the Scots, the forces 
which tug at the country’s heartstrings, which play on the country’s collective psyche, are 
significantly different. The Union flag is not a symbol especially prized, for example.’52 
Likewise, a number of other commentators highlighted this sense of ambivalence amongst 
the Scottish. Ian MacWhirter, for example, commented that ‘like many Scots, I looked 
forward to last weekend’s VE Day celebrations with a mixture of boredom and irritation’, 
while Tom Brown noted that ‘I’m left with the impression that we’re the outsiders. Looking 
in on what has been taken over as an almost exclusively English event. North of the border, 
there isn’t the same general jollification of VE Day.’ 53 Brown continued, ‘I haven’t seen a 
single Union Jack… fluttering in a single street. There isn’t the same misty-eyed nostalgia 
for World War Two. We’ve lost that we-were-all-in-it-together feeling’.54  Similarly, Tom 
Nairn referred to VE Day in Scotland as a ‘day of forgetting’.55 
This limited engagement is also revealed by the low number of events held. For Raphael 
Samuel, despite appeals to regimental loyalties, VE Day celebrations were minimal, while 
the Lothian Regional Council refused to recognise 8 May as a public holiday.56 Indeed, both 
Marcello Mega and Gillian Harris have highlighted that although events were held across 
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the length and breadth of Britain… [in Scotland] there were fewer events than in many 
individual regions of England and the atmosphere north of the Border was more 
commemorative than celebratory’.57 Of those events held, most appeared to revolve 
‘around church services and quiet periods of reflection’, contrasting sharply with the ‘street 
parties, flag waving and unofficial beacon lighting that were far more widespread’ in 
England.58 Mega and Harris continued: ‘in Scotland… the public generally appeared to be 
going about its business and many expressed ignorance of the two-minutes silence’ while 
in England ‘few were unaware of the call to remember the sacrifice of those who did not 
survive the war’.59 Additionally, although the biggest VE Day parade held outside of London 
took place in Perth, this involved the only public turn-out in Scotland, which was a small 
one. Here, a crowd of only 5000 assembled to watch more than 1500 veterans from 
Scottish regiments, including the 51st Highland Division – with the Gordons, Seaforths, 
Cameronians, Black Watch and Argylls - march through the streets.60 
For Richard Weight, this is illustrative of the extent to which the fading memory of the 
Second World War was a key factor in the decline of ‘Britishness’ in the last decade of the 
twentieth century.61 Indeed, a number of surveys had highlighted that ‘Britishness’ was in 
serious decline. In 1995, for example, the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust conducted a study 
in which people were asked to describe their nationality. It was found that 64% of Scots 
and 41% of the Welsh thought themselves more Scottish and Welsh than British, or not 
British at all, compared to only 25% of the English who viewed themselves as more English 
than British. 62 Yet, the War is widely regarded as having reinvigorated British national 
identity.63 This suggested that those who lived through the war years were acutely aware 
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that they had united to defend an island which could not afford national divisions. As 
Weight convincingly argues, it was the wartime generation, whether Scots, Welsh or the 
English, that felt the greatest attachment to the Union.64 However, as this generation 
passed away so too did their sentimental or emotional loyalty to the Union and collective 
memory of the geopolitical need for British unity, based on the war years.65 Moreover, the 
predominance of Anglo-centric narratives throughout much of the commemorative 
programme, and indeed in World War memorialisation generally, impacted younger 
generations of Scots. They perceived the rhetoric of ‘Our Finest Hour’ as an exclusively 
English battle and, consequently, not one which resonated as a source of shared or 
common identity.  
This episode and the decline in ‘Britishness’ which it implied are indicative of broader 
issues in the nature of the relationship between England and Scotland, as alluded to by 
Massie and Brown in their articles discussing the Scottish reactions to VE Day. The VE Day 
anniversary came during a period when calls for autonomy were growing amongst the 
Scottish and there was an ever-growing disenchantment with Westminster rule. As Graham 
Walker argues, the long period of Conservative rule between 1979 and 1997 was notable 
for the ‘reassembling of the devolutionary case in Scotland as a form of popular protest 
against the Government and its perceived lack of appreciation of Scottish national 
distinctiveness’.66 This is an argument advanced by both Alvin Jackson and Cameron, who 
contend that Thatcher and the Conservative Party appeared unable to cope with the 
distinctiveness of not only the political culture, but also the national situation more 
broadly. 67 For Jackson, in fact, Thatcher had ‘no real understanding of the importance of 
Scottish national sensitivities and symbols’ or, indeed, ‘no real knowledge of Scotland’.68 
                                                             
64 Weight, Patriots, p.669. 
65 Ibid.  
66 G. Walker, ‘Scotland, Northern Ireland and Devolution: Past and Present’, Contemporary British 
History, 24:2 (2010), p.247. 
67 Cameron, Impaled Upon a Thistle, p.348, p.337; A. Jackson, The Two Unions: Ireland, Scotland and 
the Survival of the United Kingdom, 1707 – 2007 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.266. 




Significantly, Scottish opposition to Thatcherism and the Conservatives went deeper than 
simple hostility to an unpopular government. Indeed, the Governments’ values had been 
wholeheartedly rejected in the 1987 general election where the Conservatives, in their 
worst result in Scotland since 1910, lost eleven out of twenty-one MPs. Despite this, their 
policies continued to be imposed in Scotland due to their majority of over 100 in the House 
of Commons. This, in turn, meant the Conservatives were subject to accusations that they 
had lost the moral right to govern Scotland. For Tom Devine, Thatcher ‘disregarded the 
tradition of the Union as a partnership in which Scottish interests had been taken into 
account’.69 Instead, Thatcher exerted what she viewed as the ‘absolute’ sovereignty of the 
Westminster Parliament to ‘rule’ Scotland. As a result, the problem of Conservative 
governance in Scotland was increasingly seen as derived from the nature of the British 
constitutional system itself, and not just a consequence of Thatcherism. This, in turn, 
stimulated a wider coalition of interests to engage with constitutional issues.  
In the late 1980s, then, pressure for devolution had mounted. This was indicated by the 
formation of the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC), which arose out of the 
publication of a Claim of Right for Scotland in July 1988 by the Campaign for a Scottish 
Assembly.70 The SCC, with the involvement of the Labour and Liberal Democrat Parties but 
excluding the Conservatives and SNP, conducted a wide-ranging policy development 
exercise. In late 1990, it produced Towards Scotland’s Parliament, in anticipation of a 
Conservative defeat at the next general election.71 When the Conservatives were re-
elected in April 1992, however, the SCC resumed its work. This culminated in the 
publication, on 30 November 1995, of Scotland’s Parliament: Scotland’s Right.72 Its 
proposals advocated for a Scottish Parliament, which should have legislative powers over a 
range of domestic issues as well as the power to vary income tax by up to three pence in 
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the pound. Subsequently, both the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties incorporated 
support for Scottish devolution, based upon the proposals of the SCC, within their 1997 
election manifestos as part of their respective commitments to British constitutional 
reform.73  
The 1995 VE Day anniversary in Scotland, then, took place in a climate in which there was 
an ever-growing hostility towards the Conservative Westminster Government. Significantly, 
this had also created a growing sense of disenchantment with the Union more broadly and 
a decline in the sense of ‘Britishness’. Consequently, there was little engagement with the 
commemorations in Scotland. Indeed, the events were broadly interpreted with scepticism 
as a flag-waving exercise by the English. Moreover, the Anglo-centric narratives employed 
by the Tory Government only added to the sense that the events bore little relevance to a 
Scottish people who no longer felt the same degree of attachment to the British nation 
that had fought in the Second World War.  
The commemorative events which took place prior to 1997, then, did so between two 
periods of political upset, and on the eve of significant constitutional change. On 1 May 
1997, following years of Conservative rule, the Edinburgh-born Tony Blair and his New 
Labour came to power in a landslide victory. In what was the biggest Labour victory to 
date, they achieved a majority of 177, while the Conservative Party not only experienced 
their worst election result since 1832, but also found that for the first time in history not a 
single Conservative MP was elected in either Scotland or Wales.74 Significantly, this was to 
have wide-ranging implications for the Union, due to the Labour Party’s commitment to 
achieving devolution, as outlined above. 
On 24 July 1997, a White Paper on Scottish devolution was presented to the House of 
Commons. Scotland’s Parliament provided for a 129-seat Scottish Parliament, with the 
power to make primary legislation in all areas except those specifically reserved to 
Westminster, as well as the ability to raise (or lower) revenue by means of an additional 
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income tax of up to 3p in the pound.75 It proposed that elections would take place every 
four years using the Additional Member System. Within this, seventy-three members 
would be elected from individual constituencies using First Past the Post, while an 
additional fifty-six members (seven from each of the eight regions) would be elected from 
lists of candidates put forward by the parties using Proportional Representation.76 
A referendum on Scottish devolution was subsequently held on 11 September. It asked 
whether people in Scotland: 1) Agree/Do Not Agree that there should be a Scottish 
Parliament and 2) Agree/Do Not Agree that a Scottish Parliament should have tax-varying 
powers.77 Throughout the referendum campaign in Scotland, party lines were more clearly 
drawn and united around their respective constitutional preferences than had been the 
case in 1979.78 The Conservatives advocated for a ‘NO/NO’ vote, while the Labour, Liberal 
Democrat and Scottish National Parties all backed devolution.79 The co-operation of Alex 
Salmond and the SNP with the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties is widely regarded as 
significant in accounting for the successful outcome. Indeed, during a special National 
Council Conference held on 2 August 1997, the SNP agreed to support the White Paper’s 
proposals, widely regarding it as a ‘door of opportunity for the Scottish people to move 
towards independence’.80 Consequently, the Scotland Forward campaign operated as a 
cross-party lobby for a ‘YES/YES’ vote.81  
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Moreover, as Christopher Harvie has noted, the Scottish media, with the exception of the 
Scottish Daily Mail, were broadly supportive of devolution, while the No-No campaign 
suffered from links with the Conservatives.82 Throughout the media campaign, in fact, 
references were frequently made to the negatives of Tory rule. The Daily Record, for 
example, commented on the day of the vote that ‘we’ve had to wait through 18 years of 
Tory diktat rule. A generation grew up resenting an arrogant government that Scotland 
didn’t elect and that didn’t even try to understand Scots’. It continued, ‘Labour have 
delivered what the Tories would not. The Tories have never acknowledged what every Scot 
knows – that Scotland is special. It isn’t just our own education, our own laws, or own local 
government. It’s history. It’s kinship. It’s Scottishness’.83 Similarly, The Scotsman noted that 
‘a devolved parliament has been made more popular, however, by 18 years of Tory 
Government, which made the status quo unsustainable’.84 In each of these, the implication 
is clear – that Scotland needed to obtain devolutionary powers. It continued, arguing that 
the Union ‘could not endure four [elections] in a row, especially when the divergence 
between Tory England and Labour Scotland looked like becoming systematic’.85 
Significantly, in the context of discussions about the commemoration of the World Wars, 
both the Daily Record and the Sunday Mail invoked the Second World War in referring to 
the day of the vote as the ‘D-Day battle cry of Scots from every walk of life’.86 
Ultimately, the results were decisive. The Scots voted 3-1 in favour of devolution, with 
74.3% of the votes cast on a turnout of 60.4%, representing a swing of 40% compared to 
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the results from the 1979 referendum.87 Additionally, the vote as to whether they wanted 
their Parliament to have tax-raising powers, resulted in a 63.5% vote in favour.88  
The Scotland Bill that was subsequently introduced gave effect to the White Paper’s 
proposals, with no substantial changes.89 It provided for a Scottish Parliament, to have 
legislative power over all devolved matters and a Scottish Executive, headed by a First 
Minister on whom executive functions would be conferred in respect of devolved and 
other matters.90 Throughout the House of Lords Debate on the Scotland Bill, a number of 
Peers alluded to the impact of Tory rule in Scotland, discussed above. The Earl of Glasgow, 
for example, stated that during the Thatcher years ‘many of us living north of the Border 
felt that we had become a colony, governed by a remote foreign power that emanated 
from somewhere in the home counties’.91  
Perhaps of more significance, however, is the fact that during this and other debates 
regarding devolution, a number of Peers who opposed the Bill framed their discussions of 
devolution through reference to the Second World War. Baroness MacLeod of Borve, for 
example, commented that: ‘I fought in the war with the Scottish, the Welsh, the Africans 
and the Australians. Like other noble Lords who work in this House, I fought for the ‘United’ 
Kingdom. Long may she remain so’.92 Moreover, during a later debate in the House of Lords 
on the ‘Referendum of Scottish Independence’, the Earl of Mar and Kellie, in discussing the 
complexities of national identity suggested that ‘the combined sense of Britishness and 
Scottishness is strongest among those with life experience of the Second World War. Those 
born subsequently may have increasingly less strong identification with that sense’.93 A 
Nuffield Study conducted earlier, at the end of 1997, in fact, indicated that this remained 
the case and that the prospect of devolution had done little to stabilise the trend regarding 
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nationality. Indeed, when asked what best described their nationality regardless of 
economic considerations, respondents indicated 85% Scots, 63% Welsh, 34% English while 
simultaneously finding that those whose ‘Britishness’ was rock solid tended to be over 50 – 
thus seeming to confirm that the bastion of unionism remained the ever-shrinking wartime 
generation.94 
Between 1994 and 1998, World War commemoration in Scotland was driven by 
Westminster and thus echoed those events held throughout the rest of the United 
Kingdom, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter One. Until the general election of 1997, 
however, this meant it was led by an increasingly unpopular Conservative Government, 
which appropriated commemoration as a means of promoting the unity of the United 
Kingdom. This created a sense of dislocation and Scottish difference was only exacerbated 
further by the predominance of Anglo-centric narratives within commemorative events, 
such as the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day. Consequently, Scottish responses to, and 
engagement, with remembrance was limited, reflecting the fact that Scots not only no 
longer felt as connected to the events, but also the significant distance that had emerged 
between the Scottish people and UK Government following eighteen years of a 
Conservative Government at Westminster.95  
 
Devolution under Labour, 1999 – 2007 
By 1997, we have seen that World War commemoration was taking place in a political 
climate in which the relationship between Scotland and England was becoming strained as 
calls for Scottish autonomy grew. This, however, began to change following the election of 
the Labour Party in 1997 and the subsequent referendum on devolution. 
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Following the referendum vote and subsequent debates on devolution, the Scotland Act 
was passed on 17 November 1998. The results of the referendum gave considerable 
momentum to implementing the legislation necessary to enact Scottish devolution, making 
it easy to point to the ‘declared will of the Scottish people’, while Labour’s large majority, 
and the SNP’s support, similarly ensured its safe passage.96 The first Scottish Parliamentary 
elections were subsequently held in May 1999. On 6 May 1999, Labour won 38.8% of the 
vote (securing fifty-six seats), from a turnout of 58%, and subsequently formed a coalition 
with the Liberal Democrats, who had won seventeen seats, with Labour’s Donald Dewar 
becoming First Minister.97 The SNP became Scotland’s second largest party and the official 
opposition, with 35 seats, although it is worth noting that they achieved only 28.8% of the 
vote, lower than that achieved in 1974.98  
On 1 July 1999, Scotland’s new Parliament, temporarily housed in the hall of the General 
Assembly of the Church of Scotland, was opened. It took up its full powers to make laws on 
matters such as health, justice, local government, sports, the arts and education.99 
Amongst other things, this also included responsibility for the maintenance, repair and 
protection of Scotland’s war memorials and war commemoration more broadly.100 The 
powers reserved to Westminster, on the other hand, covered areas such as the 
constitution of the United Kingdom, UK foreign policy, the economy and defence.101 
The opening ceremony was a revealing event, in which symbols of Scotland’s links with 
Britain abounded. The Queen’s speech, for example, commented that in the ‘new era of 
government in Scotland we can draw strength and direction from such landmarks of our 
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tradition and history’.102 She continued by defining ‘Scottishness’, along Blairite lines, as 
‘entrepreneurial flair’.103 She referred to the qualities of the Scottish such as ‘grit, 
determination and humour’ as well as ‘the forthrightness and… strong sense of identity of 
the Scottish people’ which ‘contribute so much to the life of the United Kingdom’.104 
Despite this, there was also a strong emphasis on Scotland’s autonomy and a sense of 
Scottish identity.105 Throughout his speech, for example, First Minister Donald Dewar 
stressed that ‘this is about more than our politics and our laws. This is about who we are, 
how we carry ourselves’. He referred to the ‘echoes from the past’ that could be heard; 
‘[t]he shout of the welder in the din of the great Clyde shipyards… the wild cry of the Great 
Pipes… back to the distant cries of the battles of Bruce and Wallace. The past is part of us. 
But today there is… a voice for the future’.106 Here, Dewar drew on distinctive elements of 
Scotland’s history, especially its military past and martial tradition, in order to emphasise 
its own identity as separate from that of Britain. 
While the broad impact of devolution has been disputed, at the time it was widely 
regarded an ‘extraordinary moment’ in Scottish politics, decisively changing the political 
landscape and signalling the start of contemporary politics in Scotland.107  Indeed, as 
Jackson has argued, the creation of the Scottish Parliament provided a new focus for 
Scottish patriotism and identity that was far removed from the institutions of Westminster 
and the ‘British’ state.108 This had implications for the representation and remembrance of 
not only the World Wars, but of Scottish history more broadly. For Richard Finlay, 
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devolution in Scotland made Scottish history appear more relevant. Consequently, the 
Scottish nation, in line with its ‘re-discovery of its political self’ and ‘flowering of national 
self-belief’, embarked on a process of rediscovering its past. 109 For Alex Salmond, the 
opening of the new National Museum of Scotland in 1998 typified the new Zeitgeist that 
had emerged since the referendum, characterised by an upsurge in scholarly and public 
interest in and engagement with the country’s history, culture and politics’.110 This can be 
further illustrated by the growth in numbers of Scottish TV series, newspaper serials, 
history magazines and even political debates.  
On 11 November 1999, for example, the Scottish Parliament debated the issue, raised by 
the ‘Shot at Dawn Campaign’, of providing pardons for soldiers executed during the First 
World War for cowardice and desertion. Throughout the debate, the image of the soldier 
fighting in the trenches was mobilised to further the campaign, though the predominant 
focus was on Scotland, as opposed to Britain as a whole. Patricia Godman, Labour MSP for 
West Renfrewshire, for example, commented that while:  
Matters relating to the armed forces are reserved to Westminster. Nevertheless, it 
is fitting that this Parliament should speak out on behalf of the Scottish soldiers 
who were executed following courts martial conducted by officers who never gave 
the accused a fair hearing. Of the soldiers executed for so-called cowardice… 43 
were Scots.111  
A number of other MSPs made specific references to Scotland’s involvement in the War. 
Dorothy-Grace Elder (Glasgow, SNP), for example, highlighted the experiences faced by 
families in Scotland during the War noting that ‘to this day, my family – like so many 
families in Scotland – are still haunted and shaped by the Great War, more than by the 
Second World War’, while Kay Ullrich (West of Scotland, SNP) discussed the stories of 
Fusilier Herbert Burden and Private James Archibald, both of whom, despite being young 
men, had been executed.112 She argued that despite the Westminster Government’s 
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excuses, ‘what is needed is a general amnesty or pardon to mark the new millennium and 
to remove the burden of shame, guilt and resentment from the families of those who were 
executed’.113 
Similarly, much of the local and national press in Scotland mobilised the image of the 
soldier specifically as ‘Scottish’. The Scotsman, for example, noted that: 
The Scottish Parliament will use Armistice Day to call for pardons for Scottish 
soldiers shot for cowardice and desertion during the First World War… The 
Parliament does not have the power to order Royal Pardons as defence matters are 
reserved to Westminster. However a motion, which has cross-party support, has 
been tabled by a Labour MSP Elaine Murray in a bid to lend the Parliament’s 
support to clearing the men’s names.114 
Throughout this article no reference was made to the total number of ‘British’ soldiers who 
were shot for desertion, only of ‘Scottish’ soldiers. Writing in the Daily Record, political 
editor Carlos Alba adopted a similar note, commenting: 
The Scottish Parliament is to pardon 39 Scots soldiers shot for cowardice and 
desertion during World War One. MSPs are expected to back a motion calling for 
them to be cleared and their reputations restored. The Scots were among 307 
British troops shot by firing squad during the conflict.115 
As Ross Wilson argues, this issue became a point at which ‘Scottish’ identity could be 
distinguished from notions of ‘British’ identity or ‘Britain’.116 The debate framed 
contemporary concerns surrounding concepts of nationhood, thus providing a means of 
expressing and debating contemporary identities in a post-devolution Scotland. It was also 
used to highlight the limitations placed on the Scottish Parliament. 
Despite the emergence of a new political climate, the first eight years of devolution were 
generally characterised by continuity and stability. In fact, from the establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament in 1999 until the third Scottish Parliamentary elections held in May 
2007, the Labour Party remained the lead partner in a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. 
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This, in turn, meant that between these years Labour was in power both in Scotland and at 
Westminster. Consequently, there was significant pressure for convergence with the 
political rhetoric of the UK Government, resulting in common policy themes.117 This meant 
that there was minimal divergence in official approaches to commemorative events 
between Scotland and England.  
It is also worth noting that debates about Scotland’s place in the political union became 
less prominent immediately following the establishment of the Scottish Parliament. This, 
however, proved temporary as debates developed further between the 2003 and 2007 
Scottish elections. This was a consequence of the deepening unpopularity of the Labour 
Government which resulted, at least in part, from its interference in devolved matters and 
discontent directed at unpopular policies, such as the disbanding of Scottish regiments.  
In March 2006, after months of debate, and in the face of strong opposition, the six existing 
Scottish line infantry regiments were amalgamated to form a single new Royal Regiment of 
Scotland with a common uniform and badge.118 While this was part of a wider re-
organisation of the army, it proved highly controversial in Scotland. Indeed, the plans had 
generated a political furore both at Westminster and at Holyrood, as well as public outcry 
and protest in the Scottish media. Within much of the newspaper coverage, for example, 
the Scottish military tradition was perceived as remaining an ‘important and popular part 
of modern Scottish culture and society, enjoying the general support of most of the 
population’.119 Writing as early as 2003, for example, Ian Bruce noted in The Herald that 
‘the image of the kilted “jock” in warlike pose is etched deep in the Scottish psyche’, and 
that Scotland’s ‘regiments are the fiercest guardians of centuries-old traditions’.120 
A number of commentators situated the Scottish regiments within this tradition by 
stressing their history. Brian Brady, writing in the Scotland on Sunday, highlighted that ‘the 
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proud fighters of Scotland’s historic regiments have fought and suffered, won and 
sometimes lost, from Culloden to Tangiers, to Gallipoli and the Somme, Dunkirk, Suez and 
now Iraq’.121 Similarly, commenting on the Black Watch specifically, Jennifer Cunningham 
noted that ‘from Highland glens to the Napoleonic Wars, Crimea, the two World Wars, 
Korea, the partition of India, Kenya, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Iraq the Black 
Watch has been in the thick of some of the worst fights in history’.122 By invoking historic 
battles and contemporary battles in the same article, the writer placed the Scottish 
regiments within this martial tradition. Significantly, the First and Second World Wars, and 
those Scots who fought in them, were viewed as a key component of this tradition. 
Cunningham, for example, drew attention to the Black Watch’s specific contribution to 
both World Wars, noting ‘twenty-five Black Watch battalions served in the First World War 
and 7993 men were killed… Six battalions… were involved in the Second World War’.123 This 
highlights the fact that for many Scots, as Carswell argues, the Scottish soldier was viewed 
as an icon of their country’s identity. Consequently, the elimination of so many historic and 
venerated regimental identities was tantamount to ‘vandalism’. It destroyed the 
perception that devolution under Labour was safeguarding Scottish interests and history. In 
a letter to the Sunday Mail, for example, Rob MacLeod wrote that ‘after centuries of 
distinguished service… our proud Scottish regiments have been stabbed in the back. The 
decision to downgrade regiments such as the Black Watch and Royal Scots demonstrates 
breath-taking disregard for our military heritage’.124 Similarly, R.F. Ramsay commented that 
‘I find it disgraceful this Government has amalgamated the Scottish regiments’.125 
These debates, regarding pardons for executed soldiers and the disbanding of Scottish 
regiments, demonstrate the extent to which the World Wars were increasingly located 
within a Scottish framework, even while official commemorative practices remained 
broadly in line with those of the Westminster Government. The distinct contributions made 
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by Scotland’s historic regiments were situated within the Scottish martial tradition. Indeed, 
in removing Scottish experiences from the wider British context, it highlights the way in 
which this issue became a further means of distinguishing ‘Scottish’ and ‘British’ identities. 
Furthermore, as Jackson has argued, the amalgamation and disbanding of historic Scottish 
regiments, in representing an affront to Scottish patriotism, effectively alienated Scots and 
served to undermine the Union.126 
In the years leading up to the tercentenary of the 1707 Act of Union (16 January 2007), the 
constitutional debate about Scotland’s place in the Union reignited.127 During a Scottish 
Parliamentary debate held on 27 April 2006, for example, Alex Neil of the SNP asked: ‘Does 
the First Minister agree that the best way of commemorating the 300th anniversary of the 
union of the Parliaments would be to end the union of the Parliaments and to repatriate 
Scotland’s wealth to the Scottish people?’.128 Similarly, on 18 January 2007 Iain Smith, of 
the Liberal Democrats, asked: 
Does the First Minister agree that, 300 years on […] the time is now right for a 
serious debate about the future of Scotland’s Parliament? […] Does he agree with 
the words of Donald Dewar, who said that devolution was not an event but a 
process? The anniversary of the union is the ideal time to move that process on.129 
The anniversary also triggered comprehensive newspaper coverage. The Herald, for 
example, ran a series entitled ‘300: The State of the Union’.130 Similarly, The Scotsman 
launched ‘Scotland 300: The Nationhood Debate’.131 According to its Editor, Mike Gilson, 
this eight-debate series was fundamentally about: 
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Trying to understand what happened back then and how history might have been 
different if that crucial vote had gone the other way. But it is more than that. It is 
about the present and the future. Especially as, 300 years later, we are entering a 
fascinating year in which the May elections will ask profound questions both within 
Scotland and over the Border.132 
Significantly, as these debates took place, political and media discourse in Scotland 
increasingly referred to Scottish experiences in the World Wars to highlight the need for 
separation from Westminster and affirm a distinctly Scottish identity. This can be 
evidenced in the Scottish Parliamentary debates about the ninetieth anniversary of the 
Battle of Passchendaele. This debate focused on the possible construction and funding of a 
monument in Flanders to commemorate the involvement of all Scottish servicemen on the 
Great War battlefields [See Figure 4.2].133 Here, the project’s initiators perceived the 
existence of a gap in the landscape of remembrance: ‘Strangely enough, at the Western 
Front, nowhere a monument can be found commemorating the overall Scottish 
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involvement. This is so much more striking as the very Scottish regiments took part in some 
very heavy fighting, often at crucial moments’.134 
It should be noted that, while this project was initiated (and driven) by the Scottish 
Memorial in Flanders Campaign, the Scottish Parliament discussions about the memorial, 
and the subsequent involvement of the Scottish Executive in providing funds to support its 
construction, are revealing. They highlight the rhetoric increasingly being used to discuss 
the World Wars in Scotland. 
During the debate, Murdo Fraser, then Deputy Leader of the Scottish Conservative Party, 
highlighted the purpose of the memorial, commenting: 
As part of the commemorations, a monument will be erected as a memorial to all 
Scottish soldiers who took part in the battle – and indeed, in the Great War… 
several Scottish regiments played a pivotal role in the battle: they include the Argyll 
and Sutherland Highlanders, based in Stirling, and the Black Watch, based in 
Perth.135 
Fraser continued by suggesting that the ‘Celtic Cross is to commemorate not only Scottish 
soldiers, but also Commonwealth regiments and units that are linked to Scotland’.136 It was 
intended that this would include Highland regiments and Scottish soldiers from Canada, 
Australia and South Africa, as well as ‘the many Scots who served in English, Irish, Welsh, 
New Zealand, New Foundland [sic] and other battalions’.137 
This was indicative of Scotland’s traditional identification with the former British Empire 
and modern Commonwealth. Moreover, it highlighted the manner in which the process(es) 
of commemoration in Scotland were frequently driven by an acute sense that the Scottish 
Nation had made a substantial and distinctive contribution to the imperial project through 
                                                             
134 E. Ureel & J. Sutherland, ‘A Scottish Monument in Flanders’ in Will Ye Come to Flanders (Brochure 
Published by the Scottish Memorial in Flanders Campaign, 2007), pp.20-23. 
135 M. Fraser, ‘Battle of Passchendaele (90th Anniversary)’, Scottish Parliamentary Debate Official 
Report, 31 January 2007, col. 31728. 
136 Ibid. 





its military. In the case of the First World War, this reflected the perception that Scotland 
made a disproportionate ‘blood’ sacrifice.  
The Labour Deputy Minister for Communities Des McNulty, for example, noted: 
In raising a magnificent Celtic Cross on the Frezenberg in Flanders… the organisers 
are commemorating the bravery of Scottish troops not only in Flanders or at the 
Battle of Passchendaele, but throughout the entire First World War. As Tom Devine 
pointed out, Scottish soldiers suffering proportionately the heaviest battlefield 
casualties… Our soldiers fought alongside from other parts of the UK, the 
Commonwealth, France and the USA to defend our traditions, values and way of 
life.138 
The sacrifice of Scottish soldiers on the battlefield was recognised as significant for Scottish 
values and character. Moreover, by highlighting the disproportionate Scottish sacrifice, 
McNulty appears to assert that the weight of Scotland’s contribution to the war effort 
provides a means of validating its own, distinctive, Scottish nationhood. 
Similarly, in commenting on the reasons for the Scottish Government’s financial 
contribution to the memorial, Linda Fabiani, then Minister for Europe, External Affairs and 
Culture, noted:  
The Scottish Government strongly agreed that the horror of Passchendaele must 
be remembered and appropriately commemorated, in particular for Scots the 
sacrifice of the ten Scottish regiments that participated in the offensive. In raising a 
magnificent Celtic Cross made from Scottish granite at Frezenberg, we are 
commemorating the bravery of Scottish troops not just in Flanders or at the Battle 
of Passchendaele, but throughout the entire First World War… It is with humility 
and compassion and quiet pride that we remember with gratitude those Scots who 
fought and died for our nation on the fields of Flanders during 1917.139   
 
The use of such language as ‘[they] fought and died for our nation’ is overtly political in 
appearing to suggest that those Scots who fought in 1917 had consciously given their lives 
for the ideal of Scottish nationhood.  
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The monument was constructed on the Frezenberg ridge, near the village of Passendale in 
Zonnebeke, West Flanders close to the site where the 15th Scottish Division stormed and 
captured ground held by the German Army during the Battle of Passchendaele. It took the 
form of a ‘High Cross’ or ‘Celtic Cross’ made from Scottish granite (Corrennie Pink) and 
produced by the Scottish firm Fyfe Glenrock (based near Aberdeen) situated on a plinth of 
original Great War bunker stones [See Figure 4.3].  
 
It was this which led both Erwin Ureel and John Sutherland, the Coordinator of the Scottish 
Memorial in Flanders Campaign and UK Coordinator respectively, to write that the Cross 
Figure 4.3: A photograph showing the detail on the Scottish Celtic Cross.  
Attribution: MMP1917 
Accessed at: https://www.visitflanders.com/en/things-to-do/attractions/top/scottish-




would ‘constitute a symbolic link with the homeland both in shape and material’.140 
Moreover, the unveiling of the Cross itself, which appeared draped in the Scottish national 
flag, reiterated that the image of Scottish troops in battle remained a significant 
component of Scottish identity [See Figure 4.4].  
Furthermore, its inauguration was linked to what was referred to as a ‘Scottish Memorial 
Weekend’, presented under the title ‘Will Ye Come to Flanders’, held on 25 and 26 August 
2007 to commemorate the ninetieth anniversary of the Battle of Passchendaele.141  This 
consisted of a number of commemorative activities, which sought to combine ‘the aspects 
of remembrance with traditional Scottish culture’. These included a Highland Games, 
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Military Tattoo, battlefield visits and dawn service, which were designed to specifically 
commemorate Scottish soldiers, and involved delegates from the Scottish Executive, 
Flemish Government, Scottish Military and Scottish Civilian population.142 The 
commemorative weekend took place following the election of the SNP minority 
government in May 2007, whose avowed aim was to achieve independence for Scotland. 
As such, it was their decision as to whether to attend the event. The impact of this election 
will be discussed further in the final section of this chapter. 
As David Hesse has argued, throughout this commemorative weekend the reframing of 
Scottish history for political purposes became evident.143 Indeed, in addition to its framing 
as a means of validating Scottish nationhood, discussed above, the event was also used to 
highlight the historic connections between Scotland and Europe and, more specifically, 
Scotland and Flanders. There was discussion of the fact that the memorial provided an 
opportunity to emphasise the bond between ‘two rising federal states within Europe 
visually and permanently’.144 Geert Bourgeois, Flemish Minister of Tourism, External Affairs 
and Media – and a member of the secessionist Nieuw Vlaamse Alliance party – stressed 
that the Scottish monument furthered ‘bonding through commemoration’.145 He 
continued, placing the Flemish-Scottish co-operation in a contemporary political context: 
‘the commemoration of what should never be repeated thus immediately becomes an 
active step towards increased and intensified co-operation between the federated states in 
Europe’.146 In this reading, the joint commemoration of the Scottish war dead became an 
act of solidarity between two aspiring European regions. Indeed, while both Scotland and 
Flanders had acquired greater political self-determination in the 1990s, they continue to 
have strong separatist movements. It is, however, perhaps worth noting that the SNP 
appeared less keen to invoke the European dynamics of Scotland’s past or Scottish identity. 
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Rather, throughout this event they tended to emphasise ‘the massive effect that the First 
World had and the sacrifices that Scotland made’. 147  
Ultimately, between 1999 and 2007 there was little divergence in official approaches to 
World War commemoration in Scotland. This was due, in part, to the dominance of the 
Labour Party both in Holyrood and Westminster which ensured that devolution between 
these years remained predominantly an internal affair characterised by continuity. 
Consequently, there was considerable pressure for convergence with UK Government 
political rhetoric and policy which was frequently reflected in the commemoration of the 
World Wars. 
Between the 2003 and 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections, however, the constitutional 
debate about the nature of Scotland’s relationship with the United Kingdom reignited. This 
can be demonstrated by examining debates regarding the Scottish Regiments and 
anniversary of the 1707 Union. Significantly, during these years both political and media 
rhetoric increasingly referred to the Scottish war experience as a means of asserting a 
‘Scottish’ identity as distinct from a ‘British’, as seen in debates surrounding the building of 
a Celtic Cross in Flanders. Indeed, devolution had ultimately created a political climate in 
which the commemoration of the World Wars – which had started as Unionist 
‘propaganda’ – was increasingly being appropriated/utilised for political purposes. 
 
The SNP in Power, 2007 – 2016 
Between the advent of the new Scottish Parliament in 1999 and the elections of May 2007, 
the Scottish Government was dominated by a Labour-led coalition, which coincided with 
thirteen years of Labour rule at Westminster (1997 – 2010). In the May 2007 Scottish 
Parliamentary elections, however, the SNP became the largest party in Scottish political 
history for the first time, achieving one more seat than the Labour Party (forty-seven and 
                                                             
147 L. Fabiani quoted in J. Vallely, ‘Scots Who Fell at Flanders Honoured 90 Years On’, Scotland on 




forty-six respectively).148 The SNP subsequently formed a minority government, while Alex 
Salmond was elected as First Minister.  
As John Curtice has argued, it was the system of political devolution that proved ‘crucial to 
the party’s ability to secure power’.149 Indeed, for Colin Mackay the creation of the Scottish 
Parliament in 1999 provided the SNP with a ‘political platform and status it could never 
have otherwise achieved’, thus ‘breathing new life into the SNP’.150 Similarly, for Hassan 
this demonstrated the extent to which in the post-devolution landscape the reality of both 
the SNP and Scottish politics more broadly had changed – providing nationalism with both 
a platform and the ‘trappings, prestige and resources of office’.151 
Significantly, this meant that, for the first time in its seventy-three-year history, the SNP 
had power at a national (Scottish) level as well as significantly enhancing its electoral 
position at a local government level.152 As Fiona Mackay and Meryl Kenny both highlight, 
the 2007 Scottish Parliament election results were historic. The SNP had not only ended 
over 50 years of Labour dominance in Scottish politics, but this was also the first time a 
nationalist-led administration had been elected in one of the devolved parliaments. 153 It is 
this which has led Margaret Arnott and Jenny Ozga to comment that 2007 signalled a 
‘significant change to the electoral and political landscape of Scottish politics’.154 Salmond 
himself recognised this when, with a play of words on Macmillan’s 1960 Cape Town speech 
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– which heralded the end of the British Empire in Africa – he commented that ‘there is a 
wind of change blowing through Scottish politics’.155  
From the outset, the tone, style and content of Salmond’s minority administration was one 
of ‘Scotland’s Government’, with the SNP aspiring to be perceived as the national voice of 
Scotland.156 This was in stark contrast to the Labour-Liberal Democrat Executives which had 
preceded it, and was part of an attempt to convince a majority of Scots of the merits of the 
drive to achieve national self-determination. In government, then, the SNP sought to 
promote a distinct Scottish national identity that was not only ‘inclusive, diverse and 
exciting’ but also ‘steeped in rich culture and history’.157  
To this end, the SNP sought ‘to embed Scottish history, culture and heritage’ in a range of 
policy areas.158 Predominant amongst these was the introduction of wide-ranging reforms 
to the school curriculum in Scottish schools – the so-called Curriculum for Excellence.159 
Within this, a great deal of emphasis was placed on the teaching of history. The former 
Education Secretary, Fiona Hyslop, argued for more emphasis on Scottish history in the 
education of Scottish pupils, noting that ‘Scotland is one of the few countries in Europe 
which does not have teaching of its own culture and heritage as a core element of the 
curriculum’.160 Underlying this was the perception that Scotland had been “denied” its own 
history. Moreover, for the SNP, the absence of references to Scottish History accounted for 
a greater focus on the English aspect of ‘Britishness’ in the identity building of young Scots. 
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Adam Ingram, then Minister for Children and Early Years, went further suggesting that the 
Scots lacked confidence due to the fact ‘they have little knowledge of the glories of their 
past achievements… or the contribution that the Scots have made to the modern world’.161 
The SNP argued that ‘Scotland’s young people must reclaim the past and understand this 
nation’s history’.162  
Consequently, the SNP Government strongly encouraged the teaching of a version of 
Scottish History which emphasised the pre-Union period or focused on specifically Scottish 
post Union history. As Peter Hillis has highlighted, a compulsory Scottish element was 
introduced to the ‘Special Topic’ at Higher level.163 Significantly, one of these possible 
topics was the ‘Impact of the Great War, 1914-1928’, which taught the First World War 
exclusively through the prism of Scottish participation. This course focused on both Scottish 
experiences of the Great War and its significance in the development of Scottish identity.164  
The course specification listed the four key issues within the module as: Scots on the 
Western Front; the Domestic Impact of War: Society and Culture; Industry and Economy; 
and Politics.165 The description of the content to be covered included, for example, ‘the 
experience of Scots on the Western Front, with reference to the battles of Loos and the 
Somme’, ‘the kilted regiments’, ‘the role of Scottish military personnel in terms of 
commitment, casualties, leadership and overall contribution to the military effort’, ‘Red 
Clydeside’, ‘continuing support for political unionism’ and ‘the crisis of Scottish identity’. 
The narratives deployed by the SNP, then, tended to overlook the wider context of events, 
focusing on Scottish experiences only whilst frequently glorifying certain aspects of the 
Scottish past, such as its proud martial tradition, in an attempt to emphasise a distinct 
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‘Scottish’ identity. In many ways, this somewhat ironically appeared to mirror Gove’s use of 
history from which this chapter started. 
Discussions of the place of history in schools, however, attracted a significant amount of 
political debate, press coverage and public comment – more than any other subject. These 
debates raised a number of concerns about the ‘Bruceification’ or ‘Tartanisation’ of history 
teaching within Scottish schools.166 During a Scottish Parliamentary debate held on 30 
January 2008, for example, Conservative Education Spokesman Murdo Fraser commented 
that ‘we don’t want to see any Nationalist tinge to Scottish History’ and criticised attempts 
by the SNP to present a ‘Braveheart version of our country’s past’.167 Similarly Ken 
Macintosh, Labour Shadow Schools Minister, questioned whether the debate about history 
had been ‘generated’ to focus on the importance of ‘Scottishness’, rather than history.168 
He continued: ‘this is actually about a more limited perspective – about trying to get young 
people to see the world from a particularly narrow and nationalistic viewpoint’.169 In a 
similar debate held a year later, Ken Macintosh commented that it was ‘difficult not to 
worry about implicit politicisation’ and ‘nationalism creeping into the curriculum’, while 
Murdo Fraser raised a suspicion that the SNP were ‘pursuing a narrow nationalist 
agenda’.170  
The controversy regarding the History Curriculum continued for several years. As late as 
2012, Neil McLennan, President of the Scottish Association of Teachers of History, 
commented ‘the British History units pale into dry, boring insignificance against this 
populist history… many units portray Britain as the consistent arch-imperialist villain of the 
piece’.171 The British History paper, for example, reduced the Empire to a module on the 
Atlantic Slave Trade as well as included a module on Britain and Ireland, 1900 – 1985. In 
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contrast to this, the module in the Scottish History paper on Scotland and Empire, 
‘Migration and Empire, 1830-1939’, focused on the significance of migration and Empire in 
the development of Scottish identity. Here, the key issues were listed as: The Migration of 
Scots; The Experience of Immigrants in Scotland; The Impact of Scots Emigrants on the 
Empire (with reference to Canada, Australia, NZ and India); and The Effect of Migration and 
Empire on Scotland, to 1939.172  Similarly, in the guidance provided for the Great War 
module, no reference was made to the fact Scotland fought for Britain and, indeed, the 
British Empire.  
This highlights the existence of enduring anti-imperialist themes within SNP narratives of 
Scottish nationalism and independence. Furthermore, it draws attention to the fact that 
Scotland’s involvement in the former Empire and Commonwealth has proven largely 
absent from the SNP’s constructions of an independent Scottish nation-state, with limited 
acknowledgement of its potential contribution to the shaping of contemporary Scottish 
national values or identity.173 This reflected a propensity for nationalists to focus 
excessively on Scotland’s own perceived ‘colonisation’ by England, whilst simultaneously 
overlooking the extent to which modern Scotland was not only a ‘product of empire’, but 
that even its economic success was linked to exploitation and slavery.174 Instead, the SNP 
insisted that many senior figures within the UK Government had regarded ‘Scotland as a 
colonial property to be divided and ruled by Westminster’.175 Yet, while criticising 
Westminster and the British Empire, the SNP was also unwilling to engage with Scotland’s 
own imperialist past. Instead, the implications of any post-independence constitutional ties 
with the former Empire were not only overlooked but disregarded altogether. Salmond, for 
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example, argued that with independence Scotland ‘would carry none of the baggage of the 
imperial past’.176  
This reluctance to adopt a self-critical position when considering the legacy of Empire and 
the Scottish nation was linked to a desire by the SNP Government to build diasporic ties.  
The perceived economic, social and cultural benefits are set alongside the ability to 
emphasise the distinctiveness of Scottish nationhood and nationality. For example, the 
2009 ‘Homecoming’ event aimed to encourage Scottish self-identifying diasporic 
communities in countries such as the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia to ‘come 
home’.177 Yet, there was limited engagement with those diasporic communities which 
might draw attention to the negative legacy of Scotland’s involvement in the imperial 
project, such as in the Caribbean.178 Significantly, the Scottish-born diaspora in England 
were also largely overlooked, due to their potential to highlight links with the Union and a 
shared ‘Britishness’. 
It must be kept in mind that between 2007 and 2011 the SNP Government remained a 
minority administration. This meant that as the SNP was required to govern on the basis of 
co-operation and consensus, substantial restrictions were often placed on the policies it 
was able to implement. The reform of Scotland’s education system, with a particular focus 
on the teaching of history, however, remained a crucial component of the SNP’s political 
agenda. It is within discussions about these reforms that we can see increasing reference 
made to an explicitly ‘Scottish’ experience of the First World War. This emphasis on 
‘Scottish’ experiences would continue following the re-election of the SNP in 2011. 
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In May 2011, the SNP secured an absolute majority of seats in the Scottish Parliament. The 
party won 69 of the parliament’s 129 seats, equating to 53.49% of parliamentary seats.179 
This signalled a dramatic shift from the 2007 elections, with an increase of twenty two 
seats and a 13% rise in the percentage of the vote achieved.180 The SNP took Labour seats 
in every city in Scotland, while, Orkney and Shetland aside, they wiped out the Liberal 
Democrats.181 Consequently, this victory was widely regarded at the time as historic, 
particularly given the electoral system used in Holyrood elections was designed to prevent 
any single party from gaining overall control. In fact, devolution, as George Robertson once 
commented, ‘was meant to kill nationalism stone dead’.182 The scale of the SNP victory, 
then, changed the political map of Scotland and marked a new period for both the 
devolved UK and Scottish politics.183 After the victory, Salmond commented that ‘for the 
first time we’re living up to the idea that we’re a national party of Scotland, all classes, all 
communities, all parts of Scotland; we will do our absolute best to redeem the people’s 
trust.’184 
The election of the SNP, in turn, had significant implications for the commemoration of the 
World Wars. This is particularly evident in the case of the First World War centenary, where 
it is apparent that the SNP encouraged a distinctive approach to the commemorations in 
Scotland. In March 2013, for example, the Scottish Government announced the formation 
of a Scottish Advisory Commemorations Panel to ‘recommend and oversee a programme of 
events to commemorate the centenary of World War One’.185 Under the leadership of 
former Army Chaplain Professor Norman Drummond, the panel were tasked with 
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identifying key dates to be commemorated for Scotland, in addition to ensuring 
commemorations achieved a range of objectives.186 According to both the WW100 
Scotland and the Scottish Government websites, these objectives were as follows: to 
‘remember the role and sacrifice of Scottish servicemen and women’; ‘reflect on the global 
impact of World War One’; ‘reflect on the domestic impact of World War One in Scotland 
both during 1914-1918 and the lasting social and civic legacy of the war’ while achieving a 
‘balance of tone between remembrance and celebration’ as well as ‘encouraging a spirit of 
research and inquiry in educational and genealogical terms’.187 Similarly, the minutes from 
the first meeting of the panel indicate that in ‘Setting the Scene’, the historian Trevor Royle 
explained why, despite having been a British effort, the War had a ‘significant and distinct 
political, social and economic impact and implications for Scotland and her people’.188 
Here, it is apparent that a desire to raise awareness about Scotland’s experiences of the 
War was central to the panel’s objectives. 189  
The Scottish Commemorations Panel subsequently recommended a series of eight key 
dates to be commemorated, alongside local and community initiatives, which would span a 
five-year commemorative programme running from 2014 – 2019.190 This differed from the 
UK Government programme, which spanned only four years from 2014 to 2018. In addition 
to national centenaries including both the outbreak of the War and the Armistice, the dates 
recommended by the Scottish panel focused on a series of anniversaries of particularly 
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Scottish significance.191 Sir Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of War at Oxford University 
and member of both the UK and Scottish Commemorations Panels, commented that the 
panel wished to mark those events that had a ‘much bigger impact on Scotland than 
perhaps they did elsewhere’.192 These included the Quintinshill rail disaster, near Gretna, 
which killed 214 Scottish Territorial soldiers on 22 May 2015; the Battles of Loos and Arras, 
which are seen to have particular resonance given the involvement of Scottish Battalions; 
the Battle of Jutland; and the sinking of the HMY Iolaire in January 1919, off the coast of 
Stornaway, during which 204 servicemen drowned.193 In this, Drummond noted that ‘as 
well as aligning with the United Kingdom commemorative programme, these dates would 
enable Scotland to remember the specific and significant contributions made by our 
servicemen and women and our local communities in very challenging times throughout 
the First World War and beyond’ while also reflecting ‘the impact the First World War had 
on Scotland’.194 Yet, it is striking that these commemorations focused overwhelmingly on 
military events. 
The Scottish Government also announced the creation of two £1 million funds to assist 
secondary schools to undertake battlefield visits and support the renovation of war 
memorials. The first of these, the Centenary Memorials Restoration Fund (CMRF), was 
launched in January 2013 by First Minister Alex Salmond ‘to support the repair and 
conservation of war memorials in Scotland’ as one way to mark the First World War 
centenary.195 Speaking during a visit to the war memorial in Fyvie, Aberdeenshire, Salmond 
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stated that ‘the events in 2014 to mark the anniversary of the outbreak of the Great War 
will not be a celebration in Scotland, but a commemoration of the servicemen and women 
who paid the ultimate price in defence of our country.’196 He argued that ‘Scotland’s war 
memorials… pay tribute to those fallen and will be an important part of the 
commemorations in communities  the length and breadth of Scotland during 2014’ before 
remarking that ‘the launch of the CMRF… will offer grants to those who care for these 
important monuments for works to be carried out’.197 Salmond commented that ‘each 
memorial in Scotland reminds us of the sacrifice made by those who died during the Great 
War, Second World War and other conflicts. They remind us of the futility of war and the 
necessity that we never forget the sacrifice made by those who fell in conflict.’198 Similarly, 
a Government Spokesman noted that ‘the creation of this new fund… will allow 
communities across Scotland to carry out maintenance of memorials as part of the 
hundredth anniversary of the First World War’.199  
This initiative appeared to be generally well-received. Members of the public wrote to 
newspapers about it and intervened on radio talk shows. For example, in a ‘Letter to the 
Editor’ of The Herald, one Donald MacLeod wrote that ‘as one who lost many relatives in 
the two world wars I am grateful to the SNP Government for establishing a fund to restore 
Scottish War memorials… In the two world wars Scotland made a military contribution 
greatly above her due and fair share having regard to the Scottish proportion of the British 
population’.200  
Later that year, in May 2013, the Government announced that ‘every secondary school in 
Scotland’ would be offered financial help in order to carry out educational visits to 
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European battlefields as part of the Governments’ plans to mark the centenary.201 The 
scheme would provide a £2000 grant to every senior school throughout Scotland to help 
them meet the costs of trips to Western Front battlefields and war graves.202 In announcing 
the £1 million fund, to be administered by Historic Scotland, the First Minister commented: 
‘it is absolutely crucial that we take the opportunity presented by the centenary to help 
young people develop a deeper understanding of the causes, consequences and horrors of 
the war and the devastation wrought by the conflict on communities in all corners of the 
country’.203 Moreover, he noted that by taking ‘pupils and teachers to Europe during the 
centenary’ the fund would not only broaden pupils’ knowledge of the conflict but ensure 
‘that a new generation of Scots never forgets the unimaginable price paid by their forbears 
a century ago’.204 In response to this announcement, Drummond commented that ‘it is vital 
that we create an educational legacy as part of Scotland’s commemorative programme’.205 
He continued, ‘these visits will enable our pupils and teachers to experience at first-hand 
the significant service and sacrifice given by so many Scottish servicemen and women 
throughout World War One’.206 Similarly, Denise Dunlop, President of the Scottish 
Association of Teachers of History, said: ‘battlefield visits are a once-in-a-lifetime 
opportunity for school pupils to learn first-hand about war and its horrible consequences… 
many of these conflicts are glamourised in today’s society, and these trips offer a chance 
for young people to learn the truth about what happened to so many thousands of 
soldiers’.207  
The developments of these years illustrated the existence of significant differences in the 
patterns of official commemoration either side of the border, which can be seen both in 
                                                             
201 Anon, ‘WW1 Battlefield Schools’ Visit Funding’, Scottish Government News Release, 20 May 2013. 
202 Ibid; F. Urquhart, ‘Schools To Get Cash for WW1 Battlefield Trips’, The Scotsman, 20 May 2013. 
Accessed at: https://www.scotsman.com/news/education/schools-to-get-cash-for-wwi-battlefield-
trips-1-2937206 [Date Accessed: 16/01/2018]. 
203 A. Salmond quoted in Urquhart, ‘Schools to Get Cash for WW1 Battlefield Trips’. See also: Anon, 
‘WW1 Battlefield Schools’ Visit Funding’. 
204 Ibid.  
205 Norman Drummond quoted in ‘Urquhart, ‘Schools to Get Cash for WW1 Battlefield Trips’. See 
also: Anon, ‘WW1 Battlefield Schools’ Visit Funding’. 
206 Ibid.  




the length of the Scottish commemorative programme and events chosen. These 
differences were also reflected in the different ways in which the British Prime Minister 
and Scottish First Minister announced their respective countries’ centenary plans and the 
rhetoric adopted more broadly throughout the commemorations. The Prime Minister, 
David Cameron, justified the need to mark the centenary on the basis of three reasons: the 
need to remember the scale of the losses from every community in the country; the War’s 
place in the development of modern Britain, not least in the demonstration of ‘resilience 
[…] courage [and] the values we hold dear’; and the emotional pull of the conflict, which 
was still ‘a fundamental part of our national [British] consciousness’ and mattered ‘not just 
in our heads, but in our hearts’.208  It was for these reasons, therefore, that Cameron called 
for a ‘truly national commemoration’.209  
Conversely, Salmond, speaking at the annual Royal British Legion Scotland conference in 
Perth in May 2013, adopted a more downbeat tone. He stated that communities across 
Scotland were to gather together and remember the ‘exceptional sacrifice made by their 
sons during the brutal conflicts of the war’.210 Continuing, Salmond noted: 
[T]he Great War commemorations are in no sense a celebration of the centenary of 
this devastating conflict. They are a commemoration, which will give the whole of 
the country the opportunity to reflect on the impact that the First World War had 
on Scotland… By reflecting on these devastating events, and the consequences 
they had for communities the length and breadth of Scotland, we will help people 
of all ages in this country understand more about the futility of war and strengthen 
our resolve to never let a tragedy like the Great War happen again.211 
In this address, Salmond struck a distinctive note. By emphasising the futility of the conflict 
and framing the Scottish Government’s programme of events in terms that depicted the 
War as a tragedy never to be repeated, he sought to distinguish the commemorations in 
Scotland from those of the UK Government.   
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The divergence in these announcements, in fact, reflected differences in not only the 
politics of the Great War’s meaning, but also the politics of nationhood in the UK and 
Scotland more broadly. As we have already seen (cf. Chapter One), Cameron’s 
announcement, which compared the centenary to events such as the Diamond Jubilee and 
Olympic Games, was interpreted by some as too celebratory.212 Indeed, it appeared 
motivated by a desire to appropriate the memory of the First World War in order to 
generate an outpouring of patriotic sentiment that would bind the Union together. At the 
heart of Salmond’s announcement, however, was a contrasting political agenda focused on 
the achievement of Scottish independence.   
Yet, while these announcements diverged in discussions of the historic events themselves it 
is also evident that there were some similarities with regards to attitudes to the present. In 
each of these speeches, neither Salmond nor Cameron refer to reconciliation with former 
enemies such as Germany or, indeed, joint commemorations with allies including France 
and Belgium. Instead, each focuses on specific national contexts. This contrasts sharply 
with approaches elsewhere. In France, for example, the State framed the commemoration 
of the centenary in terms of ‘peace and reconciliation’, emphasising not only international 
dimensions but European ideals more specifically.213 This was particularly evident in the 
joint commemoration, with German President Joachim Gauck, of the declaration of war by 
Germany on France on 3 August 1914. In Germany, on the other hand, there was no central 
commemorative event in 2014.214 Instead, both Gauck and Angela Merkel took part in 
commemorative events in Belgium and France. Despite this, it is also worth noting that 
Germany criticised Cameron’s ‘celebratory’ approach to the centenary. Andreas Meitzner, 
the Federal Foreign Office’s Special Envoy to the commemoration of the outbreak of the 
First World War, for example, flew to London and observed that a victory celebration might 
lead to a cooling of German-British relations while noting that the focus should be on 
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victims and especially on the European Union as the institution that ‘helped us overcome 
the situation where a war like this could start, where European countries could go to war 
with one another’.215 
Throughout the course of the centenary commemorations, it is apparent that the rhetoric 
used frequently sought to balance an emphasis on the futility of war with drawing 
attention to Scotland’s ‘unique’ contribution to the war effort and its ‘lasting social and 
civic legacy’ for the Scottish nation.216  This is indicative of a politicised commemorative 
narrative which sought to combine pride in Scotland’s military achievements with a sense 
of inconsolable loss and sorrow, reflecting the significance that the First World War has 
come to bear, located within the martial tradition, in Scottish history and, indeed, for 
Scottish identity. Within this, the perception of a ‘disproportionately Scottish contribution’ 
to the war effort was predominant. Stephen McGinty, writing in The Scotsman, suggested 
that the ‘ties that bind Scotland to World War One are blood red... as a nation we lost 
149,000 men during the conflict… Proportionally more than twice the number of other 
parts of Britain’.217 Similarly, ahead of the Glasgow Cathedral World War One 
Commonwealth Service, Salmond commented that: 
No home, no school, no community in Scotland was left untouched by the 
devastating impact of the Great War, which remains one of the most brutal 
conflicts the world has ever seen. Scotland’s losses were, per capita, among the 
highest of any combatant nation, and the war’s effects on our nation were 
profound and long-lasting.218 
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He continued: ‘between 1914 and 1918, the First World War claimed the lives of around 
145,000 Scots’. 219  In each of these instances, reference was made to an inflated figure of 
Scottish deaths in order to draw attention to the significance of Scotland’s contribution.  
Throughout this speech, and the commemorations more broadly, it is striking that Salmond 
does not refer to the ‘British’ state or even the ‘British Empire’ in framing the cause that 
Scots fought and died for. Instead, the commemorations, and its transnational connections, 
were being firmly located within a distinctly Scottish context and experience of war. This is 
indicative of a broader omission of Scotland’s involvement in the British Empire, as already 
noted in the discussion of education policy, from the rhetoric and policies as well as the 
political and cultural constructions of ‘Scottishness’ being promoted by the SNP. This is due, 
in no small part, to the complicated and problematic legacy of the British Empire for those 
seeking post-UK independence/statehood.220 The involvement of large numbers of Scots, 
Welsh, Irish and English in the British Empire has the potential to draw attention to a 
common imperial experience. Consequently, acknowledging Scottish involvement in the 
‘British’ imperial project could highlight narratives that emphasise a shared ‘British’ past 
and a ‘British’, as opposed to ‘Scottish’, identity thus reinforcing links with the wider Union.  
It is apparent, therefore, that the language utilised throughout the commemorations 
focused on the wider framing of the War and the casualties of war as exclusively 
‘Scottish’.221 There was not only no mention of the British Empire, but also, linked to this, 
little to no differentiation or acknowledgement of the experiences of the different ethnic or 
religious groups, such as the Irish Catholics or Italian immigrants, within Scotland. Instead, 
their experiences appeared to have been integrated into, if not even lost within, a broader 
‘Scottish’ narrative of the War which focused on Scotland’s martial tradition.222 The 
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absence of any references to race, and indeed religion, in this self-analysis of the Scottish 
nation, then, is striking. It contrasts sharply with the commemorations undertaken by both 
Ireland and the Westminster Government (cf. Chapter One), which explicitly sought to 
recognise the contributions of ethnic minority communities and the impact of the War on a 
multi-cultural Britain. In Scotland, however, this lack of engagement with diversity was not 
only linked to the problems created by recognising and representing a multi-ethnic past, 
but also to the underlying sectarian traditions of the SNP.  
The SNP, in fact, have been broadly criticised by the Labour Party for their approach to the 
sectarian question since 2007, which Tom Gallagher has argued has largely been an 
‘invisible issue’.223 This is despite the fact that sectarianism continues to maintain a visible 
presence in Scotland.224 It is particularly apparent in Glasgow where it continues to be 
played out symbolically in both street parades and football matches between Celtic and 
Rangers. Indeed, commenting ahead of the centenary commemorations, Sir Hew Strachan 
observed that in Glasgow it was still possible to view the Great War in sectarian terms.225  
Taken together, the absence of both race and religion throughout the centenary 
commemorations suggests that the SNP was attempting to overlook – instead of 
reconciling - schisms within Scottish society that have the potential to compromise national 
unity or the perceived unity of Scottish nationhood. 
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The 2011 election not only generated a distinctive approach to commemoration but also 
signalled a marked change in debates about Scotland’s future constitutional arrangements 
within the United Kingdom. The SNP’s 2011 election manifesto, for example, contained a 
commitment to holding a referendum on Scottish independence, stating: ‘[w]e think the 
people of Scotland should decide our nation’s future in a democratic referendum and 
opinion polls suggest that most Scots agree. We will, therefore, bring forward our 
Referendum Bill in this next Parliament’.226 
Between 2007 and 2011, however, the SNP had been unable to hold a referendum on 
secession from the United Kingdom as the opposition parties (together accounting for a 
majority of the MSP) opposed it.227 Consequently, the SNP’s landslide victory in May 2011 
was seen as removing this barrier, and providing the ‘moral authority’ to deliver a 
referendum, thus making the fulfilment of its manifesto commitment unavoidable.228 
The political dynamics of this referendum, held on 18 September 2014, and its 
juxtaposition with the anniversary of the start of Britain’s involvement in the First World 
War (six weeks earlier on 4 August 2014), as well as that of the Battle of Bannockburn, 
provided a further dimension to debates about the centenary. Although this was 
coincidental, the way it was handled was indicative of the cultural and political cross-
currents associated with the centenary commemorations and the potential mobilisation of 
history as a powerful cultural resource for purposes of British national integration and 
disintegration. 229  However, it is worth noting that both the pro- and anti-independence 
campaigns formally signalled a ‘political armistice’ in agreeing that the commemorations of 
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the First World War should not be utilised for political purposes. Scottish Secretary Alistair 
Carmichael, for example, noted that while ‘2014 is obviously a very important year for 
Scotland for other reasons… it should go without saying that an experience with such 
profound and lasting consequences as the First World War deserves the utmost respect 
from politicians and commentators’.230 Similarly, a spokesman for ‘Yes Scotland’ noted that 
‘the horrific sacrifice and bloodshed of the First World War is something for everyone in 
Scotland to remember and honour and people of all political views and none will come 
together on that respectful basis.’231 Here, the marking of a ‘national anniversary’ at a point 
when the shape of the United Kingdom was about to potentially alter highlights the degree 
to which the multi-national nature of the UK state presented further political challenges in 
approaches to World War commemoration. 
Significantly, Do Mention the War, a report published on 4 August 2013 by the Imperial 
War Museums and British Future, an independent think tank, which surveyed attitudes 
towards the War revealed national differences. In this report it was the Scottish response, 
centred on Glasgow, which was arguably the ‘most striking’.232 According to Sunder 
Katwala, director of British Future, in Scotland responses reflected a wider gender gulf than 
elsewhere, which in turn took on a stronger political dimension. The survey results 
suggested that ‘for Scottish men, there was strong suspicion of political agendas given the 
timing of the centenary’, within which suspicion was frequently directed at ‘the 
Westminster Government […] but also at how Alex Salmond might exploit the occasion for 
those opposed to independence’.233 The results also indicated that ‘Glasgow men saw the 
centenary as British, rather than Scottish, and therefore as less relevant to them’.234 
Interestingly, it has also been suggested that sectarianism may have been an important 
determining factor in explaining the results of this survey. Helen McArdle, writing in the 
Sunday Herald, drew on a report which stated that for Glaswegian men ‘the starting point 
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was scepticism about the political uses of this event so close to the referendum and 
distance from a “British” event. Moreover, it noted that the context of sectarianism (and 
football) in Glasgow in particular framed the male discussion of British identity, the military 
and Remembrance’.235 
Moreover, as briefly discussed in the introduction to this chapter, during the referendum 
campaign supporters of Scottish independence raised concerns about the United 
Kingdom’s ‘jingoistic celebrations’ of the Great War.236 For Stephen McGinty, there were 
those who were ‘concerned that the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the First 
World War could be used to tighten the bind of Britishness’.237 In a letter to The Herald, for 
example, Ian Grant commented that the ‘nature and tenor’ of David Cameron’s national 
centenary announcements made him ‘extremely anxious’. He noted that ‘for Scotland the 
First World War was a defining event in history, not based on the national spirit, but on the 
sheer destruction of a generation of the country’s young men and the desolation of 
communities across the land […] proportionately, more than twice as many Scots died in 
the First World War as in other parts of the UK’.238 Grant continued, ‘if this were to be a 
genuine commemoration of the war, with due regard being given to its futility and the 
destruction it wrought, as well as to the bravery and loss, that would be acceptable. If it 
becomes a celebration of British imperial history it will be a disgrace.’239  
This was a sentiment echoed in a number of other letters to newspapers. Mary Thomas, for 
example, regarded the UK Government’s plans to commemorate the start of the First 
World War as an ‘attempt to bolster Britishness in 2014’ and ‘cynical attempt to influence 
the referendum result’ while for Iain Mann they represented a ‘cynical political ploy to 
wrap Britain once again in the Union Flag just a few weeks before the independence 
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referendum’. 240 He continued, ‘if that is indeed so, I can only regard such behaviour as 
despicable and an insult to the sacrifice of all those Scots who lost their lives in the 
conflict’.241  Similarly, Donald Kerr wrote that ‘David Cameron wants to have that special 
day in August 2014, the anniversary of the start of the war, what I believe to be, a cynical 
attempt to make political capital just before the referendum on independence. That, to 
me, is abhorrent’.242 Hugh McLean, also made this link to the referendum, commenting 
that: 
It would be extremely distasteful if David Cameron has in mind to promote and to 
stimulate the NO vote in this year of the independence referendum on the backs of 
the victims of this dreadful war in which the Scots and more particularly the 
Highland regiments had a disproportionate share.243  
Similarly, in an article in the Daily Record, the SNP MSP Joan McAlpine referred to the 
‘Great Slaughter’ of Scotland’s young who died as a result of ‘misplaced loyalty’.244 One 
observer went as far as to suggest that ‘British military commanders have always viewed 
Scottish forces as expendable’.245 He continued by arguing that a vote for independence 
would ensure that future generations of Scots could not be ‘sent like lambs to the slaughter 
for a monarch or a crusading Western zealot’.246 
In contrast to this, supporters of the Union argued that the century would provide ‘ample 
opportunity to remind the Scottish people how they stood together with the English, Welsh 
and Northern Irish’.247 Perhaps the most controversial of these statements came from Lord 
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Lang of Monkton, a former Scottish Secretary, during a debate in the House of Lords about 
the implications of an independent Scotland. Lang noted that ‘for generations, Scots and 
English have lived alongside each other, sharing a British heritage. They fought shoulder to 
shoulder in the battles of the past three centuries and still serve together today’.248 He 
continued, ‘must they now, both Scotland and England’ disavow that shared history? 
Would that not dishonour the sacrifices, made in common cause, of those who died for the 
United Kingdom, a nation now to be cut in two if the present generation of Scottish 
nationalists have their way?’249 The Scottish Conservatives, however, quickly distanced 
themselves from these remarks. Ruth Davidson, the leader, ‘[d]eplore[d] all intemperate 
language in this hugely important constitutional debate… I believe everybody in Scotland, 
no matter their views on the referendum, will come together throughout the year to 
commemorate those who fought for their country in the First World War’.250 
Moreover, a number of commentators also portrayed the commemorations as a chance to 
counter the nationalist rhetoric associated with the 700th anniversary of the Battle of 
Bannockburn, which is widely regarded by nationalists as a key episode in Scotland’s 
history of self-determination, to be commemorated on the 23 and 24 June 2014.251 
Significantly, a number of Unionist politicians, in both the Scottish and UK parliaments, 
accused the Scottish Government of investing more funding in the Bannockburn 
anniversary while deliberately sidelining the First World War commemorations. In 2010, for 
example, the Scottish Government announced that a new £5 million visitor centre would 
be built at the site of the Battle of Bannockburn, to be opened in 2014 for the 
anniversary.252 In addition to this, a further £250,000 was allocated to the staging of a 
major re-enactment event, which was to be held on 28-30 June 2014. As a result of this, 
the Government was interpreted as dedicating considerable resources to the celebration of 
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the defeat the Scots inflicted on the English. This approach led one commentator to 
suggest that it was an attempt by the Scottish Government to appeal to the ‘inner 
nationalist’ of Scots rather than their ‘outer Brit’.253 For Ditchburn and Macdonald, in fact, 
the public profile of Bannockburn increased enormously as both the anniversary and the 
referendum approached while Simon Johnson has emphasised that history is central to 
Salmond’s political thinking.254  
Furthermore, in April 2013 a cross-party group of Scottish MPs and Peers raised these 
concerns, suggesting that the SNP Government was lagging behind the rest of the UK in 
meeting grassroots demands for events to mark the centenary of the start of the conflict. 
Instead, they called upon the Scotland Office, and Scottish Secretary Michael Moore, to ‘fill 
the gap’ left by the Scottish Government and take a leading role in facilitating events north 
of the border.255 Labour Peer Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, for example, commented that ‘the 
First World War was very much about the Union and different parts of the UK standing 
together whereas Bannockburn was, of course, about fighting the English… Quite a number 
of Peers and MPs were worried that the Scottish Government wanted to play down the 
First World War commemorations because of this’.256 Here, the concern was that, with 
2014 being the year in which the independence referendum was held, SNP ministers were 
more concerning with marking the Bannockburn anniversary.257 In response to Donald 
Kerr’s letter to The Herald, for example, Ronald J Sandford wrote: ‘I do not agree[…] that 
David Cameron’s wish to commemorate the centenary… is in any way a cynical attempt to 
have an impact on the forthcoming independence referendum’. Rather, he suggested ‘the 
cynicism lies with our First Minister who has chosen to wrap himself in the Saltire in 2014 in 
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a blatant attempt to hijack public opinion by embracing… the 700th anniversary of the 
Battle of Bannockburn to underpin the final weeks of his independence campaign’.258  
The commemoration of the World Wars in Scotland between 2007 and 2010, especially 
from 2011 onwards, was influenced by the electoral fortunes of the SNP. When they came 
to dominate the Scottish Government, the latter adopted a distinctive approach to 
commemoration, in particular the First World War centenary. Through the Scottish 
Commemorations Panel, a series of events was scheduled which emphasised the specific 
contributions made by Scotland’s soldiers and thus the Scottish nation. Moreover, the 2011 
election also signalled a marked change in debates about the political union between 
Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. Here, the SNP’s manifesto commitment made 
the holding of an independence referendum inevitable. This, in turn, influenced debates 
about the centenary as the War was invoked in support of both sides of the debate.  
 
Conclusion 
The politics of World War commemoration in Scotland between 1994 and 2016 was 
decisively affected by shifts in the nature of its relationship with the rest of the United 
Kingdom. Prior to the introduction of devolution in 1998, commemoration was driven by 
the Conservative Government in Westminster. This, however, meant that it was dominated 
by Anglo-centric narratives and overwhelmingly ‘British’ iconography. Such narratives, 
however, reinforced and exacerbated a growing sense of difference between Scotland and 
the United Kingdom as well as an increasing notion of Scottish distinctiveness. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the evidence illustrates a lack of Scottish engagement with 
World War commemoration, which was increasingly viewed as a Conservative ‘tool’. This is 
evidenced, in particular, by the limited response to the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, which 
as Chapter Five will show was also a feature of the Welsh response.  
The establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, however, decisively changed the 
political landscape. It created a new environment in which both further constitutional 
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debate took place and the nature of discussions about and approaches to World War 
commemoration began to shift. Increasingly, the World Wars were used as a means of 
highlighting the need for increased devolutionary powers and/or Scottish independence as 
well as establishing a more explicit ‘Scottish’ identity. This was apparent both in the 
Scottish Parliamentary debates about granting pardons for soldiers shot for cowardice and 
in the construction and unveiling of the Celtic Cross Monument to Scottish troops in 
Flanders in 2007. 
It was, however, the election of the SNP first in 2007, and again in 2011, that had the most 
significant impact on both debates about the state of the Union and the commemoration 
of the World Wars. This, largely, was a consequence of the SNP’s stated aim of achieving 
Scottish independence. Under the SNP, then, the tone and focus of commemoration 
shifted. This is most clearly evidenced by the official approach to the First World War 
centenary. Here, the emphasis was placed on those anniversaries/events that were of 
specific relevance to Scotland, such as the Battles of Loos and Arras, thus distinguishing it 
from the commemorations led by the Westminster Government. In the same vein, much of 
the rhetoric surrounding the Scottish commemorations adopted a more downbeat, and 
less celebratory, tone stressing both the futility of war and disproportionate sacrifice made 
by Scotland during it. It is apparent, therefore, that World War commemoration had 
become increasingly politicised, utilised by the SNP as a means of highlighting a distinct 
‘Scottish’, and not ‘British’, identity and history. The coincidence of the referendum on 
Scottish independence with the anniversary of the start of the First World War added 
another dimension to such debates about and approaches to the centenary. 
 
 
Chapter Five: ‘A Process, Not an Event’1: Devolution and World War 
Commemoration in Wales, 1994 – 2016 
On 28 October 2013, at the launch of the Cymru’n Cofio – Wales Remembers 1914-1918 
Commemorative Programme, then First Minister Carwyn Jones stated that ‘the centenary 
of the start of the war in 1914 marks an important opportunity for us to remember all 
those who took part in the First World War’.2 He continued by noting the ‘transformational 
impact of the conflict in shaping modern Wales’ and suggested that ‘there will be very few 
people in Wales whose lives have not been affected by the First World War’s enduring 
legacy, whether they are aware of it or not’.3 Jones not only appears to highlight the 
enduring place of the War in Welsh national consciousness, but also alludes to a sense of 
collective suffering and the perception that Wales suffered disproportionately in the 
aftermath of the War. It is perhaps for this reason that Jones goes on to note the ‘central 
role’ that ‘education and community events’ would play in the commemorations, which 
were intended to ‘reach out to people of all ages’.4 
This is indicative of one way in which the commemoration of the World Wars in Wales has 
been approached at a governmental level in the post-devolution period. Indeed, it speaks 
to the Welsh approach to the First World War centenary, which was largely non-political 
but also focused on the distinctive experiences and legacy of the War for modern Wales. 
Although general statements, they also reveal a shift in World War commemoration as it 
increasingly interacted with the shifting political climate, identity politics and conceptions 
of the Welsh nation. 
This chapter analyses how successive Welsh Governments have approached the 
commemoration of the World Wars. It deals with questions regarding the nature of Wales’ 
relationship to the wider United Kingdom. How is the idea of ‘Welshness’ articulated 
through political narratives associated with commemoration? How does this relate to 
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conceptions of ‘Britishness’? How far has the tone and focus of commemoration changed 
between 1994 and 2016 and to what extent has it reflected and been influenced by shifts 
in the political climate, such as devolution? To what extent has commemoration become 
one means through which to assert a sense of the Welsh nation’s own culture, history and 
identity? Has commemoration continued to follow wider British trends or highlight Wales’ 
links with the United Kingdom? Consequently, exploring and analysing World War 
commemoration adds a new dimension to our knowledge of how contemporary Wales has 
redefined its relations with the United Kingdom and dealt with associated questions of 
identity politics whilst simultaneously contributing to wider historiographical debates on 
war, remembrance and the politics of the union. 
First, however, it is worth briefly commenting on the current state of Welsh historiography. 
As Martin Johnes has noted, ‘little Welsh history… [has been] written by people from 
outside Wales’. Moreover, he has argued that Welsh history ‘has made little impact beyond 
Wales, too often going unread, ignored or unappreciated’.5 Philip Jenkins has also claimed 
that surveys of the UK often pay ‘extremely perfunctory and sometimes derisory attention 
to Wales’.6 
Since the 1990s, however, there has been a noticeable, albeit slow, growth in research into 
Welsh history. Angela Gaffney, for example, wrote in 1998 that Welsh history was 
beginning to attract ‘considerable scholarly attention’ as increasing numbers of historians 
successfully applied traditional and new historical approaches to the study of Wales.7  The 
Welsh language and its revival, for example, now has a rich historiography of its own.8 
Another theme to emerge within this growing body of literature was religious change and 
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the legacy of Nonconformism in Wales.9 A number of studies have also focused on histories 
of Liberalism and Labour as well as key political figures such as David Lloyd George and Neil 
Kinnock.10 The ‘Yes’ vote in the 1997 referendum on devolution also triggered a number of 
projects exploring both the short-term and long-term history of devolution in Wales.11 In 
addition to this, several broader examinations of Welsh history have been published, such 
as those by John Davies, Gareth Evans, John Gower and Philip Jenkins.12 
Even with this emerging body of scholarship, it is striking that few full-length treatments of 
Wales’ experience of the First and Second World Wars exist.13 This stands in stark contrast 
to both Scotland and Ireland, which, as we have seen in previous chapters (cf. Chapters 
Three and Four), have been the subject of numerous academic volumes as well as receiving 
their own ‘military histories’.14 Writing in 2014, for example, Robin Barlow commented that 
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‘of the thousands of works published on the First World War with “Britain” in the title’ one 
could ‘search in vain through the index of nearly all of them for references to “Wales”[…] 
unfortunately, the old cliché still applies, “For Wales, See England”’.15 Alun Eirug has also 
argued that the history of the Great War as it affected Wales has often been written in the 
context of other subject areas.16 Consequently, the historiography is, not just ‘fractured 
and incomplete’, but barely existent.17 Similarly, Stuart Broomfield suggested with regards 
to the Second World War that ‘as far as Wales is concerned a significant overview […] has 
not yet been created’. Matthew Cragoe and Chris Williams have also argued that ‘the 
Second World War remains something of a paradox in the history of Wales. Though quite 
evidently a conflict of enormous significance, it has yet to draw substantial attention from 
professional historians’.18 The Welsh experience of the two World Wars, then, has received 
little focused attention and is seldom disaggregated in British and international overviews. 
Rather, it is frequently subsumed into overarching narratives of Britain and the British 
Empire. 
Accordingly, Barlow’s Wales and World War One and Broomfield’s Wales at War. The 
Experience of the Second World War in Wales remain amongst the only English-language 
monographs dedicated to this subject.19 Barlow sought to provide a narrative of the Welsh 
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experience of the First World War both on the home front and abroad whilst Broomfield 
attempts to ‘knit together the individual experiences of people from across Wales against a 
background of the narrative of the war at home and abroad’.20 Another important addition 
to the scholarship, although not a monograph, is Mari A. Williams’ contribution to the BBC 
Millennium History of Wales, which examines Wales in the period between 1914 and 
1945.21 
Furthermore, few studies have sought to explore the nature of World War commemoration 
in Wales. Gaffney’s Aftermath. Remembering the Great War in Wales remains one of the 
only examples.22 Gaffney analyses the various ways in which communities in Wales 
engaged with processes of commemoration to remember the War dead. She also explores 
how the experience and memory of the First World War pervaded society in the inter-war 
years. Furthermore, by situating this study within the wider context of Welsh history in the 
decade after the War, Gaffney examines how remembrance was influenced by language, 
cultural diversity and economic decline, as well as how far the commemoration process can 
help to provide insights into the complex topic of national and local identity.23 Additionally, 
Andrew Mycock, Dan Todman and Keith Jeffery have all, albeit briefly, analysed World War 
commemoration in Wales in relation to the First World War centenary.24 In each of these 
articles, however, discussion of Wales’s involvement in and responses to the centenary 
takes the form of only one paragraph, or in the case of Jeffery one line, situated within a 
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larger article exploring issues inherent in the commemoration of the First World War in the 
United Kingdom as a whole. 
Yet, both the First and Second World Wars had a significant impact on Wales. Gaffney, for 
example, has referred to the First World War as ‘the deepest cleft in the history of the 
Welsh nation’.25 Indeed, according to figures cited by Williams, Gower and Barlow, 
approximately 270,000 men from Wales (including Monmouthshire) served in the British 
Army during the Great War.26 This equated to 21.52% of the male population (compared to 
24.02% in England; 23.71% in Scotland and 6.14% in Ireland).27 Of this, it is calculated that 
between 35,000 and 40,000 Welshmen died in the conflict.28 The latter figure, however, is 
based on rough approximations stretched widely to include those born in Wales, those 
living in Wales who served with any unit, and those who died whilst serving with a Welsh 
Regiment.29 It should also be noted that although these figures highlight that Wales 
contributed proportionately fewer recruits to the British Army than either England or 
Scotland, Welshmen played a major role in the War. Kenneth Morgan, in fact, has 
previously argued the people of Wales ‘threw themselves into the war with gusto’, 
displaying ‘heights of hysteria rarely matched in other parts of the United Kingdom’. In this, 
he argues that the ‘wholehearted support that Welshmen of all parties and creeds gave to 
the war itself’ was in ‘striking contrast to the divisions of the recent past’.30 
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The contribution of Welshmen to the war effort, however, is perhaps best exemplified by 
the fact that David Lloyd George, who became known as ‘the man who won the war’ after 
1918, was a quintessential Welsh-speaking Welshman. Lloyd George, who had become 
Prime Minister in December 1916, was also celebrated (or ridiculed) as the ‘Welsh Wizard’ 
and had played a critical role in the formation of a Welsh Army Corps (WAC).31 The aim had 
initially been to raise two divisions; however, due to the numbers of recruits in the event, 
the ‘Welsh Army Corps’ was confined to a single division only. The 1st Division of the WAC 
became the 43rd (Welsh) Division on 10 December 1914 and was later renumbered as the 
38th (Welsh) Division on 29 April 1915. The Welsh Guards had also been formed on 26 
February 1915, to add a regiment representing Wales to the Foot Guards. One might, 
therefore, expect the Welsh war effort to have both attracted considerable scholarly 
attention and inspired commemoration.32  
The Second World War also involved a sizeable number of Welshmen. Johnes, for example, 
has estimated that of the around 5 million British men and women in uniform at the end of 
the war, around 300,000 were Welsh.33 He suggests that there were approximately 15,000 
Welsh-born deaths.34 Significantly, both the threat and reality of bombing also put Wales 
on the frontline.35 Pembroke Dock, Cardiff and Swansea, in particular, were badly hit during 
the Blitz. Of these, Swansea suffered the most intense attack over the course of three 
nights in February 1941. 30,000 bombs were dropped on the city, destroying 282 and 
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damaging 11,084 houses as well as killing at least 227 people. In Cardiff, 33,000 houses 
were damaged and 335 people were killed during the War. In total, 984 people were killed 
and 1,221 seriously injured in bombing raids targeting Wales.36 
Furthermore, for historians such as Morgan and Johnes the Welsh experiences of the 
World Wars and their aftermath were distinctive from the rest of Britain. Morgan, for 
example, refers to Wales’ ‘distinctive national experience’ of the Great War, describing its 
impact on Wales in terms of the ‘distinctive transformation wrought upon Welsh culture 
and the sense of nationhood’.37 He argues that ‘in no part of the British Isles was the 
contrast between pre and post-war conditions more pronounced’ nor did any ‘part of the 
United Kingdom [show] more dramatically than Wales the revolutionary impact of the 
events of 1914-1918’.38 Morgan continued, noting that ‘Liberal Wales, the basis of later 
Victorian society in our nation, its status and its values, was a casualty of total war’ before 
concluding that ‘the Wales that emerged after the Armistice was a far more troubled, 
tormented a nation […] On a series of levels, there was evidence of an endemic decline – 
the war left a bitter legacy’.39 As Paul O’Leary has identified, this is indicative of the ‘view of 
the war as one of discontinuity between two periods’, which has become an established 
feature of accounts of twentieth century Wales.40 Indeed, O’Leary suggests that such 
narratives of the War as a decisive moment in the twentieth century have made it central 
to contemporary historians’ understandings of modern Wales.41 
Additionally, Lester Mason has argued that there is a perception of a more distinct pacifism 
within Wales, which interacts with and complicates Wales’ relationship to war.42  Barlow, 
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for example, notes Wales’s reputation as a predominantly peace-loving and pacifist nation, 
influenced by the Welsh tradition of non-conformism, whilst Densil Morgan argues that ‘on 
the eve of the First World War non-nonconformity was the most single significant 
institution which Wales possessed’.43 Similarly, Cragoe and Williams comment that ‘though 
it flickered in the face of huge moral challenges posed by the two World Wars, the flame of 
pacifism did not die out’ but rather ‘lingered at the margins of Welsh life’.44 Indeed, they 
note that ‘conscientious objection remained a distinctively Welsh option during the Second 
World War’ – embraced, in particular, by many members of Plaid Cymru.45 This, however, is 
not uncontroversial. As Cragoe and Williams highlight, subsequent research has suggested 
that pacifism was always a minority belief in the Principality.46 The existence of a tradition 
of pacifism within Wales, therefore, does not counteract the above claims of a substantial 
Welsh contribution to the War but rather complicates the picture. As John Ellis has argued, 
Wales’ relationship with war is more complex.47 He argues that Welsh national identity is 
‘Janus-faced’, contested by ‘two competing images’ alternatively defining the Welsh as a 
pacific people and as a martial race.48 Ellis suggests that Wales has suffered from a process 
of ‘selective national amnesia’ regarding its military and imperial pasts, noting that there 
are ‘competing traditions of militarism and pacifism within Modern Wales’. He concludes 
by suggesting ‘Welshness and its relationship to war is not a static concept […] but a fluid 
construction, constantly contested, negotiated and revised in relation to changing historical 
circumstances’.49  
This chapter consists of three sections, each of which analyses a specific stage of Wales’ 
political development and its relations with the United Kingdom. This chronological 
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structure reveals the extent to which the changing nature of Wales’ relationship with the 
United Kingdom has impacted on the manner in which the World Wars have been 
commemorated. The first section focuses on the period immediately preceding the 
introduction of devolution to Wales, from 1994 to the passage of the Government of Wales 
Bill in 1998. Section two will analyse the immediate post-devolution period, from the first 
Welsh Assembly elections leading up to and including the introduction of the second 
Government of Wales Act in 2006. Finally, section three discusses the period from the 
implementation of this Act in 2007 up to June 2016, focused predominantly on how the 
Welsh Government has approached the commemoration of the First World War centenary. 
Ultimately, it will be argued that, as in Scotland, the commemoration of the World Wars in 
Wales has interacted with the changing political dynamic in the United Kingdom. The 
creation of the devolved Welsh Assembly in 1998 and, more significantly, the evolution of 
this process, which culminated in the successful outcome of a referendum on primary law-
making powers in 2011, had a significant impact on the tone and focus of commemorative 
events. This is most clearly demonstrated by the Welsh Government’s approach to the First 
World War centenary, which shows the way in which World War commemoration in post-
devolution Wales had increasingly come to emphasise the distinctive legacy of the World 
Wars for Wales. Yet, it is also notable that the changes to commemorative approaches not 
only proceeded at a slower pace – reflecting the way in which devolution progressed 
differently in Wales – but also proved to be significantly less politicised than in Scotland. 
 
The Last Years of Parliamentary Centralism, 1994 – 1998 
The 8 May 1995 marked the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day. As both Chapters One and Four 
have demonstrated, the official commemorative events led by Westminster were 




these state-led commemorations failed to refer to Welsh experiences of and contributions 
to the war effort.50 
Despite this lack of explicit focus on the home nations, there is evidence to suggest that 
Wales engaged far more widely in the commemorative events and celebrations than 
Scotland did. On 1 May 1995, for example, John Ezard, writing in The Guardian, noted that 
Wales was holding 101 local commemorative events (compared to 23 in Scotland and 44 in 
Northern Ireland).51 Of these, the largest was arguably a free concert held (by the BBC 
National Orchestra of Wales) at Cardiff’s Cooper’s Field, which attracted around 20,000 
people.52 
This is corroborated by the coverage of the fiftieth anniversary in Welsh newspapers, which 
was not only considerably more extensive than that featured in Scottish newspapers, but 
also indicates the extent and nature of the Welsh response. On 25 April 1995, for example, 
Jenny Waldorf, writing in the Western Mail, reported that ‘VE Day is set to be the biggest 
street celebration in Wales since the Royal Wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana’.53 
She noted that ‘sales of bunting, flags and plastic hats have hit heights not seen since the 
halcyon days of 1981 [and the Royal Wedding]’.54 Four days later, the Western Mail wrote 
that ‘all over Wales this week, people are preparing for one of the biggest celebrations of 
recent times, the 50th anniversary of the end of World War Two’ whilst the South Wales 
Evening Post noted that a ‘1940s style extravaganza celebrating VE Day in Port Talbot had 
sold out for the second time after moving to a bigger [2600 seat] venue’.55 On 9 May, the 
day after the anniversary, the Daily Post commented that ‘people throughout North Wales 
turned the clock back half a century yesterday and threw themselves into the spirit of the 
nationwide VE Day celebrations. Street parties and parades got into full swing under yards 
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of bunting and flags’. The South Wales Evening Post also reported that ‘it was the biggest 
and best party for 50 years. S. West Wales’ streets were a blaze of red, white and blue.56 
Additionally, the Daily Post, South Wales Echo and South Wales Evening Post all ran special 
issues across several days providing coverage of VE Day.57  
Throughout the anniversary, it is apparent that a number of the commemorative events 
were intended to echo both the tone and format of those organised by the Westminster 
Government. Areas such as Llanelli organised ‘Weekends of Celebration’ in conjunction 
with the ‘National Weekend of Celebration’ held at Hyde Park (cf. Chapter One) while 
beacons were also lit across Wales to coincide with the one lit by the Queen during the 
commemorations on 8 May. British imagery and symbolism also dominated events: Union 
Jacks were waved, street parties were held, military uniforms worn and Vera Lynn songs, 
such as ‘White Cliffs of Dover’ and ‘We’ll Meet Again’, were sung. The South Wales Echo, 
for example, wrote that ‘across the capital, hundreds sat down to wartime fare of spam 
sandwiches, ideal milk, jelly and ice cream, to celebrate VE Day and the end of the war in 
Europe’.58 Similarly, the Daily Post noted that ‘it was a weekend of celebration, a weekend 
of commemoration […] Towns and villages across North and Mid Wales were swathed in 
red, white and blue yesterday as thousands marked the end of the war in Europe’.59 
Yet, it is notable that although the commemorations emphasised well-established British 
iconography, Welsh symbolism was simultaneously present. Sarah Roberts, for example, 
reported in the South Wales Echo that ‘mile upon mile of patriotic bunting framed the blue 
skies, and hundreds of Union Jack and Welsh Dragon flags fluttered in the brilliant May 
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sunshine’.60 Likewise, visual and photographic evidence appears to reinforce this with a 
number of photographs depicting the presence of both flags.61 Another shows a street 
drawing comprised of a Welsh Dragon, Union Jack and a dove.62 Additionally, the South 
Wales Evening Post utilised the image of a Welsh Dragon on the front cover of its VE Day 
special edition. 
 
There is also evidence that, alongside the dominant ‘British’ narratives of the Second World 
War, there was an emphasis on specifically Welsh narratives as both commemorative 
events and coverage of the anniversary drew attention to wartime experiences in Wales 
and the Principality’s contribution to the wider war effort. In Swansea, for example, the ‘Air 
Defence Monument’ was officially unveiled on VE Day by the Lord Mayor of Swansea to 
simultaneously ‘commemorate the 50th anniversary of the cessation of hostilities in Europe’ 
and act ‘in memory of the 387 civilian and military personnel who died in air raids on 
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Swansea’ [See Figures 5.1 and 5.2].63 The memorial, in fact, was broadly interpreted as a 
‘symbol of Swansea’s proud air defence stand against the Second World War bombers’.64 
A number of newspapers also included articles referring to the experiences of the Blitz in 
Wales with a particular focus on cities that suffered the most damage, such as Swansea and 
Cardiff. On 8 May 1995 Don Thompson of Winch Wen, Swansea, writing in the South Wales 
Evening Post, discussed his experiences of the impact of the bombing in Swansea and 
linked this to the end of the War by concluding that ‘this is why the VE celebrations in 
Swansea were so memorable – now Swansea could sleep at night’.65 Furthermore, other 
coverage explored the involvement of Welsh soldiers. The South Wales Evening Post, for 
example, included articles under the title ‘Welsh Feared by Nazis’. One such piece, entitled 
‘The Warrior Celts’, outlined the 53rd Welsh Division’s participation in the Second World 
War.66 The newspaper coverage of the anniversary also frequently included photos and 
stories sent in by readers which detailed their personal experiences of the War and the VE 
Day celebrations.67 
The combination of British and Welsh symbolism throughout the commemorations 
reflected the nature of Wales’ relationship with England, which has generally been less 
problematic than that between Scotland and England. For Richard Weight, this is due in 
part to the length and depth of Wales’ union with England. This has not only meant that 
discontent has rarely become a mass dislike of the English, but also that, as Bradbury and 
Andrews have argued, English/British and Welsh national identities ‘have co-existed for 
centuries’.68 Furthermore, the union also meant that the formation of ‘modern’ Wales was 
strongly influenced by wider ‘British’ developments such as industrialisation and the British 
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Empire.69 These ‘shared experiences’ created socio-economic linkages as Wales was 
integrated into the wider ‘British’ and Imperial economies.70 
In addition, any sense of a separate and distinct Welsh identity was weakened by a number 
of other factors. This includes the prevalence of migration between England and Wales 
which, as Taylor and Thomson have noted, was a consequence of the long border shared 
between the two. Indeed, historically there have been large numbers of English immigrants 
in Wales as well as many Welsh immigrants in England.71 The distinctiveness of a Welsh 
identity had also predominantly depended on religion, specifically nonconformism, which 
in turn had made Liberalism an obvious political choice.72 Liberalism, however, declined 
after 1929. Similarly, as Robert Pope has noted, religion as a whole in Wales declined 
during the twentieth century particularly from the 1960s onwards.73  
There is, however, also evidence to suggest that the VE Day anniversary was not 
unanimously embraced throughout Wales to the extent that a number of prominent 
commemorative events failed to engage significant numbers. In Llanelli (Carmarthenshire) 
for example, a three day VE Day celebration ‘billed as among the top four in Britain outside 
London’ and the ‘biggest VE Day event in Wales’ proved to be a ‘complete flop’.74 The 
event, which spanned three days, had been expected to attract over 15,000 people yet it 
was estimated that less than 1000 actually participated.75 In response, organisers 
suggested that apathy was to blame, noting that the ‘people are apathetic in Llanelli and 
many of the young are ignorant about VE Day’, which was broadly interpreted as a 
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consequence of a lack of understanding about the relevance of the Second World War to 
the Welsh.76 Rather, it was felt that the events were being used as an opportunity for the 
English and, more specifically, the Tories to wrap themselves in the Union Jack and bolster 
unionist sentiment. The predominance of Anglo-centric narratives further reinforced this 
sense of indifference and feeling amongst some that the anniversary was no longer 
significant for them. 
A number of ‘Letters to the Editor’ drew attention to this sense of disappointment with and 
disengagement from the commemorations. J.D. Roberts, writing from Roath in Cardiff, 
condemned the ‘content of the VE Day concert which was held in Cardiff on May 7’ for its 
Anglo-centric nature and the fact that ‘at no point during the day was the Welsh National 
Anthem played’. They commented: ‘I consider this to be an outright insult to the thousands 
of Welsh people who contributed to the war effort... If it is appropriate to play the English 
anthem, then why was the Welsh National Anthem left unplayed?’77 Similarly, Ann 
Richards, also from Cardiff, found the concert held at Coopers’ Field ‘inspiring’ yet criticised 
it for the same reason. She wrote that ‘it was of great disappointment that not one song 
was sung in Welsh, and the absence of the Welsh National Anthem was deplorable’. She 
continued ‘surely the Welsh soldiers who fought and died in the war deserved to be 
commemorated with due respect in their own language’.78  
Others criticised the commemorations for their Anglo-centric nature while also linking this 
to wider concerns. In letters to both the Daily Post and Western Mail, for example, Cith Up 
Henri from Cardiff wrote that ‘sadly, some little Englanders are trying to wrap themselves 
up in the Union Jack and turn VE Day into anti-Europe Day. These people are dangerous 
fools’.79 The writer continued: ‘fifty years on, we in Wales do not have a democratically 
elected government nor do we have full national representation in Brussels. We 
desperately need both… Our economy is now totally dependent on the EU. We need to 
bypass the Tory little Englanders in London if we are to prosper and return to full 
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employment’.80 Henri concluded that ‘today in Wales the Union Jack and low-flying RAF jets 
are not symbols of freedom but of oppression. Let the Red Dragon fly over Wales and our 
skies be free and empty. Free Wales’.81 It is apparent that Henri was interpreting the 
commemorations as a flag-waving exercise by the English – a tool utilised by a Conservative 
Government that had refused to grant Wales the ability to govern its own affairs.  
Moreover, this letter contrasted the marginalisation of Welsh interests by the Conservative 
Government with the perceived benefits that the evolving European Union (EU) could offer 
Wales. As Andrew Thompson has argued, the EU was increasingly viewed, in particular by 
Plaid Cymru, as providing a forum for a separate voice in Wales and an opportunity for 
Wales to achieve ‘an appropriate level of self-determination’ and, thus, to ‘step out of the 
shadow cast by the central government in London’.82 From the late 1980s onwards 
organisations began to look to the EU more, partly due to the improved availability of 
funding from EU Programmes.83 The impact of the EU, in fact, would later become an 
important component in the revived devolution debate, acting as a catalyst for the 
‘political metamorphosis’ in Wales. 84 
This was indicative of the gradual emergence of wider issues in the nature of the 
relationship between England and Wales. The fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, in fact, fell 
during a period when public demand for a more advanced and effective democratic 
process in Wales began to increase. For Rebecca Davies, as in Scotland, this could be 
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‘attributed to eighteen years of Conservative Government in the United Kingdom, and 
particularly the impact of Thatcherism’.85 Although Wales had initially supported Margaret 
Thatcher, her policies soon became unpopular.86 This growing hatred was predominantly a 
response to her Government’s economic policies and, in particular, the impact they had on 
manufacturing and industry as well as unemployment rates.87 The issue which dominated 
Welsh politics under Thatcher, however, was the Miners’ Strike 1984-1985.88 The strike was 
a deeply traumatic experience, which led to large numbers of pit closures and the 
subsequent collapse of the coal industry having a devastating impact on mining 
communities.89 
Similarly, James Mitchell has contended that devolution was also given impetus by the 
growing perception that the Conservatives lacked legitimacy in Wales.90  He has 
convincingly argued that the shift in opinion on political devolution began in earnest after 
the Conservatives’ third election victory in 1987. 91 During the 1987 election, the Welsh 
Conservative share of the vote had fallen to 29.6% returning only 8 Welsh MPs compared 
to 14 in 1983 (31.0%) and 11 in 1979 (32.2%).92 By 1992, this had fallen again to 28.6% and 
6 MPs.93 Yet, electoral success elsewhere meant that despite securing a small proportion of 
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the Welsh vote, the Conservative Party ruled Wales continuously from 1979 to 1997.94  It is 
this which led Ron Davies, for example, to later write that: 
I vividly recall the anguish expressed by an eloquent graffiti artist who painted on a 
prominent bridge in my constituency overnight after the 1987 defeat the slogan 
“We voted Labour, we got Thatcher! I felt the future was bleak […] For me, this 
represented a crisis of representation. Wales was being denied a voice.95 
Ultimately, as support for the Conservatives declined in polls both at Westminster (down 
from 32.2% in 1979 to 28.6% in 1992) and at local government level (12.5% in 1993 to 8.1% 
in 1995), the perception of a democratic deficit in Wales grew.96 
Additionally, the existence of a Welsh Office run by a succession of English-born, English-
speaking Secretaries of State, predominantly representing constituencies in England, 
fuelled this notion of a ‘democratic deficit’ or ‘crisis of representation’ as it was felt they 
were not accurately representing Welsh interests.97 For J. Graham Jones, this led to a 
growth in hostility, ‘to such an extent that they [the Secretaries of State] began to be 
viewed as alien governor-generals or viceroys’.98  This echoes Gwynfor Evans, who claimed 
that they wielded ‘the enormous powers of a colonialist governor-general’.99 In particular, 
the appointment of John Redwood in 1993, MP for Wokingham in Surrey, led to a dramatic 
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change in style. Indeed, as both Mitchell and Johnes have identified, Redwood was a 
staunch Thatcherite with little knowledge of or feeling for Wales or its people.100 It was also 
under Redwood that the ‘abuses of the Welsh quangocracy came to light’.101 
The role and nature of the ever-increasing number of quangos, which were not 
democratically accountable, and were perceived to reflect party political considerations as 
opposed to merit, became particularly contentious throughout Wales.102 Between 1979 
and 1991 the number of bodies officially recognised as quangos in Wales doubled to 80. 103 
It is perhaps this which in 1996 led Kevin Morgan to coin the term ‘Quangoland’ as a 
description of Wales.104 By 1996, for example, there were 1273 councillors in Wales, but 
approximately 1400 quango appointees.105 It is not surprising, then, that the historian 
Richard Vinen has claimed that the Tories ‘began to look like a foreign army of 
occupation’.106 Similarly, David Hanson, Labour MP for Delyn, following a survey of 
appointments conducted at the end of 1993, concluded that the Welsh Quangos were 
‘overstuffed with white, male businessmen, lawyers and accountants, with a sprinkling of 
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establishment figures for good measure. The pattern of appointments represents the face 
of the Conservative Party and their sympathisers, not the people of Wales’.107  
In criticising Quangos for their overwhelmingly ‘white’, ‘male’, middle-class nature, and by 
extension English, composition Hanson appeared to argue that both Quangos and the 
Conservative Party, from which appointments were frequently drawn, were not capable of 
representing Welsh interests because they did not reflect Wales’ demographics, which 
were more diverse in terms of gender, class and ethnicity. The ‘Quango State’ in Wales, 
then, was broadly perceived to be a vehicle for Conservatives to increase the extent of 
their power.108 Despite this, it is worth noting that anti-English and anti-Conservative 
sentiment was less extreme in Wales than in Scotland. 109  
The fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, then, took place amidst a growing sense of 
dissatisfaction with the nature of governance in Wales. This was predominantly a 
consequence of the perceived ‘democratic deficit’, fuelled by the so-called ‘Quango State’ 
and the appointment of English Secretaries of State. Significantly, this also contributed to a 
growth in devolutionist sentiment and the re-emergence of devolution onto the political 
agenda. 
On 1 May 1997, Tony Blair’s New Labour came to power, the first time the Labour Party 
returned to office since 1979. Heralded as a landslide victory, Labour achieved a majority of 
179 in the House of Commons (winning 34 out of the 40 Welsh seats on the basis of 54.7% 
of the vote).110 Conversely, the Conservative Party failed to secure the election of a single 
Conservative MP in Wales (and Scotland) for the first time in history, achieving only 19.6% 
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of the vote.111 Significantly, this had wide-ranging and profound implications for Wales, due 
not only to the Labour Party’s commitment to achieving devolution, but also to the 
traditional identification of Wales with Labour. 
As early as 1992, the Labour Party (re)confirmed their commitment to pursue devolution 
by pledging in their election manifesto to establish a 'Welsh Assembly of 76 members (2 for 
each constituency) with executive, but not legislative, powers’.112 It should be noted, 
however, that in Wales there was no equivalent to the Scottish Constitution Convention (cf. 
Chapter Four), which had been founded in 1989. Rather, the Welsh Labour Party – the 
branch of the Labour Party that operates in Wales - established its own Policy Commission 
to undertake a ‘consultation process’ intended ‘to produce a blueprint for the type of 
Assembly that will command the broadest range of support in Wales at the next general 
election’.113 The Commission’s Final Report, Shaping the Vision, was approved by the Welsh 
Labour Party Conference in May 1995.114 This was supplemented in 1996 by a further 
document, Preparing for a New Wales.115 In stark contrast to Scotland, it is apparent that 
the policy documents were the products of internal, largely closed, party discussions and 
not wider cross-party or civil-society based consensus.116 By June 1996, the Labour Party 
had also announced that a pre-legislative referendum would be held.117 This was 
subsequently confirmed by the Labour Party’s 1997 Election Manifesto, which stated:  
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Labour will bring a fresh start for Wales. We will, with the consent of the people of 
Wales, legislate for a Welsh Assembly […] As soon as possible after the election we 
will enact legislation to allow the people of Wales to vote in a referendum on our 
proposals, which will be set out in a White Paper. This referendum will take place 
not later than the autumn of 1997.118 
On 22 July 1997 the White Paper on Welsh Devolution was published.119 A Voice for Wales 
set out Labour’s proposals for an elected ‘Assembly for Wales’, consisting of 60 members 
to be elected every four years under the Additional Member System. 40 members would 
be elected from individual constituencies using First Past the Post, while an additional 20 
members (4 from each of the 5 regions) would be elected from lists of candidates put 
forward by the parties using Proportional Representation.120 In addition, the Assembly 
would assume many of the functions and powers of the Secretary of State for Wales. The 
powers proposed for the Welsh Assembly, however, were nowhere near as extensive as 
those to be granted to the Scottish Parliament (cf. Chapter Four). For Taylor and Thomson, 
the proposals only matched those for Scotland in one regard – the electoral system to be 
used. 
A referendum on Welsh devolution was subsequently held on 18 September - one week 
after a separate vote was held in Scotland.121 As Wyn Jones and Lewis note, the hope was 
that a positive result in Scotland would create a ‘bandwagon’ effect in favour of 
establishing the Welsh Assembly.122 The potential significance of the Scottish vote was 
recognised within much of the media coverage of the referendum. The Daily Post, for 
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example, included headlines such as ‘Prescott Hopes Scots Will Boost Wales Vote’, ‘Your 
Turn Now, Tony Blair Tells Wales’ and ‘Follow the Scots’ Plea in Referendum’, whilst the 
South Wales Evening Post ran articles entitled ‘Scots Say Yes to Own Parliament’ and 
‘Welsh Yes Boost at Scots’ Double’.123 
The situation in Wales, however, was different.124 There had been little public discussion of 
the devolution plans, whilst the parties that came to form the ‘Yes for Wales’ campaign, 
launched in February 1997, had not previously worked together. Ultimately, the Welsh 
Labour Party, Welsh Liberal Democrats and, from July, Plaid Cymru took part in the cross-
party campaign.125 On the other hand, the Conservative Party formed the organisational 
backbone of the ‘Just Say No’ campaign, which was not launched until 21 July 1997. 
Significantly, the Yes Campaign had a much higher profile. As Johnes has noted, both the 
Western Mail and Daily Post were broadly supportive of devolution. Yet, the collective 
readership of these newspapers only amounted to approximately 12% of households whilst 
the local and regional press was largely disengaged. In Wales, due to the limited nature of 
the Welsh ‘national’ press, the majority of the public read British newspapers which were 
less likely to cover Welsh events extensively.126 Consequently, there was little awareness of 
arguments for or against devolution, especially when compared to the level of engagement 
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with the issue in Scotland. As in Scotland, the No Campaign also suffered from its links with 
the Conservatives. 
Throughout discussions of devolution and the referendum campaign itself reference was 
frequently made to the impact of Conservative rule. In a letter to the South Wales Evening 
Post, for example, Robert Smith argued that: 
The referendum tomorrow presents the people of Wales with a unique opportunity 
[…] Then, as now, the people of Wales recognised the damaging influence of 18 
years of a Conservative government that systematically set out to centralise 
political power and under local autonomy in a manner alien to any democratic 
tradition […] A Welsh Assembly is a crucial step towards addressing the problems 
created by those years.127 
This was a sentiment echoed in a number of parliamentary debates. In a House of 
Commons Debate held on 4 June 1997, for example, a number of MPs highlighted the 
consequences of Tory rule in Wales. Ted Rowlands, MP for Merthyr, Tydfil and Rhymney, 
for example, argued that ‘two things have changed public opinion [on devolution] in the 
past 18 years’. 128 He noted that ‘people have seen […] an unrepresentative Government 
determining Welsh affairs [and] Secretaries of State who did not understand, feel, or 
appreciate Wales’. 129 He continued, ‘the second contributory factor… is the growing 
revulsion for the quango state […] That state offends the instinctive democratic instincts of 
the Welsh people. I believe that […] has been a major factor in increasing the mood in 
favour of devolution. I sense that that feeling has grown in the past 18 years’.130  Similarly, 
Donald Anderson, MP for Swansea East, commented that in campaigning for devolution: 
‘We must get through to the people of Wales [and Scotland] the fact that the Tories have 
shamelessly bypassed local government and democratic structures for 18 years by creating 
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quangos from which they largely excluded representatives of the majority […] by putting in 
their own people, who often had no credible claim to be Welsh or to represent Wales.’131 
Perhaps of more significance, however, is the fact that throughout the referendum 
campaign and subsequent debates on the Government of Wales Bill, discussions of 
devolution were sometimes framed through reference to the World Wars. In a letter to the 
South Wales Evening Post, for example, Chris Lewis wrote that ‘the yes vote will inevitably 
bring about the break-up of the UK as we proudly know it… Wars have been fought, lives 
have been lost and past victories won all under the Union Jack flag of which we as BRITISH 
people should be proud as a combined nation’.132 Here, the fact that it was ‘Britain’ and not 
Wales, that declared and fought in conflicts, such as the First and Second World War, was 
raised in opposition to the notion of devolution. Similarly, in a House of Commons Debate 
of 21 May 1997 Michael Howard highlighted this notion of ‘a community of interests, a 
shared history, and an essential friendship between its constituent peoples’ in support of 
the union. He continued by invoking the words ‘of the highlander at Dunkirk, who told his 
comrades that, if the English surrendered too, it could be a long war’ before concluding 
that ‘Labour has jeopardised that relationship. A Union that has held fast for centuries 
could begin to fray in a matter of months’. 133  
Ultimately, the Welsh voted narrowly in favour of establishing a National Assembly of 
Wales. The ‘Yes’ vote obtained 50.3% or 559,419 votes compared to the 552,698 votes cast 
against, in a turnout of only 50.1%. The margin of victory, then, was small, with a majority 
of only 6,721 votes, which represented only 0.6% of those cast during the referendum or 
0.3% of the total eligible electorate.134 
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This outcome was not only significantly different to that in Scotland, which had voted 
decisively in favour of devolution, but appeared to expose a fault line at the heart of Welsh 
society.135 As Taylor and Thomson have argued ‘Welsh’ Wales backed devolution, whilst 
‘British’ Wales still appeared to want to retain its links with Westminster.136 Despite the 
narrow majority, however, the result represented a significant swing, 30%, towards 
approving the notion of an assembly compared to the results from the 1979 referendum 
when the ‘Yes’ vote had achieved only 20.3%.137 For Richard Wyn Jones and Bethan Lewis, 
despite the closeness of the result and low turnout, this signalled a substantial 
transformation in Welsh attitudes towards devolution.138  
It is also particularly striking that, when analysing the results, age appeared to be an 
important factor in determining voting decisions. For John Osmond, writing for the Institute 
of Welsh Affairs, ‘arguably the single most important explanation’ for this marked change 
was a ‘fundamental, in many ways psychological shift between generations that took place 
during the period [between the two referendums]’.139 He notes that ‘in 1979 society was 
still governed by a generation whose formative experience had been the Second World 
War, the fight against fascism, the creation of the Welfare State after 1945, and the 
consciousness and then loss of Empire.’.140 Yet, by 1997 ‘this generation had largely passed 
on. In its place was 600,000 people who in 1979 had been too young to vote. For them the 
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Second World War was as much history as the Napoleonic Wars’.141 Consequently, ‘this 
new generation… regarded their Welshness in a different light… Giving Wales a political 
vote seemed a natural thing to do’.142 In 1997, the Welsh Referendum Survey, conducted 
by the University of Wales in Aberystwyth, suggested that those under 45 were likely to 
vote ‘Yes’ by a margin of 3:2, whilst those over 45 were likely to vote ‘No’ by a similar 
margin.143 This evidence would seem to offer significant support to Richard Weight’s 
contention that it was the wartime generation which continued to feel the strongest 
attachment to the United Kingdom and the fading memory of the Second World War was a 
key factor in the decline of ‘Britishness’ in the last decade of the twentieth century.144  
This section has argued that between 1994 and 1998 the public commemoration of the 
World Wars in Wales remained the preserve of Whitehall. The official commemorative 
event organised for the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, a ‘National’ Weekend of Celebrations 
held in London, not only failed to disaggregate the Welsh experiences of the War within an 
overarching ‘British’ narrative, but also was dominated by Anglo-centric iconography and 
narratives such as the Union Jack, Churchill and the songs of Vera Lynn. This, in part, 
reflected the priorities of the Conservative Government that drove the official 
commemorations between 1979 and 1997, as discussed further in Chapter One. Although 
Westminster did not directly organise any official events in Wales for the anniversary, 
which in of itself is striking, the commemorations held in conjunction with the national 
celebration tended to adopt a similar tone, format and style to those in London and 
England. There was a preponderance of street parties and 1940s style celebrations while 
beacons were lit across Wales and commemorations were frequently framed as a weekend 
of events. This, in turn, suggests that the level of engagement with the commemorations in 
Wales was significantly higher than that in Scotland (cf. Chapter Four), reflecting the less 
problematic nature of Wales’ relationship with both England and the wider United 
Kingdom.145 
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Throughout the VE Day commemorations, however, there is also evidence that Welsh 
symbolism and narratives were increasingly being placed alongside the dominant 
narratives of the Second World War as Welsh experiences of and contributions to the 
wider war effort were highlighted. Furthermore, the analysis has also revealed that in some 
instances the commemorative events were not as well received in Wales compared to 
England as the predominance of Anglo-centric narratives was criticised, creating apathy 
and a lack of understanding as well as a sense of difference regarding the relevance of the 
events to the Welsh. 
 
The Early Years of Devolution, 1999 – 2006  
In the years leading up to (and including) 1998 the commemoration and remembrance of 
the World Wars, which was driven by Westminster, was taking place in a shifting political 
climate – one in which the nature of the relationship between England and Wales was 
beginning to alter amidst calls for a more democratic political process in Wales. This 
culminated in the landslide victory of the Labour Party in the 1997 General Election and 
subsequent holding of a referendum vote on the devolution of political powers to Wales. 
The narrow ‘Yes’ vote, however, was only the start of a process of devolution which 
continued to evolve over the course of the next decade (and beyond) following the opening 
of the Welsh Assembly in May 1999. This, in turn, would have significant implications for 
the commemoration of the World Wars. Throughout this period, Wales came to be viewed 
not as a Principality, but as a distinct nation. Consequently, it was increasingly felt that 
there was a need for Welsh experiences of the World Wars to be explicitly recognised and 
the Welsh war dead commemorated as such.  
The first Welsh Assembly elections were held on 6 May 1999.146 The Labour Party won a 
total of 28 seats, from a low turnout of 46.3%, which was nearly 12% lower than those held 
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in Scotland.147 However, they achieved 18% less of the vote than in the 1997 General 
Election and failed to win an overall majority, despite this being widely anticipated ahead 
of the vote. In contrast to this, Plaid Cymru became the second largest party, winning a 
total of 17 seats.148 For Plaid Cymru, this represented more than double its previous best 
performance of 11.5% in 1970 and, significantly, placed it on an electoral par with the 
Scottish National Party for the first time in its history.149 In winning traditionally Labour 
seats in the Rhondda, Islwyn (Neil Kinnock’s former seat) and Llanelli, Plaid Cymru also 
succeeded in breaking out of its traditional strongholds in the Welsh-speaking areas.150 This 
represented, as Thomas has argued, ‘possibly the biggest shake-up the Labour Party in 
Wales had ever seen’, as its vote collapsed in their traditional heartlands of South Wales.151 
This ‘disastrous’ electoral performance has widely been interpreted as a consequence of 
Alun Michael’s leadership of the Welsh Labour Party between October 1998 and February 
2000. 152  It had been expected that Ron Davies, who has often been regarded as the 
‘architect of devolution’ in Wales and was selected as Labour’s candidate for First Secretary 
in September 1998, would become First Minister of Wales. Davies, however, was forced to 
resign following a self-declared ‘moment of madness’, during which he was mugged at 
knifepoint by a man he had met on Clapham Common, then a well-known gay meeting 
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place.153 Alun Michael was instead put forward by Blair as a ‘decent but nondescript 
placeman’ and a ‘safe pair of hands’.154  
Michael was portrayed as ‘Blair’s poodle’, the candidate ‘parachuted’ into Wales against 
the grassroots favourite, ‘maverick’ and ‘off-message’ Rhodri Morgan.155 Moreover, Blair 
proceeded to engineer Michael’s victory by using the trade union bloc vote to outweigh the 
preference of individual party members. Morgan won the Members Ballot by 64.35% to 
35.65% but lost overall due to Michael’s victories in the affiliates and MPs/candidates 
sections (by 63.96% to 36.04% and 58.43% to 41.57%) giving Michaels a 52.68% to 47.32% 
victory.156 This revealed a degree of central control which contrasted with the logic of 
devolution, which was about reducing the influence of Westminster. This flouting of 
national wishes, Bradbury and Andrews have argued, led to the perception that the Labour 
Party in Wales was both ‘anti-Welsh’ and ‘too overly British-centric’.157 Martin Shipton, for 
example, wrote at the time that ‘Labour’s failure to gain an overall majority largely reflects 
the general feeling that something undemocratic and profoundly distasteful had occurred 
[…] The Labour Party must realise that it cannot run Wales like a rotten borough any 
longer.’158 Later, in February 2000, Michael resigned ahead of a ‘no confidence’ vote; 
yielding the job to Morgan. A month later, he quit as an Assembly Member altogether. 
The devolutionary process culminated in May 1999 with the opening of the Welsh 
Assembly, which has since been hailed as an institution of ‘unique historic significance’ and 
the ‘political expression of nationhood’ in Wales.159 Upon its opening on 27 May, the 
Assembly took up the executive powers formerly held by the Welsh Secretary of State and 
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the Welsh Office.160 The new devolved body, however, was not granted full law-making 
powers or the ability to initiate primary legislation.161 Rather, the National Assembly 
exercises its powers through secondary legislation or law-making powers – the passing of 
subordinate legislation under existing Acts of Parliament.162  
The opening ceremony itself was a low-key affair, in contrast to the equivalent event held 
in Scotland two months later. The event lasted only 23 minutes whilst formalities akin to 
those of Westminster were also kept to a minimum, with little or no acknowledgement of 
the old anachronistic symbols of sovereignty, such as flag raising. 163 The South Wales 
Evening Post, for example, referred to it as a ‘dignified’ but ‘modern and more relaxed 
occasion’.164 During the ceremony, speeches which were made in both English and Welsh 
emphasised not only Wales’ links with the United Kingdom, but also acknowledged the 
Principality’s distinctive identity and the need to accommodate this within the wider 
political union. The Queen, for example, described the Assembly as both a ‘notable 
moment in our nations’ long history’ and ‘[a] bridge into the future’.165 In a reference to the 
whole devolutionary project, she suggested that the Assembly derived from the 
recognition ‘of the need for devolved, democratic bodies […] to reflect and articulate our 
rich national diversity’.166 The Queen also noted that the Assembly would provide Wales 
with ‘a more resonant democratic voice and a clearer expression of Welsh society and 
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culture’.167 Similarly, Prince Charles, speaking in Welsh, referred to the Assembly as ‘a 
modern expression of the spirit of Wales’ and suggested that ‘in ways not possible before, 
Welsh minds will be directed to Welsh matters’.168 
There was also a strong emphasis placed on the opportunities presented by devolution for 
Wales to create its own political identity and focus on issues specific to Wales. Throughout 
his speech, for example, First Minister Alun Michael noted the ‘profound sense of history’ 
he felt. He continued, ‘it is our responsibility to start a new era. This is a time of change and 
it is a time of hope […] [We must] devise Welsh solutions to Welsh problems’. Similarly, 
Dafydd Wigley commented that the Assembly would bring ‘confidence and new dignity’ to 
Wales.169 Jan Morris, writing in The Independent after the opening, echoed this sentiment 
when noting that ‘the Welsh sense of national identity has marvellously revived. Pride in 
Welshness is far stronger now, the Welsh language flourishes’. Morris continued: ‘anybody 
who has lived in this country since the devolution referendum two years ago must have 
observed the immense change in the national spirit’.170 
The National Assembly in its early years, however, was beset by numerous difficulties. This 
was predominantly a consequence of the limited nature of the powers granted to Wales by 
the 1998 Act, compounded by the poor electoral turnouts in both the 1997 Devolution 
Referendum and 1998 Welsh Assembly elections. It was also coloured by the issues 
regarding Alun Michael’s leadership. Indeed, the Assembly’s capacity for initiative was 
severely constricted by its reliance on Westminster to provide the legislative framework 
within which it could advance a distinctive Welsh dimension.171  The Scottish Parliament, 
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for example, was able to pass forty-four Acts during the first three years of devolution, 
whereas Wales managed to obtain only one Wales-only statute from Westminster. 
This combination of issues, especially the limitations on its powers, appeared to have a 
wider effect on the National Assembly, in terms of the areas which dominated political 
debates during its early years. Consequently, some subjects, regardless of how they might 
affect or be relevant to Wales, were marginalised. This can be illustrated by the Assembly’s 
response to the issues raised by the ‘Shot at Dawn’ Campaign which contrasted sharply 
with that of the Scotland Parliament (cf. Chapter Four). On 30 November 1999, for 
example, John Griffiths (MP for Newport East) tabled a written question, asking: ‘What part 
may the Assembly play in the debate as to whether there should be a “millennium 
pardon”?’ In his reply, the First Minister, at this time still Alun Michael, commented that: 
‘the subjects of pardons for soldiers executed during the First World War is a defence issue 
and, therefore, a wholly reserved matter’.172 He discussed the review carried out by the 
former Minister of State for Armed Forces and highlighted that ‘those responsible for the 
country’s war memorials and books of remembrance have been asked to add these men’s 
names so that they can be remembered alongside their comrades’. Despite this, and the 
fact that 15 Welshmen were executed during the First World War, Michael was ultimately 
unwilling to involve the Assembly and concluded: ‘I suggest that it is sensible for the 
Assembly to approach with care those matters over which we have no jurisdiction, on 
which we have limited information, and on which Members of Parliament are better placed 
to comment’.173 
This represented a stark contrast with the debates that took place in Scotland. Indeed, as 
we have seen, despite the question of pardons also being a reserved matter there, it 
became an issue around which not only a sense of ‘Scottish’ identity could be established, 
but the Parliament’s limited powers could both be highlighted and criticised. In Wales, 
however, no such links between commemoration, identity, nationalism and further 
devolution were made. The issue of commemoration, and especially the pardons, was not 
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subject to wider parliamentary debate. Rather, it appears that the focus of attention during 
the first years of the National Assembly was overwhelmingly directed towards issues 
relating to the operation of the new devolutionary settlement as well as the delivery of 
public services such as health and education. 
Despite such limitations, it is now generally agreed that devolution represented an ‘historic 
achievement’ and a ‘pivotal moment in the history of Wales’ which ‘constituted the most 
significant milestone in the history of democratic government in Wales’.174 Dennis Balsom 
has also referred to the establishment of the National Assembly in 1999 as the ‘birth of the 
political nation’.175 Significantly, in creating an explicitly Welsh political arena, devolution 
decisively changed the political landscape of Wales. This allowed, as Morgan has argued, 
‘the application of an all-Wales viewpoint at the point of decision-making for the first time 
in modern history’.176 The National Assembly, in fact, although limited in power, has been 
crucial for the renewal of a distinctive Welsh identity. Graham Day, David Dunkerley and 
Andrew Thompson, for example, wrote in 2000 that ‘the devolution of decision-making 
powers to the National Assembly for Wales signifies political recognition of the 
distinctiveness of Wales as a place that merits independent representation, which has its 
own ‘voice’, and its own problems and concerns’. They continued by suggesting that it 
constituted an acceptance that Wales formed ‘a distinct, although not wholly separate, 
society with its own history, identity and institutional structure’.177 Furthermore, as 
Bradbury and Andrews argue, debate about revitalising and reconfiguring conceptions of 
‘Welshness’ appeared to acquire an unparalleled degree of prominence within the public 
and political life of the country.178  
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During this period, there was also growing debate about commemorative events and a shift 
in perceptions, which increasingly highlighted the need for Wales to be represented during 
such events. In 2002 and 2003, for example, discussions emerged regarding the nature of 
the annual Remembrance Day commemorations in Wales. The lack of a ‘central focus’ for 
remembrance or ‘single national event’ in Wales was frequently highlighted and 
increasingly criticised.179 Rather, it was noted that senior politicians in Wales ‘attended 
separate services to honour the country’s war dead’.180 The Welsh National Assembly had 
marked the occasion by attending a service at Llandaff Cathedral in Cardiff, whilst the 
Cardiff County Council traditionally held a service at the National War Memorial in Cathays 
Park.181 
In November 2002, then, a Westminster Government spokesman stated: ‘the present 
situation doesn’t unify Wales enough at a time when the whole of Wales mourns its war 
dead’.182 They noted that Peter Hain, Secretary of State for Wales, wanted to address this 
issue and would ‘try to get agreement for a service which will be relevant to the whole of 
Wales in the Welsh capital’.183 Similarly, Hain himself later commented that shortly 
following his appointment as Secretary of State he ‘became aware that there was no 
Remembrance Sunday service to honour all the Welshmen and women who died in the two 
World Wars and subsequent conflicts… I thought there must be such a focus for national 
remembrance’.184 
This culminated in the introduction, in 2003, of an ‘all-Wales’ or ‘combined’ Welsh 
‘National’ Service of Remembrance intended to act as a ‘focal point for the country’s 
mourning’.185 Although this initiative was driven by the Secretary of State and not the 
National Assembly, it is significant that throughout the commentary in the media, a 
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number of figures specifically linked this issue to the emergence of a new political climate 
in Wales. The Lord Mayor of Cardiff, Russell Goodway, for example, commented that: ‘I am 
really pleased that [we] have been able to find a way forward [...] Change is always difficult 
to bring about and there is nothing more sensitive than events such as this. I have been 
aware for some time that we needed to reflect the new arrangements, post-devolution’.186 
In addition to this, Goodway noted that these changes to the Remembrance Service would 
‘enable an enhanced level of national representation’.187 Similarly, First Minister Rhodri 
Morgan in supporting the call for a Welsh National Remembrance Service in the previous 
year had commented that: ‘It would be desirable… Obviously the Cenotaph service is held 
in London, and I believe they hold an equivalent service in Scotland, but there has never 
been one in Wales… It is something we have been edging towards in recent years, since 
devolution’.188 
These discussions, then, highlight changes that were taking place in the nature of Wales’ 
relationship with the commemoration of the World Wars as the wider political climate 
shifted. Indeed, this issue appears to have become one around which the ‘Welsh Nation’, in 
establishing its own ‘national’ event was able to further distinguish itself as separate from 
‘Britain’ in the post-devolution period. 
In 2004 a controversy emerged over First Minister Rhodri Morgan’s decision not to attend 
the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day commemorations. Instead, he went to a meeting at the 
Celtic Manor Resort near Newport to discuss Wales’ hosting of the Ryder Cup in 2010. In 
his place, Social Justice Minister Edwina Hart, whose family had served in World War Two, 
was chosen to attend the anniversary on behalf of Wales.189 
This decision not only received extensive newspaper coverage, but was heavily criticised by 
politicians in the Welsh Assembly and Westminster, veterans and the wider public alike. On 
8 June 2004, for example, this incident was raised as an ‘Urgent Question’ in the National 
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Assembly. Throughout the debate, the criticism levelled at Morgan was predominantly 
framed in terms of the First Minister’s responsibility to represent the Welsh nation. Nick 
Bourne, Welsh Conservative Assembly Leader, for example, commented that: ‘[t]he 
opportunity to represent our nation at Arromanches should be viewed as a privilege and 
not a chore. I believe that it was essential that the First Minister represented our nation in 
France last weekend. We should have been represented at the highest level.’190 
A number of other Assembly Members, in their contributions, adopted similar rhetoric. 
Ieuan Wyn Jones, the Plaid Cymru Assembly Leader, for example, stated:  
The Welsh veterans who attended the events in Arromanches last weekend 
expected to see the First Minister at their side representing Wales. This is not 
about rank or the pecking order in your Cabinet; it is about who should have 
represented Wales at this event, which should unquestionably have been the First 
Minister.191 
Likewise, Michael German, Liberal Democrat Assembly Leader, noted that ‘the issue here is 
that you represent me, the Assembly and the people of Wales. Therefore, your presence at 
Arromanches would also have been that of the people of Wales, which is why I regret your 
absence. Will you reflect on the fact that you are the most senior person in Wales, and that 
this was the most senior of occasions?’192 Rhodri Glyn Thomas (AM for Carmarthen East 
and Dinefwr), also argued that ‘the big political mistake… was to even consider that you 
should not go. Everybody expected you, as the First Minister of Wales, to do so, and 
everybody is still incredulous that you did not do that to represent the people of Wales… As 
First Minister, it was your responsibility to be there.’193 
Criticism was not only levelled at Morgan by Assembly Members, but also by other 
politicians. Nicholas Soames, Shadow Defence Secretary, for example, said:  
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It is inexcusably casual and deeply disrespectful to the memory of the tens of 
thousands of Welshmen who gave their lives on active service during the Second 
World War. Those Welsh servicemen still surviving and the families of those who 
gave their lives will no doubt find it extraordinary that Wales’ military contribution 
to the allied operations is not being recognised by Wales’ First Minister on this 
momentous occasion.194 
In addition to this, the former Welsh Secretary Ron Davies commented that: ‘Rhodri can’t 
get his bags packed fast enough if he wants to jump on a plane to watch a rugby match or a 
soccer match […] but he can’t seem to put aside a golf event to represent our nation. It’s an 
appalling lack of judgement on his part’.195 
This sentiment was echoed in numerous ‘Letters to the Editor’ from across Wales. R. 
Sheppard from Coed Hirwaun in Port Talbot, for example, wrote of Rhodri Morgan that 
‘you had a duty to represent Wales in remembrance of all those Welshmen and others who 
died or suffered injury before the hell of the beaches’ while H. Thomas from Neath Abbey, 
who was 9 on D-Day, wrote that ‘as the public face of Wales he [Morgan] should have been 
present to commemorate the sacrifices of so many of his fellow countrymen’.196 Similarly, 
Alun John Richards writing from Swansea described Rhodri Morgan’s absence from the 
commemorations as ‘contemptible’. He noted that it ‘not only insults the Welsh 
servicemen who played a disproportionately large part and suffered disproportionately 
large casualties 60 years ago, but also brings shame on the whole Welsh nation’.197 C.F. 
Williams, writing from Rumney in Cardiff, also drew this link to the nation, commenting: 
‘you disgrace us as a nation with your total lack of thought and feeling for these men and 
the suffering they endured for us all today’.198 
This is further indicative of the extent to which the commemoration of the World Wars was 
increasingly becoming one arena in which it was felt that Wales should be represented as a 
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distinct entity, separate from Britain. This incident, then, demonstrates a shift in 
perceptions of Welsh nationhood and Welsh identity in the post-devolution period. It is 
apparent that many strongly believed that the First Minister should have been present at 
the commemorations to represent Welsh soldiers and thus the Welsh ‘nation’. It was felt 
that despite Prime Minister Tony Blair’s presence on behalf of the United Kingdom to 
represent ‘British’ soldiers, Morgan’s absence was inexcusable. For some, in fact, it was felt 
that Morgan’s failure to attend the ceremony not only discredited the new political 
institution, but also appeared to invalidate a sense of Welsh nationhood. Brian Jones from 
Mamhilad in Monmouthshire, for example, wrote that in choosing to attend ‘a golf dinner 
instead of attending the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day… he has devalued his position and 
the National Assembly’.199 Similarly, D. Milner, from Ael y Bryn, Llanedeyrn in Cardiff, 
asked:  
How can he [Morgan] profess to be the leader of Wales when he was not got the 
courtesy to go to the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day? He is our so-called representative 
but it seems only when it suits him. How can Wales be a true political force with this 
kind of behaviour? The Richards report says Wales needs more powers but after Mr 
Morgan’s insult to D-Day veterans, powers need taking away until our politicians show 
they deserve them.200 
Significantly, this was taking place amidst continuing debates over the nature of devolution 
in Wales. On 31 March 2004, for example, the Richard Commission published its final 
report.201 The Commission, chaired by Lord Richard, a former Leader of the House of Lords, 
had been established on 18 April 2002. It formed part of the coalition agreement signed in 
October 2000 between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, in which the Welsh Assembly 
Government had agreed to appoint a body to review the powers and electoral 
arrangements of the Assembly.202 Its recommendations, although considered radical, were 
broadly welcomed by Members of the National Assembly. Of these, those relating to 
                                                             
199 B. Jones, ‘Letters to the Editor - Assembly Devalued’, Western Mail, 16 June 2004, p.10. 
200 D. Milner, ‘Letters to the Editor - Our ‘Leader’ Is Just a Disgrace’, South Wales Echo, 15 June 2004, 
p.24. 
201 Lord Ivor Richard (Chair), Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National 
Assembly for Wales (Report of the Richard Commission, Cardiff: National Assembly for Wales, 2004). 
202 J. Bradbury & J. Mitchell, ‘Devolution: Between Governance and Territorial Politics’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, 58:2 (2005), pp.287-302; Torrance, ‘“A Process, Not an Event”: Devolution in 




legislative powers were the most significant. The Commission argued convincingly for the 
introduction of a ‘Wales Bill’, intended to amend the Government of Wales Act 1998, to 
grant the Assembly primary law-making powers.203 It also suggested that the secondary 
legislative powers of the devolved Assembly should be enhanced as an interim measure. In 
addition to this, the report suggested changes to both the size of the Assembly and 
electoral system used, as well as recommending the separation of the Executive and 
Assembly.204 
In response to this report, Secretary of State Peter Hain, in conjunction with First Minister 
Morgan, developed the White Paper, Better Governance for Wales, published on 15 June 
2005. Although falling short of the Richard Commission Report, it proposed to: give 
legislature effect to a formal separation between the National Assembly and the Welsh 
Assembly Government; grant the Assembly primary law-making powers - although as that 
would constitute a ‘fundamental change to the Welsh [devolution] settlement’, it would 
require the support of the Welsh public through a referendum; and, it noted that it would 
“gradually over a number of years” grant the Assembly enhanced powers in defined policy 
areas.205 The Government of Wales Bill was subsequently introduced to the House of 
Commons on 8 December 2005 and received Royal Assent on 25 July 2006, signalling the 
further development of the devolutionary process in Wales. 
This section has argued that, between 1999 and 2006, there was initially little divergence in 
official approaches to war commemoration. This reflected not only the dominance of the 
Labour Party both at Westminster and in Cardiff, but also the limited nature of the powers 
initially granted to the National Assembly. Throughout this period, however, discussions 
regarding the nature of the devolutionary arrangement continued to feature prominently. 
This is shown by the establishment of the Richard Commission in 2002 and the subsequent 
publication of its report, which called for the introduction of further powers to the National 
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Assembly. Significantly, the evidence suggests that a shift was beginning to take place. 
There was an increasing emphasis on the need for the Welsh nation to be represented at 
the highest level, as distinct from ‘Britain’.  This can be seen in the debates about and 
reception of the introduction of a national event for Remembrance Day in Wales in 2002, 
and the criticism levelled at Rhodri Morgan for his failure to attend the commemorations 
for the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day held in Normandy. 
 
The Evolution of Devolution, 2007 – 2016    
Thus far, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that approaches to and discussions 
surrounding the commemoration of the World Wars in Wales were closely linked to 
debates regarding the constitutional relationship between Wales and the wider United 
Kingdom. It has argued that the introduction of devolution in Wales, while characterised by 
both numerous limitations and continuity with Westminster, ultimately created an 
explicitly Welsh political arena. This, in turn, led to the growth of a ‘Welsh consciousness’ 
and strengthening of conceptions of Welsh nationhood. It is within this political climate, 
then, that it was increasingly felt that the commemoration of the World Wars should 
reflect the new post-devolution settlement. 
In the May 2007 Welsh Assembly elections, the Labour Party again failed to achieve an 
overall majority. It won twenty-six seats in total, which equated to 43.3% of National 
Assembly seats.206 Meanwhile, Plaid Cymru won fifteen seats.207 In the wake of these 
elections, an historic coalition agreement was negotiated between Labour and Plaid Cymru 
– One Wales.208 This meant that, for the first time, Plaid Cymru was able to exercise power 
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at a national level. As Craig McAngus has argued, Plaid Cymru’s involvement in government 
was significant not only due to their commitment to achieving independence, but also their 
intention to utilise governmental status to gain further powers for the National Assembly 
of Wales.209 Plaid Cymru’s 2007 election manifesto, for example, outlined a clear pledge to 
hold a referendum in order to ‘establish a Proper Parliament for Wales’.210 
It is significant, then, that the One Wales agreement included commitments to a post-
legislative referendum on primary law-making powers for the National Assembly. It bound 
both parties ‘to proceed to a successful outcome of a referendum for full law-making 
powers under Part IV as soon as practicable, at or before the end of the Assembly Term’.211 
As Wyn Jones has noted, this represented a major concession to Plaid Cymru both in terms 
of the outlined timetable and the Labour Party’s stated commitment to campaigning for a 
‘yes’ vote.212 Additionally, the ‘All Wales Convention’ (AWC), chaired by former diplomat Sir 
Emyr Jones Parry, was established to gauge the public appetite for a vote.213 The AWC 
reported in November 2009 that the majority of voters in Wales did not understand the 
Assembly’s current law-making arrangements and argued convincingly that a move 
towards primary-law making powers via a referendum was desirable. On 9 February 2010, 
the National Assembly achieved the ‘super majority’ required by the Government of Wales 
Act 2006 in favour of holding a referendum on further devolution. The UK Government 
subsequently introduced legislation enabling such a referendum to be held on 3 March 
2011. 
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On 3 March 2011, a referendum was held on the question: ‘Do you want the Assembly now 
to be able to make laws on all matters in the 20 subject areas it has powers for?’214 The 
Welsh voted overwhelmingly in favour. A total of 517,132 people (63.49%) voted ‘yes’, 
whilst 297,380 (36.51%) responded ‘no’. It is, however, worth noting that turnout was 
extremely low, at only 35.6%.215 It is also notable that, unlike the narrow result in the 1997 
referendum, every local authority area apart from Monmouthshire returned a majority 
supporting law-making powers.216 For Wyn Jones, this appeared to show that devolution 
looked increasingly like reflecting ‘the settled will of the Welsh’.217 
The Assembly assumed its new powers on 5 May 2011, and thus finally acquired powers to 
pass primary legislation without recourse to Westminster in the twenty areas that had 
previously been devolved to Wales. It was this which led First Minister Carwyn Jones to 
comment that ‘today an old nation came of age’.218 Similarly, Deputy First Minister and 
Plaid Cymru leader Ieuan Wyn Jones said that it marked: ‘[t]he beginning of a new era of 
Welsh devolution [Wales] has demonstrated pride in who we are, and what we all stand 
for’.219 It is apparent, then, that obtaining law-making powers was viewed as crucial to a 
sense of Welsh nationhood. Consequently, the result appeared to signal that Wales was 
‘now clearly a constituent national unit in its own right, rather than an addendum to an 
“England and Wales” unit’.220 
Significantly, it was in this new political climate that the Welsh Government began to make 
its own plans to mark the centenary of the First World War. As Mycock has argued, 
commemoration plans increasingly appeared to focus on Welsh national as well as British 
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experiences, although it should be noted that these proved less politicised than in 
Scotland.221 
On 3 March 2012, for example, then First Minister Carwyn Jones announced the 
appointment of Professor Sir Deian Hopkin, President of the National Library of Wales, as 
his expert advisor on the centenary of the First World War. Speaking at his monthly news 
conference, Jones noted that ‘the First World War is widely seen as one of the most deadly 
conflicts in human history… it is extremely important that we remember those who died 
and reflect on how it changed Wales [and the world forever]’.222 He continued: ‘we will see 
events and ceremonies within Wales and beyond and Sir Deian will advise us on how best 
we can remember the conflict and engage with the Welsh public… [we] will make sure we 
strike the right tone and give the centenary the attention it deserves’.223  
In addition to this, Hopkin was to act as Chair of the Cymru’n Cofio - Wales Remembers 
1914-1918 Programme Board, established in October 2012. This cross-portfolio board 
included representation from a wide range of bodies including the Welsh Government, 
National Museum, National Library of Wales, National Eisteddfod, Arts Council Wales, BBC 
Wales, S4C, the Heritage Lottery Fund (Wales Office), the IWM and the Army in Wales.224 
The Board, under Hopkin, were tasked with ensuring ‘that Wales’ distinctive experiences 
and contribution will be accurately reflected in commemorative activities’, whilst 
simultaneously enabling commemorations to achieve a range of aims and objectives.225  
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According to the ‘Framework Programme for the Commemoration in Wales 2014-2018’ the 
overarching aim was ‘to deliver a successful and memorable commemoration in Wales that 
enables everyone to participate at a time and in a way that best suits their interests and 
aspirations’.226 Furthermore, it noted that the wider objectives were as follows: ‘to identify 
and mark significant anniversaries, working with Welsh organisations and services, other 
UK Home Nations and international partners’; ‘to support an educational programme that 
encourages schools and young people’s organisations to fully participate in 
commemorative activities’; ‘to develop and support productive partnerships to deliver 
activities and events throughout the commemorative period to diverse audiences’; ‘to 
support vibrant cultural and historical interpretation events and activities by our cultural 
and heritage bodies reflecting different perspectives on the period’; ‘to work with the 
Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) and other funders to support community projects telling the 
story of Wales and the First World War’; ‘to ensure that information about the 
commemoration in Wales is easily available to everyone with Wales and beyond’; and ‘to 
leave a rich digital legacy of the commemoration for future generations’.227 
Similarly, in a paper entitled ‘Commemoration of the First World War’ submitted to the 
Welsh Cabinet on 9 July 2013, Carwyn Jones noted that the centenary would be ‘an 
extremely high-profile opportunity to engage with people in Wales and beyond to better 
understand the transformational impact of the War on Welsh life and society’. He 
continued ‘it will be important that Wales delivers a programme which is appropriate and 
reflective in tone and which leaves a lasting digital legacy’. 228 Moreover, the paper 
highlighted in relation to the draft commemorative programme that ‘building connections 
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with Welsh life underpins our approach’.229 It is apparent that a desire to increase 
knowledge about Wales’s involvement in and experiences of the First World War was a 
central part of the Welsh Government’s approach to the centenary. A great deal of 
emphasis was placed on discussing the long-term impact and wider legacy of the War. The 
minutes from the May 2012 meeting of the First World War Centenary Board, for example, 
note that ‘the First Minister was very clear that the thrust of the celebrations should be in 
terms of the legacy of the War and that it focussed [sic] on the effects it had on the lives of 
young people’.230 It is also notable that these events were viewed as an opportunity to 
engage communities widely. 
The Framework Programme, published in October 2013, outlined a series of key dates to 
be commemorated in Wales, alongside local and community initiatives.231 In addition to 
national centenaries, which included the outbreak of War and Armistice Day, the dates 
recommended focused on a series of anniversaries of particularly Welsh significance.232 
These included the Battle of Gheluvelt (October 2014); the landing of the 53rd Welsh 
Division at Gallipoli (August 2015); the involvement of Welsh sailors in Jutland (31 May 
2016); the first Battle of the Somme, in particular the engagement of the 38th Welsh 
Division at Mametz Wood (1 – 14 July 2016); and the engagement of the 38th Welsh 
Division at Pilckem Ridge during the Battle of Passchendale where the Welsh war poet Ellis 
Humphrey Evans, better known  by his bardic name Hedd Wyn, was killed (31 July 2017).233 
In launching the programme on 28 October 2013, Jones noted that ‘the period from 1914-
1918, and the immediate aftermath, shaped the Wales we live in now and we need to 
understand not only why nations went to war, but also the lingering impact of that war on 
our daily lives’. 234 He continued, ‘I look forward to a commemoration in Wales which will 
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bring people together to pay tribute to those Welsh people whose hard work and sacrifice 
is justly remembered by us all’. 235 
The Framework Programme also outlined that a key part of the commemorative 
programme would involve the unveiling of a new National Memorial to Welsh Casualties of 
the First World War in Langemark, Flanders, on 16 August 2014. The Welsh Memorial in 
Flanders Campaign was founded in 2011 by Peter Carter Jones (in Wales) and Erwin Ureel 
(in Flanders).236 The project initiators were responding to a perceived gap in the landscape 
of remembrance. Mr Jones commented: 
I was taken aback to find there was no memorial for Welsh soldiers in Belgium […] 
the Welsh per capita lost more sons than any other nation – and most of the 
casualties occurred in Flanders[…] while New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Ireland 
and Scotland all have large monuments in Flanders to remember their war dead, 
we have no such thing […] It is going to be a very special place for generations to 
come and children can understand the sacrifices made by soldiers in the war.237 
Similarly, earlier in 2013, he stated that ‘all other nations in 2014 will be having pilgrimages 
to their various monuments where there will be services and commemorations and we the 
Welsh have nowhere to go, so this needs to be rectified’.238 
It should be noted that, while this project was initiated (and driven) by the Welsh Memorial 
in Flanders Campaign, the Welsh Government was subsequently involved in both 
publicising and supporting the campaign as well as providing up to £25,000 to underwrite 
the appeal.239 This highlights the extent to which both the Welsh public and Government 
had a desire for the wider Welsh contribution to the War to be commemorated in Belgium 
by the establishment of a ‘national’ memorial. The only other memorial to Welsh soldiers 
there, for example, is dedicated specifically to the soldiers of the 38th Welsh Division who 
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died during the Battle of the Somme. Moreover, as mentioned above, this was viewed as 
even more important given the presence of monuments to the dead of other nations – 
including Scotland and Ireland. Significantly, a Cabinet Paper on the ‘Planning of the First 
World War Commemorations’ indicates that as early as October 2012 the establishment of 
‘a memorial to all Welsh casualties at Langemark, Belgium where Hedd Wyn died’ had 
already been identified as a commemorative initiative for the approaching centenary.240 
Moreover, in commenting on the reasons for the Welsh Governments’ support, Carwyn 
Jones noted: 
The public appeal to build this memorial is a partnership between the people of 
Wales and Flanders. They are people who felt moved by the sacrifice of Welsh 
service personnel during the First World War and wanted to make sure that they 
were remembered. This memorial honours not just the Welsh men who fell in 
battle in Flanders during the conflict, but all Welsh men and women who served 
during the War. I am pleased that the Welsh Government has been able to support 
this appeal.241 
The memorial was constructed on the Pilkem Ridge, near the villages of Langemark and 
Ypres, West Flanders, on a piece of land donated by the Mayor of Langemark. This was 
close to the site where the 38th Welsh Division and Welsh Guards fought during the Battle 
of Passchendaele, tasked with driving the Germans off the ridge so the main assault could 
proceed. Moreover, it is also a short distance from where the renowned Welsh poet Hedd 
Wyn was killed on 31 July 1917. 
Significantly, the memorial took the form of an 8ft-tall red bronze Welsh Dragon, cast at 
Castle Foundry Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant near Powys, situated on a ‘Cromlech’ formed 
with Welsh Blue Pennant stones from the Craig Yr Hesg quarry near Pontypridd, Wales [See 
Figure 5.3].  
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The sculptor Lee Odishow commented that his design celebrated ‘the symbol of Wales’.242 
Similarly, Carwyn Jones commented that: ‘I’m pleased to unveil the winning design […] for 
this memorial, which will be a lasting tribute to Welsh people who lost their lives in the 
First World War. As this will be the first national memorial outside Wales, it is fitting that 
the memorial will feature Welsh stones and be topped by a proud, red dragon’.243 The 
decision to utilise the Welsh Dragon on the memorial, a non-human symbol frequently 
associated with tourism rather than commemoration, is particularly striking. It appears to 
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Figure 5.3: A photograph showing the Welsh Dragon Memorial located in 
Langemark, Belgium. 
Attribution: Llywelyn2000 [CC BY-SA 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-




reflect a desire to create strong links with the Welsh nation through the use of symbols 
that were, as Odishow commented when discussing his design, ‘instantly recognisable’.244 
In front of the memorial is a plaque which bears a red welsh dragon and an inscription in 
Welsh, English and Flemish, which reads: ‘In remembrance of all those of Welsh descent 
who took part in the First World War’ [See Figure 5.4]. 
 
It is also located within a wider ‘Welsh National Garden of Remembrance’, which includes a 
special memorial stone inscribed with the words of the first verse of the Welsh National 
Anthem, Hen Wlad Fy Nhadau (Land of My Fathers): 
Mae hen wlad fy nhadau yn annwyl I mi, Gwlad beirdd a chantorion, enwogion o 
fri; Ei gwrol ryfelwyr, gwladgarwyr tra mad, tros ryddid gollasant eu gwaed. 
 
This land of my fathers dear to me, land of poets and singers, and people of 
stature. Her brave warriors, fine patriots, shed their blood for freedom.245  [See 
Figure 5.5]. 
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The use of the Welsh Dragon and Welsh National Anthem as well as materials brought from 
Wales to construct the memorial is indicative of the extent to which symbolic and physical 
links to the Welsh nation were emphasised across the memorial site. This is reinforced by 
the fact that alternative symbols, such as the Black Chair (see below), which were both 
symbolic in Wales and more commonly associated with solemn commemoration were not 
chosen. Furthermore, the unveiling of the Welsh Dragon itself, which appeared draped in 
Figure 5.5: A photograph of the memorial stone bearing an inscription of the Welsh 
National Anthem. 
Attribution: ViennaUK [CC BY-SA 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-




the Welsh National Flag, reiterated the notion that the First World War remained 
significant in conceptions of Welsh history and identity [See Figure 5.6]. 
 
Throughout the service of dedication, in fact, physical as well as symbolic links with Wales 
abounded. It included, for example, accounts of two Welsh soldiers who lost their lives 
during the War told by two Welsh schoolboys. As part of this, the boys placed photographs 
of the soldiers of the memorial. They also ceremonially deposited soil gathered from the 
summits of Snowden, Pen Y Fon and Yr Ysgwrn, the home of Hedd Wyn, at the base of the 
Figure 5.6: A photograph showing the unveiling of the Welsh Dragon, draped in 
the Welsh flag. 
Attribution: Photograph www.greatwar.be  Accessed at: 
http://www.wo1.be/en/youwerethere/6186/service-of-dedication-of-the-




‘Cromlech’.246 In addition to this, the Hedd Wyn poem ‘Rhyfel’ (War) was read by Isgoed 
Williams and the Welsh hymn ‘Gwahoddiad’ was sung by the Welsh choir, Cor Rygbi 
Gogledd Cymru.247  Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the inauguration of the 
memorial formed part of the wider Cymru’n Cofio – Wales Remembers 2014-2018 
Programme for the First World War centenary, which emphasised the specifically Welsh 
context of the War.  
In addition to the programme of events described above, the Welsh Government 
supported a number of other commemorative initiatives. In October 2013, for example, 
then First Minister Carwyn Jones announced that the Welsh Government had ‘earmarked 
£850,000 for an educational programme to accompany commemorations’.248 It was 
intended that the money would be used to develop and produce bilingual, cross-
curriculum, learning resources ‘tailor-made’ for Welsh schools.249 The Welsh Government 
committed £76,500 of this to the ‘Wales at War’ project.250 This ‘inclusive educational 
project’ was to take the form of a digital app designed ‘enable reflection on the 
transformational impact of the First World War on life and communities in Wales’.251 It 
would ‘tell the story of Wales’ role in the conflict’ through the use of maps, statistics, 
diaries, newspapers, photographs, audio and moving image materials, all of which would 
have ‘a particular Welsh resonance’.252 In announcing the project, for example, Carwyn 
Jones noted that it would ‘put schoolchildren at the heart of efforts to put faces and life 
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stories to the names of those who fell during the War […]. Wales at War will use local 
memorials to make clear to children the impact the First World War had on their 
community and engage pupils in local history they can see and visit with their class and 
family, ensuring the learning experience is wider than the classroom’.253 He continued, ‘the 
result will be a lasting digital record that will act as a legacy and remind future generations 
of how we in Wales remembered the sacrifice of our people during the war 100 years 
on’.254 
Furthermore, it was announced that ‘every secondary school in Wales’ would be given the 
opportunity to apply for grants of £1000 to ‘develop creative and innovative projects to 
commemorate the War and to encourage debate and discussion’.255 Within this, it was 
noted that the Welsh Government would provide schools with only ‘basic criteria along 
with a list of possible ideas to explore’.256 Rather, schools would be ‘given the freedom to 
interpret the project as they wish’ and could, therefore, ‘develop their own approaches to 
commemorating the First World War and […] utilise the imagination of teachers and pupils 
[…] to stimulate exploration of the issues that are generated by the study of the many and 
varied aspects of the First World War’.257 Here, the intention was that schools would have 
‘a leading role in developing commemoratives activities which will lead to a wider and 
more varied range of activity in Wales over the next five academic years’.258 It was also 
argued that the programme would, support projects important to the schools’ individual 
communities and thereby ‘act as a catalyst to generate local interest in history and ensure 
that pupils across Wales are able to understand the impact the war had on their own 
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community, on Wales, on the United Kingdom, and on the world’.259 Significantly, this 
contrasted with the educational initiatives introduced elsewhere in Britain. In both England 
and Scotland, for example, funding was provided to schools to enable children to visit the 
World War One battlefields. The minutes from the First World War Centenary Programme 
Board meeting held on 28 June 2013 reveal that ‘it was not felt that a similar programme 
for Wales would be appropriate’.260 In contrast to this, the focus in Wales was placed on 
encouraging children to explore the stories of men who joined up and the impact the War 
had on their local communities. As Gethin Matthews has convincingly argued, this 
represented ‘quite a different emphasis’, highlighting a different culture of remembrance 
which was ‘more a matter of community in Wales than elsewhere’.261 For Matthews, in 
fact, this was a consequence of a ‘long-standing narrative of Wales suffering more than the 
rest of Britain… or being treated worse’ both during and as a result of the War.262  
Throughout the centenary, then, the Welsh commemorations sought to emphasise a 
number of distinctive elements of ‘the Welsh Experience’ of the War. In the foreword to 
the 2014 Commemorative Programme, for example, Hopkin noted that ‘from the outset, 
the Welsh programme is designed to encompass the widest spectrum of commemoration, 
from the military and political, to the cultural and religious, with a strong emphasis on the 
international dimension’.263 Similarly, in 2013 he highlighted that ‘we will be reflecting on 
many aspects of the war and considering what it meant to the people of Wales… we will 
also be reflecting on the challenges faced by those who resisted the War or declined to 
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participate for religious or political reasons’.264 This can also be seen in the centrality of 
particular Welsh historical figures, specifically David Lloyd George and Ellis Humphrey 
Evans, within the commemorative programme. It is striking that it is the renowned Welsh-
language poet, Hedd Wyn, who garnered the most attention. Hedd Wyn was killed on 31 
July 1917, during the first day of the Battle of Pilckem Ridge. Five weeks later he was 
declared the winner of Wales’ greatest poetry prize – the National Eisteddfod chair.265 The 
empty chair was draped in black cloth and has since come to be known as ‘the Black Chair’. 
This vacant chair, and Hedd Wyn himself, subsequently became symbols of sacrifice, an 
example of the cost of war, representing all the other empty chairs throughout Wales and 
the loss of an entire generation of men. It is this, which is regarded as ‘part of the legend of 
modern Wales’.266 Speaking in November 2012, for example, Carwyn Jones stated that 
‘Hedd Wyn has a special place in our country’s history and securing his legacy is essential if 
we are to keep his story and experiences alive for future generations, especially as we 
approach the 100th anniversary of the start of the First World War’.267 The October 2012 
Cabinet Paper on the centenary, in fact, highlights that from an early stage in the planning 
process, Hedd Wyn was identified for inclusion in the programme. It notes that one 
commemorative project would be the development of ‘a major £3 million interpretative 
centre at Hedd Wyn’s home, Yr Ysgwrn, Transfynydd, through a Heritage Lottery Fund 
grant, to be opened by the centenary of his death in 2017’.268 The July 2013 Cabinet Paper 
later notes the ‘purchase of Hedd Wyn’s family farm for the nation’ and reiterates the 
intention to ‘establish an interpretative centre on the First World War to open in time for 
the centenary of Hedd Wyn’s death on 31 July 2017’.269 Similarly, it is notable that he is the 
only individual to be named in the 2013 Framework Programme under ‘The Scope of 
Programme Activities’ list of ‘initial events identified for commemoration’.270 
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Taken together, it is apparent that there were demonstrable differences in the patterns of 
official commemoration adopted by the Westminster and Welsh Governments during the 
course of the First World War centenary. This can be seen not only in the events and 
individuals selected as a focus for the commemorations, but also in the emphasis on the 
War’s wider legacy and links to ‘community’. Significantly, these differences were also 
reflected by rhetoric which was dominated by the themes of ‘remembrance and 
reconciliation’, with key figures keen to emphasise that the commemorations would in no 
way be a ‘celebration’. It is striking that many also referenced notions of peace and 
contemporary conflict. In the foreword to the 2013 Framework Programme, for example, 
Carwyn Jones wrote: ‘Wars are sadly still a part of our world and young people can take a 
great deal from understanding the causes and impact of the “Great War” into how we 
should resolve conflict in our own time’.271 Similarly, in 2012 he commented: ‘reflecting on 
the First World War will not only help us understand the past, but also help us to try and 
understand conflicts across the world today’. This sentiment was echoed in 2014, when he 
noted that ‘the commemorative period will be a time to reflect on how we can develop our 
understanding of our place in the world and work even harder to play our part towards 
conflict resolution and tolerance’.272 This is indicative of the extent to which Welsh 
commemorations drew on the perception of a distinctly Welsh tradition of pacifism.  
This section has demonstrated that the commemoration of the World Wars in Wales 
between 2007 and 2016 was significantly affected by shifts in the nature of Wales’ 
relationship with England and the wider United Kingdom. The 2007 Welsh Assembly 
elections proved significant as Plaid Cymru entered into a coalition government with the 
Labour Party. Plaid Cymru secured significant concessions and played a critical role in 
securing first a referendum on the devolution of further powers, and then a ‘yes’ vote. 
Although Plaid Cymru later lost ground at the 2011 Assembly elections, the outcome of the 
referendum proved historic in securing for Wales primary law-making powers for the first 
time. It also signalled a marked change in the politics of the union. It is striking then, that 
the Welsh Government subsequently adopted a distinctive approach to the 
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commemoration of the First World War centenary, developing a series of commemorative 
initiatives to represent the distinct experiences and legacy of the War in Wales, in addition 
to reflecting Welsh priorities such as a focus on community. 
 
Conclusion 
The politics of World War commemoration in Wales between 1994 and 2016 was 
influenced by the gradual development of the devolutionary process and resulting shifts in 
its relationships both with England and the wider United Kingdom. It has been shown that 
changes in commemoration often reflected not only the slower progression of devolution 
in Wales, compared to Scotland, but also the specific nature of Wales’ links to the Union, 
which was notably less problematic.  
This is illustrated by the Welsh engagement with the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day. As in 
Scotland, prior to the introduction of devolution in 1998, commemoration was driven by 
the Conservative Government in Westminster. Consequently, as we have already seen, it 
was dominated by Anglo-centric narratives. It is not surprising, therefore, that there were 
notable instances whereby commemorative events failed to attract significant attention or 
were broadly interpreted as the product of Tory ‘Little Englanders’ and, in turn, criticised 
for a lack of focus on ‘Wales’. The evidence, however, has also shown that there was a 
substantial amount of media coverage of and engagement with the commemorative 
events, which frequently utilised a combination of Welsh and British symbolism. 
Although the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales did not initially have an 
impact on approaches to World War commemoration, this chapter has argued that it was 
still significant for its creation of an explicitly Welsh political arena. Throughout the initial 
years of devolution, debates about the Union and the need to obtain increased powers 
remained prominent. In 2002, for example, the Richard Commission was established to 
investigate the question of further devolution. Later, in 2004, it reported in favour. It is at 
this time that discernible shifts in discussions about and approaches to the 




introduction of a ‘national’ Welsh event for Remembrance Day and the controversy which 
arose as a consequence of First Minister Rhodri Morgan’s decision not to attend the 
sixtieth anniversary of the D-Day landings. In each of these cases, links were made to the 
need to reflect the post-devolution political climate and, therefore, represent Wales as 
distinct from Britain. 
Of more significance for both debates about constitutional matters and the 
commemoration of the World Wars, however, was the electoral success of Plaid Cymru in 
2007. Plaid Cymru entered into a coalition with the Labour Party as a minority partner. The 
party gained significant policy concessions and played a key role in not only obtaining a 
referendum on the devolution of primary law-making powers to the Welsh Assembly, but 
also securing a ‘yes’ vote in March 2011. This represented a significant shift in Wales’ 
relationship with the Union and signalled, for some, the first time Wales constituted a 
national unit in its own right. It was against this background that the Welsh Government 
began to develop its plans to commemorate the First World War centenary. The evidence 
has shown that a great deal of emphasis was placed on those anniversaries/events that 
would highlight Wales’ specific contribution to the War and its legacy for the development 
of modern Wales, such as the Battles of Mametz Wood and Pilckem Ridge (during the 
Battle of Passchendaele). The rhetoric adopted and tone of events also often reflected a 
perceived Welsh tradition of pacifism and emphasis on community. Yet, it should also be 
noted that commemoration was not politicised to the same degree as in Scotland. It was 
not utilised either to promote Welsh independence or defend the Union, but rather to 
assert a distinctive history and identity in a Wales that was increasingly understood not as a 




Between 1994 and 2016 the United Kingdom, like many other countries globally, 
experienced an intensification of commemorative activity focused around the events of the 
First and Second World Wars. Certainly Europe, Australasia, and Canada shared a similar 
focus, while the USA and the Far East had their own war experiences to commemorate. 
This commemorative activity coincided with a series of political and constitutional as well 
as socio-economic, demographic and cultural shifts, which radically altered the nature of 
the political relationships between the United Kingdom and Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. These included, amongst others, the introduction and subsequent development of 
devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Peace Process 
and the Scottish independence referendum. A significant increase in immigration as well as 
generational shifts and the passing away of the World War generations were also perceived 
as influences on the events of this time.  
Taken together, such developments raise questions about how far the emergence of this 
new political climate affected both debates about and approaches to the representation 
and commemoration of the World Wars. Thus, a central argument of this thesis has been 
that these recent political developments and consequent shifts in how we perceive and 
understand both the United Kingdom and the wider British Isles have necessitated the 
adoption of new and more nuanced approaches to the study of World War memory and 
commemoration, which account for the multi-national nature of the state. This, in turn, has 
revealed a degree of complexity about the changing nature of World War commemoration, 
which has so far been overlooked in accounts of ‘British’ remembrance. Therefore, it has 
been argued that the commemoration of the World Wars and the political climate in each 
of the four nations of the United Kingdom has, in fact, been closely linked. 
It has also become apparent when considering the state-led approaches to World War 
commemoration that the Westminster Governments of John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon 
Brown and David Cameron appropriated and manipulated the commemoration of the 
World Wars as a means of both maintaining and promoting the unity of the Kingdom. As 




Wars were frequently utilised as an instrument of policy in the attempt to renew the 
significance, and indeed relevance, of the United Kingdom in a time of increasing social and 
political fragmentation.  
The evidence has shown that the fiftieth anniversaries of D-Day and VE Day in 1994 and 
1995 respectively were broadly interpreted by John Major as an opportunity to unite the 
nation amidst growing calls for devolution in both Scotland and Wales. Similarly, the 
Cameron Government’s approach to the First World War centenary, which called for a 
‘truly national commemoration’, revealed a desire to not only appeal to all four nations of 
the United Kingdom, but also draw attention to shared experiences and memories amid 
the ongoing threat of Scottish independence. 
Alongside this, Chapter One showed that both the Blair and Cameron Governments 
recognised the importance of acknowledging and emphasising diversity for the 
maintenance of the union and promotion of an overarching hegemonic ‘British’ identity. 
Wider policy objectives, then, were reflected in the commemoration of the World Wars, 
which increasingly highlighted the contributions of ethnic minority communities and the 
impact of the World Wars on a multi-cultural Britain. 
However, this thesis has also revealed that, despite a growing recognition of the breadth of 
World War experiences, commemoration continued to draw on pre-existing ‘British’ and 
overwhelmingly Anglo-centric narratives of the World Wars focused on ‘British’ values and 
ideals. Consequently, debates about and the remembrance of previously overlooked 
groups tended to integrate their experiences within the dominant narratives, stressing the 
extent to which they fought and died for ‘Britain’ and the ‘British Empire’. 
The relationship between the modern British monarchy and the commemoration of the 
World Wars as of yet has not received any sustained attention by historians. In 
consideration of the significance of the monarchy as a source of union as well as its 
importance as ceremonial Head of State, this thesis has considered it important to include 
an analysis of that relationship. The monarchy and the British royal family have been ever-
present in commemorative events whilst iconography traditionally associated with the 




the wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton in 2011. While much of this involvement 
was a direct consequence of the constitutional duties incumbent in the sovereign’s position 
as ‘Head of State’, this thesis has argued that the monarchy has also played a significant 
‘symbolic’ role in commemoration for three interlinked reasons. 
First, the continuity of the monarchy created by its hereditary nature as well as the 
longevity of key royal figures, including Queen Elizabeth II and the Queen Mother, helped 
to establish a sense of stability and permanence, providing familiarity and reassurance, 
particularly in times of significant change. This was due to their ability to connect the past 
with the present, by providing a common thread spanned the decades. As we have seen in 
Chapter Two this was reinforced within commemorative events, such as the fiftieth 
anniversary of VE Day, which frequently drew attention to the role the monarchy played 
during the World Wars. Significantly, this both provided a direct link to the historical events 
themselves, but in doing so highlighted narratives that have become associated with the 
World Wars in the public consciousness, such as the strength and resilience of a nation 
which came together, united in war.  
Second, this continuity, in part, allows the sovereign to act as the ‘Head of Nation’, a term 
first coined by Antony Jay. This refers to the monarchy’s ability to embody and represent 
the nation in its entirety, regardless of politics, religion, nationality, class, gender, age or 
any other defining factors. The responsibility of the monarchy is to act as a ‘symbol of 
unity’ by not only transcending national and societal divisions, but also highlighting shared 
histories, experiences and common bonds. Through their involvement in World War 
commemoration, therefore, members of the royal family draw attention to these bonds 
allowing the nation to come together in shared remembrance. 
Third, the ability of the British monarchy to act as a ‘symbol of unity’ has been enhanced in 
the period under discussion by the increased involvement of other members of the royal 
family in the public sphere. Following the argument of Walter Bagehot, it has been shown 
that the concept of a Royal ‘family’ not only makes the monarchy more relatable, but also 




the Duke and Duchess of Sussex, for example, are commonly regarded as connecting 
younger generations with the institution of the monarchy and, therefore, the Union. 
It is clear when analysing the commemoration of the World Wars in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland that throughout all of them the changes to the politics of the Union had a 
significant impact on the tone, focus and narratives of official commemorative events as 
well as the debates and discussions surrounding them. The evidence shows that in each of 
these nations devolution, and (in Northern Ireland) the Peace Process, decisively changed 
the political landscape through the (re)establishment of the Scottish Parliament, National 
Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly. These representative bodies were able 
to address specific national concerns and issues. It is apparent that in the years following 
this, approaches to World War commemoration began to shift, frequently diverging from 
the overarching ‘British’ and Anglo-centric narratives that had previously dominated and 
continued to be employed by the Westminster Government. While there were 
demonstrable similarities in the development of World War commemoration, the analysis 
also revealed that in each of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland changes approaches to 
commemoration predominantly reflected the specific national circumstances surrounding 
the introduction of devolution and subsequent political developments. 
It was in Northern Ireland, that the politics of World War commemoration were most 
decisively affected by shifts in inter-Irish and Anglo-Irish political relationships. As we have 
seen in Chapter Three, the most significant of these was the emergence and development 
of the Northern Ireland Peace Process, which resulted in the signing of the Good Friday, or 
Belfast, Agreement on 10 April 1998. In building on the work of historians such as Richard 
Grayson and Keith Jeffery, this thesis has sought to demonstrate that through the easing of 
political, religious and sectarian tensions the Peace Process ultimately helped to create an 
environment in which divergent and divisive memories of the First World War could be 
rehabilitated amongst nationalist communities. This enabled politicians belonging first to 
the SDLP and, later, Sinn Fein, to take significant steps towards engaging with 
commemorative ceremonies. Perhaps the most significant intervention was made by Alex 
Maskey, the first Sinn Fein Lord Mayor of Belfast, in 2002 when he laid a laurel wreath in an 




This thesis has also highlighted that while this new atmosphere of reconciliation allowed 
such acts of commemoration to take place, the commemoration of the World Wars 
simultaneously became a forum in which the Peace Process could be both reinforced and 
further advanced. This was apparent throughout the opening of the Island of Ireland Peace 
Tower in 1998 and especially, as also discussed in Chapter Two, in the 2011 Royal Visit to 
the Republic of Ireland. In Northern Ireland, therefore, the narratives employed within the 
commemoration of the World Wars increasingly emphasised all-Ireland commonalities and 
shared experiences in an attempt not only to draw communities together, but also to 
establish closer political relationships with both the wider United Kingdom and the 
Republic of Ireland. In the years following 1998, the language employed throughout the 
commemoration of the World Wars, focused on a ‘parity of esteem’, ‘inclusivity’ 
‘reconciliation’ and ‘togetherness’, was that of the Peace Process. 
In many ways, the changes taking place in the nature of World War commemoration in 
Northern Ireland appeared to represent the inverse of those occurring in Scotland and 
Wales. As Chapters Four and Five have sought to demonstrate, in both Scotland and Wales 
official approaches to commemoration increasingly emphasised the uniqueness of their 
experiences, differentiating them from the overarching ‘British’ and predominantly ‘Anglo-
centric’ narratives employed by the Westminster Government. In Northern Ireland, 
however, the commemoration of the World Wars was utilised to try and established 
stronger bonds with both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. 
Prior to the introduction of devolution the commemoration of the World Wars in Scotland 
was driven by Westminster and a Conservative Government. Consequently, it was 
dominated by Anglo-centric narratives, which largely overlooked the individual experiences 
of the individual nations within the UK. This exacerbated a growing sense of divergence 
between Scotland, England and the wider United Kingdom, as political relationships were 
placed under strain by the policies of an increasingly unpopular Conservative Government. 
The evidence has suggested that it was for this reason that the Scottish engagement with 





The introduction of devolution in 1998 and opening of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, 
however, created a new political climate in which not only further constitutional debate 
took place, but the commemoration of the World Wars was increasingly used as a means of 
highlighting the need for further autonomy and establishing a distinct Scottish identity. This 
was apparent in the Scottish Parliamentary debate about granting pardons to soldiers shot 
for cowardice and desertion during the First World War, which focused explicitly on the 
Scottish soldiers who were executed. 
This thesis has also argued that in Scotland, it was the election of the Scottish National 
Party (SNP) first in 2007, as a minority government, and then again in 2011, with a majority, 
which had perhaps the most significant impact on not only constitutional debates, but also 
the commemoration of the World Wars. This was largely a consequence of the SNP’s 
commitment to achieving Scottish independence. It has been shown that the SNP 
Government adopted a distinctive approach to the First World War centenary, focusing on 
events of specific relevance for Scotland including the Battles of Loos and Arras. 
Furthermore, the analysis also revealed that much of the rhetoric surrounding the 
commemorations adopted a more downbeat tone than those of the Westminster 
Government, focusing overwhelmingly on the consequences of the War for Scotland. 
Throughout the campaign for Scottish independence, which coincided with the hundredth 
anniversary of the start of World War One, commemoration became politicised in Scotland 
as Scottish Nationalists tended to emphasise the perceived disproportionate sacrifice of 
Scotland, drawing on the War not only to highlight a specifically ‘Scottish’ history and 
identity, but in some instances as an example of why Scotland needed independence. 
In the years leading up to (and including) 1998 the commemoration and remembrance of 
the World Wars in Wales, which was also driven by Westminster, was taking place in a 
political climate in which the nature of the relationship between England and Wales was 
beginning to change. This was apparent in the growth of calls for a more democratic 
political process, which were in response to Conservative governance in Wales. In contrast 
to Scotland, however, while this did result in notable instances of apathy towards and 
criticism of the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day, Chapter Five argued that the level of 




number of street parties and other celebrations held as well as the newspaper coverage 
the events received.  
Following the landslide victory of the Labour Party in the 1997 General Election, a 
referendum on the devolution of political powers to Wales was held which achieved a 
narrow ‘Yes’ vote. While the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales in 1999 was 
significant for its creation of an explicitly Welsh political arena, Chapter Five demonstrated 
that it did not initially have a substantial impact on the tone and focus of World War 
commemoration. This was due to the combination of both the limited nature of devolution 
and the domination of Labour-led Governments in London and Cardiff as well as the long 
and intertwined history of Wales’ association with England and the United Kingdom. 
In the years immediately following devolution, however, debates regarding the nature of 
the devolutionary arrangement and the extension of the Assembly’s powers continued. It 
was during this period that discernible shifts in discussions about World War 
commemoration become apparent, first in 2002 and later 2004. In 2002, for example, a 
‘national' event for Remembrance Day in Wales was introduced. Although this initiative 
was driven by the Welsh Office in Westminster, debates revealed that it was broadly 
interpreted by political figures in Wales as an appropriate step to reflect the new post-
devolution political climate. Similarly, in 2004 First Minister Rhodri Morgan was heavily 
criticised by politicians and the public alike for his decision not to attend the 
commemorations in Normandy for the sixtieth anniversary of the D-Day landings. This was 
on the basis that in his capacity as ‘First Minister’, it was felt he should have been there to 
represent the Welsh war dead and veterans as well as the Welsh ‘nation’. 
It is also evident that in Wales the election of Plaid Cymru in 2007, as the election of the 
SNP in Scotland, was significant for the advancement of debates about devolution and 
Wales’s relationship with the United Kingdom. The involvement of Plaid Cymru as the 
minority partner in a coalition with the Labour Party between 2007 and 2011 was crucial in 
securing first a referendum and then a ‘yes’ vote in (2011 in) favour of further devolution 
and the introduction of primary legislative powers. This signalled a marked change in the 




evidence suggests, for some commentators was the first time Wales represented a distinct 
national unit as opposed to a ‘province’. Notably, it was in the years following this, that the 
Welsh Government developed and subsequently implemented Cymru’n Cofio – Wales 
Remembers 1914-1918, the official programme of events for the First World War 
centenary. This thesis has argued that the Welsh Government adopted a distinctive 
approach to the commemorations, emphasising anniversaries that highlighted Wales’ 
specific and distinctive contributions to the war effort as well as the transformational 
impact it had on the development of modern Wales.  
This thesis has analysed the relationship between the commemoration of the World Wars 
and the politics of the Union as a means to explore the wider issues relating to policy 
making, national identity and the use of official memory to retain a sense of unity. It has 
also sought to highlight complexities arising from the politics of the Union and add a new 
dimension to our knowledge of official, state-led commemorative practices. The 
examination of the role of the monarchy as both a source of union and as having a 
ceremonial role in commemorative events has attempted to somewhat redress the balance 
of a lack of any sustained historical attention. 
It has sought to interrogate and problematise a framework commonly used by historians 
which tends to view the United Kingdom as a singular entity, meaning that 
commemoration has frequently been analysed in terms of an overarching ‘British’ 
remembrance of the World Wars. The single most significant contribution made by this 
thesis, then, has been to show how ‘commemoration’ was the means to advance distinct – 
ultimately contrasting and incompatible – political projects. The examination of the 
relationship between World War commemoration and the politics of the Union has 
illustrated the extent to which, in the post-devolution period, the narratives, tone and 
focus of commemoration in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland increasingly diverged 
from the ‘British’ narratives employed by the Westminster Governments and the monarchy 
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